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INTRODUCTION: IS GOD ATEMPORAL OR TEMPORAL? 
 
It seems that from the inception of western civilization as we know it the question of 
the nature of our time has been prominent.  In fact, Sherover has claimed that “it was concern 
with the nature of time and change that first provoked the Western development of rational 
thinking about the world…”1  Thinking about time, though, has experienced the ebb and flow 
of history that is typical of any subject, where at certain epochs the issue was more 
recognized than at others.  Among the many important contributions of twentieth century 
thought has been a renewed interest in the nature of time2 and the correlate to this 
phenomenon has been the resurgence within Christian thought of the relationship of God and 
time.   
Even though for centuries philosophers and theologians have grappled with the topic, 
since Augustine (354-430) the basic view that God is atemporal has ruled the tradition.3  The 
Medieval Scholastics devoted more energy to the question than anyone else, either following 
Augustine or building upon his foundation.4  Since this medieval period, however, Christian 
theology has only tangentially treated the matter, normally taking the shape of a perpetuation 
                                                 
1 Charles M. Sherover, Are We In Time?: And Other Essays on Time and Temporality, ed., Gregory R. Johnson 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 3. 
2 Ibid.  Some of the most influential thinkers are: J. M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, vol.2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927); Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New 
York: Bantam, 1988); Stephen Hawking and Roger Penrose, The Nature of Space and Time (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); D. H. Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); 
Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, ed., Maria Reichenbach (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1956); and J. J. C. Smart, Language and Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).  
3 What I intend by the predicate “atemporal” is a being that lacks temporal location and extension.  That is, God 
is atemporal in the sense that he did not exist before today, nor will he exist tomorrow, for to say this is to affirm 
that he is contained within the “now” of time and to be eternal God must be free from any sort of containment.  
This is what it means to say God lacks temporal location.  Additionally, God lacks temporal extension in that he 
does not have duration within time.  So, it would be logically possible to assert that God has temporal location 
without duration, but not the reverse.  That God lacks both temporal location and extension is what in this thesis 
I will categorize as atemporal, which is the version that can most closely be identified with the Christian 
tradition.  To this see, Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002), 6-
15.  But, as I have already stated, it is possible that God has temporal location without temporal extension—at 
least, the type of extension that loses to the past and anticipates the future.  This kind of possibility could be 
labeled “timeless” in that God’s temporality has location within our time, but extension that is uniquely his own.  
This thesis is an argument for a repudiation of atemporality in favor of timelessness in this specific sense.  
4 The most prominent patristic and medieval thinkers on this subject are the following: Augustine, Confessions, 
trans., Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), XI; Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 
trans., P. G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anselm, Proslogion, trans., ed., M. J. 
Charlesworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica and Summa Contra 
Gentiles; John Duns Scotus, A Treatise on God as First Principle, 2nd ed., ed., trans., Allan B. Wolter (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1966; and William of Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future 
Contingents, 2nd ed., trans., Marilyn Adams and Norman Kretzmann (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983).   
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of divine atemporality within a brief discussion on eternity,5 and certainly not in any 
thorough, scholastic sort of sense.  Therefore, that God is atemporal has been the given within 
theology, and I would argue, at least at the grassroots level, that remains the case. 
Yet philosophical challenges to this conception arose with Kant’s first Critique when 
he proclaimed the primacy of time for human understanding.6 
 
Kant’s essential argument here is to challenge the entire tradition in its postulation of 
atemporal or supratemporal concepts as the source of cognitive truth.  Against all 
rationalisms…, Kant argued that the human understanding is only able to obtain 
knowledge of the world in which it finds itself by the use of concepts which are 
temporally structured and which are thereby qualified to enter into the field of time in 
which all our experience transpires.7 
 
The Kantian challenge for theology (or, better, an aspect of it) was to explain exactly how an 
atemporal God could be apprehended within human cognition that is temporally bounded.  
The conclusion to this dilemma was that since “timeless concepts are not cognitive and that 
the only ways in which we can make legitimate cognitive claims about the world as we 
perceive it is to use concepts that are temporally structured,”8 then it would be impossible to 
obtain knowledge of an atemporal entity.  Further, if our cognition of the world and not the 
world in itself becomes primary, then time and not space is the fundamental dimension of 
human existence.9  The challenge would prove to be one taken very seriously both by 
philosophy and theology, indeed, much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be 
understood as a movement toward some kind of resolution between the world as it is and our 
experience of it; or, what we can know in ourselves and what it is that grounds or enables that 
knowledge.   
                                                 
5 As in Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, eds., H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1976), 203-06. 
6 Critique of Pure Reason (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996). 
7 Charles M. Sherover, ed., The Human Experience of Time: The Development of Its Philosophic Meaning 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1975), 114.  Hereafter referred to as HET, followed by page 
number. 
8 Ibid., 115.  Of course, in Kantian terms, time and space are functions of the mind and not necessarily the way 
the world is in itself.  Our knowledge of the world is essentially temporal and that which is outside that temporal 
cognition may exist but cannot be attained by means of that cognition.  See Andrew Bowie, Introduction to 
German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 14. 
9 Ibid., 118.  Below we will discover that this is a critique of Barth from Richard Roberts, i.e. that his theology 
as a whole hangs on his conception of time and eternity.  I will argue there that this overstates the case, yet it 
does appear that Barth is willing to articulate his theology within the context of Kant’s temporal challenge, 
demonstrated by the fact of his lengthy explanation of how the Kantian challenge, i.e. time and eternity, is 
answered by God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.  See his, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its 
Background and History, trans., Brian Cozens and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 2001), 290-98. 
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 This effort comes into sharp relief through the philosophy of Hegel whose attempts to 
ground our existence in time and history nevertheless could not be freed from an intrinsic 
connection with the timeless, static eternity.  Hegel insisted that our time is dynamic, that 
only the present is actual, and that our time is a constant movement of the present negating 
that which by such negation becomes the past.  Time is a linear movement of “presents.”  
Yet, the dynamic nature of our history is grounded in the eternal Present that does not move 
and, in turn, grounds our temporal presents.   
 
Seeking to understand the nuances of dynamic existence, Hegel, in the end, rooted the 
temporal in the non-temporal, discovered the dynamic in the static, derived 
contingency from necessity, and grounded time in eternity.  Advocating concreteness, 
he found the existential concrete in the abstractions of logical formulas…Subjecting 
time to logic, we see here, as Gilson once observed, that “logic has eaten up the whole 
of reality.”10 
 
The echoes of charges laid at Karl Barth’s door, as we will see, are striking, yet not without 
remedy.11   
The resurgence in the twentieth century of the preoccupation with time has taken the 
form of a strict analysis of temporal concepts and a continued concern with what it means to 
experience time.12  Additionally, Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity has raised questions 
regarding any possibility we might have of reaching a uniform understanding of time.  
Philosophy and science have continued to search for that elusive, all-encompassing 
description of temporality as the way things are and temporality as we experience it.  This, in 
                                                 
10 Sherover, HET, 162. 
11 Barth’s own perspective on Hegel can be seen in his Protestant Theology, 370-407.  While in some respects 
his doctrine of time may indeed stand on Hegel’s shoulders he is nonetheless critical of him in particular 
regarding God’s freedom.  “Hegel, in making the dialectical method of logic the essential nature of God, made 
impossible the knowledge of the actual dialectic of grace, which has its foundation in the freedom of God” 
(406).  Hegel’s Trinity cannot be identified with Barth’s centrally due to the former’s equating of it with a 
logical concept, rather than with God’s gracious freedom to reveal himself as Father, Son, and Spirit.  I believe 
that this focus upon the trinitarian personal event is the key to understanding time and eternity.  Additionally, 
the relationship of Barth, Jenson, and Hegel would be an interesting one, but one that falls outside of this thesis.  
I am primarily interested in the priority that Barth and Jenson give to Trinity, how that determines their view of 
time and eternity, and where these two thinkers converge and diverge.  I must leave the question of Hegel’s role 
in their theologies to the side, for the diversion would be too great and would steer us away from our central 
interlocutors.  For more on Hegel’s view of time and eternity see his Lectures of 1824 in, Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, Volume III: The Consummate Religion, ed., Peter C. Hodgson, trans., R. F. Brown, P. C. 
Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 185-98; Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans., A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 486-90; The Philosophy of Nature, trans., 
A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), §§ 257-61.  On Hegel’s relationship to Christianity and 
especially his doctrine of God see, Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005), 124-52; Peter C. 
Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 127-40; and William Desmond, Hegel’s God: A Counterfeit Double? 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 145-51. 
12 Sherover, HET, 261-77, 437-65. 
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turn, has had its impact on the world of Christian theology, especially regarding the 
implications for an understanding of God’s eternity, and only in the last twenty or thirty years 
have theologians and Christian philosophers of religion begun to reexamine the received 
doctrine of divine atemporality.  Most have done so in the wake of these philosophical and 
scientific challenges, combined with an unease concerning the tradition’s seeming disregard 
of the picture the Bible presents of God’s close relationship to time and change.13  There is a 
strong and sustained movement away from the traditional doctrine of atemporality—that 
much is certain.  What is less clear is the shape of alternative proposals.  That is, much of the 
work done by Christian philosophers has primarily centered on the argument for a dynamic or 
process view of our time, as opposed to a version of time that would be more conducive to an 
atemporal eternity.  How that dynamic view of time accords with the God to which the Bible 
testifies is on the whole uncharted territory.  Thus, in my judgment, what Christian theology 
needs, not as a replacement to the philosophical work undertaken as a response to specific 
challenges but rather as a supplement to it, is a theology of time and eternity that links current 
opinions with God’s own self-revelation.  I will embark upon this task by considering some 
recent proposals on time within the context of comparing and contrasting the theological 
approach to the topic of time and eternity of Karl Barth14 and Robert W. Jenson.   
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the continuing search for a way of 
understanding the relationship of God’s eternity to our temporality, but to do so from eternity 
as the starting point, rather than the nature of our time.  That is, God’s self-revelation as 
Father, Son, and Spirit reveals what his eternity is, and, given that he is in relation to our 
world as Creator and, consummately, in Jesus Christ, he has priority to determine the nature 
of both eternity and time.15  I do not dispute the contributions of the philosophers of religion 
that begin with time and move toward eternity, but, as I will argue throughout the thesis, true 
statements about God must spring from God himself, thus a theological approach to time and 
eternity seems to me to be the foundation of the doctrinal structure. 
                                                 
13 See, for example, James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (Naperville: IL: Alec R. Allenson, 1969).  The pitfalls, 
in my view, of the tradition’s adherence to atemporality will be demonstrated below. 
14 My interest in Barth also is due to the burgeoning Barth scholarship, primarily in the English-speaking world.  
Indeed, most published works in the last twenty-five years on Barth have English as their primary language and 
most of Barth’s major works are now in English.  Further, the only full-length work published on Barth’s view 
of time and eternity was by an English-speaking author.  It is reasonable to accomplish the task of this thesis 
working principally within the English language sources.  I will make reference to German sources as necessary, 
but enough has been written in English to garner an accurate picture of Barth’s doctrine of time and eternity. 
15 Thus, the fear that this approach is little more than a regression to Greek metaphysics as the speculation of 
what a divine being (any divine being) should look like is assuaged by its dependence upon what comes to us 
from God, not what we posit concerning him. 
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This chapter will briefly outline the most relevant arguments for and against divine 
atemporality.  It will serve to demonstrate an opinion of this thesis, namely, we should 
understand God as temporal in some sense and the view that has characterized the tradition is 
unacceptable for Christian theology.  The remainder of the thesis will compare and contrast 
Barth and Jenson on the possibility of divine temporality and what that sense would entail, 
followed by a critical engagement of both that, hopefully, will contribute to the broader 
discussion on time and eternity. 
 
Arguments for Divine Atemporality 
 
Aquinas, building on Aristotle’s Physics, argues for God’s atemporality from his 
understanding of simplicity and immutability, and he arrives at a definition for each through 
the via negativa, i.e. by describing what he is not.16  God is simple because he is not 
composite, for being composite entails change and individuality in terms of form and matter.  
What does it mean that God lacks individuality in form and matter?  For Aquinas, everything 
that exists in this world has form and matter.  The form of something is what it is in actuality.  
For example, it is what makes a particular dog a dog.  The dog may be black, but if it were 
somehow turned white, it would not cease to be a dog but only be described as a white dog.  
Certainly the dog is different, but, for Aquinas, the change has not been “substantial,” only 
“accidental.”17  On the other hand, if the dog dies, then its form substantially changes and 
becomes something other than a dog, namely, a corpse.  So, form is necessarily connected to 
an individual thing, in our example, a dog.  Matter is also something that is necessary to 
individuals, but it is the opposite of form.18  Davies is helpful in this regard: 
 
It is that by which something having a nature might cease to have it and turn into 
something else…Matter, for Aquinas, is opposed to form.  Form is that by which 
something actually is, while matter is that by which what it is might not be.  In other 
words, in thinking of matter Aquinas has in mind a historical line (though not a 
quantity of actual imperishable stuff) running through a series of perishings and 
comings to be.19 
 
                                                 
16 See Colin E. Gunton, Act and Being Towards a Theology of Divine Attributes (London: SCM Press, 2002). 
17 For a good discussion on Aquinas’s ideas in this regard see, Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 45-51. 
18 For a detailed treatment of Aquinas’s teaching on matter see, Christopher Hughes, “Matter and Actuality in 
Aquinas,” in Brian Davies, ed., Thomas Aquinas: Comtemporary Philosophical Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 61-76. 
19 Ibid., 48. 
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Aquinas, then, regards matter as existing only potentially, dependent on its form, not 
possessing substance, property, or attribute.20  Based on these definitions of form and matter, 
Aquinas develops his idea of the individual.  What makes a person who she is, as opposed to 
another person, is not characteristics such as height, hair color, etc., for saying that they are 
individuals based on such accidentals is already presupposing their individuality.21  Neither 
can individuality be understood in terms of essence or nature (substantial form), because two 
people who are essentially human beings share that fact and it is not something unique to 
them.22  Aquinas concludes that matter, which in this world cannot be separated from a 
physical body, distinguishes individuals.   
Therefore, for Aquinas to assert God’s simplicity is to say that he is not subject to 
substantial change, nor is he composed of form and matter.  Matter is the thing that causes 
something not to be.  There can be no potentiality in God, only pure form, so he is not an 
individual as we normally understand them to be.23  Furthermore, to identify a human being 
is to say that they exist because of their nature.  But we have seen that the nature of being a 
human is something that is shared; hence, one is not identical to human nature, but it is 
something one possesses.24  This is not the case for God.  God, not composed of either form 
or matter, is simple in that he is identical to his own nature.25 
For Aquinas, simplicity is linked to immutability.  Being simple God is identical with 
his nature, so nothing can be added to it for that would imply potentiality, and Aquinas 
believes that anything having potentiality undergoes change.  Additionally, Aquinas believes 
that God is changeless because he is the first cause of all change in the world.  If the first 
cause were mutable, then something else must exert change upon it, thus undermining the 
very idea of a first cause, and Aquinas clearly affirms that there cannot be an infinite number 
of first causes.26  These concepts directly impact his doctrine of divine eternality.  Aquinas 
believes that creatures bound by time inescapably undergo ontological change.  Again, 
relying on Aristotle’s Physics he argues that time measures change, and without change there 
is no time.  Strictly speaking, time is not itself change, but it is incomprehensible to speak of 
the passing of time apart from change.  Every being subjected to time must have past, 
                                                 
20 ST, Ia. 76. 7. 
21 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 49. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Summa Contra Gentiles, trans., ed., James F. Anderson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 
I, 16-17, 100-03.  Hereafter, I will refer to this work as SG, followed by book number, chapter and page. 
24 Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 52. 
25 ST, Ia. 3. 3. 
26 ST, Ia. 9. 1.  
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present, and future, and this is precisely what it means to change.  Since time and change are 
bound together Aquinas must say that God is not subject to time.  He explains: 
 
As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must 
we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the 
numbering of movement by “before” and “after.”  For since succession occurs in 
every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and 
after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of 
before and after in movement.  The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea 
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.  Hence, as God is 
supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal.27 
 
Therefore, based on the nature of time as inextricably bound to change and on God as 
essentially simple and immutable (in a strong sense) Aquinas argues that God must be 
atemporal.     
Giving classic expression to God’s eternity, Boethius argues that if God were 
temporal as we are, he would not possess all his life at once, and failing to do so would 
disqualify one from being eternal.  A being that loses life to the past or anticipates its future, 
or that is subject to time in that it is merely everlasting cannot be eternal.  Rather, the eternal 
being possesses his life at once without loss or anticipation.  He states: “So what does rightly 
claim the title of eternal is that which grasps and possesses simultaneously the entire fullness 
of life without end; no part of the future is lacking to it, and no part of the past has escaped 
it.”28  Thus, Boethius assumes that if God is indeed a “life,” then he must live it, i.e. it must 
have duration, for the life that is an instantaneous point is not a life, and, further, could not be 
the God of the scripture.  But this raises an interesting concept and one that has relevance for 
this thesis: can there exist an eternity with duration?  That is, can there be an eternity that has 
duration yet without any temporal extension—that does not have any earlier or later 
moments?  Two recent efforts to justify Boethius’s theory come from Stump and 
Kretzmann29 and Brian Leftow.30  Additionally, (and more to our point) Barth favorably 
quotes Boethius’s definition, though he works out his definition of eternity in a much 
different fashion that the aforementioned philosophers.  Nevertheless, we find similarities 
                                                 
27 ST, 1a. 10. 1. 
28 Consolation, 5.6, 111.     
29 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981),  
30 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 125-46.  Both Stump and 
Kretzmann and Leftow argue in detail for the possibility of a durational eternity, though this is disputed on two 
levels: first, whether they have accurately read Boethius, and second, whether such a concept can exist in 
relation to dynamic temporality.  Interestingly, temporalists are not the only ones to dispute the idea of a 
durational eternity.  See, for example, Paul Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” Four Views: God and Time, ed., 
Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 37. 
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between Barth and Boethius, principally in language, e.g. Barth’s reine Dauer (pure 
duration).  Barth will follow Boethius in positing an eternity that possesses temporality and in 
viewing our time as dynamic (process).  Nevertheless, for all the disparity between 
commentators on Boethius, it at least seems clear that he was not advocating some kind of 
divine temporality that would resemble one of the contemporary options.  For Boethius, if 
God was not timeless,31 then some of his existence would be past and some would be future, 
thus lacking aspects of his existence.  God can lack nothing necessary to him, thus Boethius 
considers his timelessness crucial to maintain his full immutability and omniscience.  
 One final argument for atemporality comes from Paul Helm and it considers the 
ramifications of a temporal view of God for divine spatiality.32  Helm’s argument is an 
attempt to lend credence to the idea of divine atemporality by countering assertions for divine 
temporality with parallel arguments that would necessarily cause God to be spatial (in Helm’s 
view).  The first argument is one from “indexicals” from Nicholas Wolterstorff.33  Helm 
frames Wolterstorff’s argument in the following manner: from 
(1) The kettle is boiling 
we can infer 
(2) The kettle is boiling at present 
From 
(3) The kettle boils on 19th January  
we cannot infer (2). 
 
What we discover from this is that (3) does not tell us that the kettle is boiling at the present 
time as (1) does.  So, if one does not know temporally where one is in relation to when the 
kettle boils and when January 19 is, then one cannot know when (1) is actually true.  
Someone can only know that (1) is true if they know when it happens, since every event is 
necessarily temporally indexed.34  Wolterstorff believes that God can only know true events, 
and since all events are temporally indexed, on Helm’s scheme there are things he cannot 
know, i.e. the past and future.35 
                                                 
31 Interpreters of Boethius argue as to his specific definitions and intentions regarding God and time.  I fear that 
he can be used by varying positions to say whatever one wants him to say, but it is difficult for me to see exactly 
how he would fall outside the basic Augustinian tradition.  The impetus for these thinkers in the tradition was to 
preserve God from temporal contamination, and Boethius affirms a similar view.  See Garrett J. DeWeese, God 
and the Nature of Time (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 134-45, hereafter referred to as GNT, followed by page 
number, and Pike, 10-15. 
32 Paul Helm, “God and Spacelessness,” Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds., Steven M. Cahn and David 
Shatz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 99-110. 
33 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds., Steven M. Cahn and 
David Shatz, 77-98.  We will examine Wolterstorff’s theory in some more detail below. 
34 Helm, “God and Spacelessness,” 100-01. 
35 Of course, Wolterstorff believes all this is true, if we view God as atemporal.  He does not believe that God 
has incomplete knowledge.   God, according to Wolterstorff, has complete knowledge because he is temporal. 
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 Helm’s counter to this indexical argument is simply to replace “time” with “space.”  It 
goes like this: while from 
(1) The kettle is boiling here 
we can infer 
(2) The kettle is boiling at this place, i.e., where I am or we are 
we cannot infer (2) from  
(3) The kettle is boiling in the Old Kent Road.36 
 
The application to God should become obvious.  God can only know that an event 
takes place “here” if it is truly occurring.  Further, he cannot know that the kettle is boiling at 
Old Kent Road unless he occupies that particular space.  According to Helm, we must 
concede some ignorance on God’s part in regard to where things take place if we follow this 
line of thought.37  Helm’s conclusion is that most theists (either for or against divine 
timelessness) are not willing to concede God’s spatiality, nor should they.  Thus, Helm views 
God’s spacelessness and atemporality as necessary to maintaining the proper view of God.38   
     
Arguments for Divine Temporality 
 
First, Wolterstorff argues for God’s temporality because the scripture represents him 
as such.  No atemporalist would object that scripture presents God as acting within time, but 
rather would affirm it as fervently as Wolterstorff does.  Interestingly, even an atemporalist as 
conservative as Helm admits that scripture does not present an airtight case for divine 
atemporality; however, he believes it does not contradict atemporality, and may favor it.39  
Over against the scripture’s apparent testimony of God’s temporality the bulk of Christian 
history affirms his atemporality.  What does Wolterstorff make of this?  He posits three 
defenses for his position:   
1) Wolterstorff proceeds on the hermeneutical principle that “an implication of one’s 
accepting Scripture as canonical is that one will affirm as literally true Scripture’s 
representation of God unless one has good reason not to do so.”40  The “good reason for not 
doing so” amounts to whether a “literal interpretation conflicts with ‘purity of life or 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 101-02. 
37 Ibid., 102.  Helm also dialogues with two other arguments for divine temporality, applying the same “space-
formula” for both.  See, 102-07. 
38 Space does not allow a thorough discussion of Augustine’s view of the nature of time and eternity.  See his 
Confessions, XI; Christopher Kirwan, Augustine (London: Routledge, 1989), 151-86; Roland J. Teske, S.J., 
Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996); and Paul Helm, Faith 
and Understanding (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 79-103. 
39 Helm, “Divine Timeless Eternity,” Four Views: God and Time, 32. 
40 Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” Four Views: God and Time, 188.  
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soundness of doctrine.’”41  Obviously for him, divine temporality does not provide such a 
conflict, so there is no reason to believe that God is not ontologically exactly as the Bible 
presents him to be, i.e. temporal. 
2) Wolterstorff also believes that the passages used to support atemporality do not 
actually succeed in doing so; in fact, they really favor an everlasting view.  Further, he says 
that the passages used to support God’s immutable ontology, when taken in context refer to 
other things such as covenant fidelity and God as a constant source of good. 42  
3) Finally, Wolterstorff believes that Platonic and Neo-Platonic sources inescapably 
influenced the classical, Christian writers’ interpretation of scripture.43 
Wolterstorff believes God must be temporal because the scripture presents him as 
such, and, secondly, God must be temporal for him to know temporally indexed statements.  
He paraphrases Aquinas: 
 
In no case does the temporality of the event that God acts with respect to infect the 
event of his acting.  On the contrary, his acting with respect to some temporal event is 
itself invariably an everlasting event.  So whenever the biblical writers use temporal-
event language to describe God’s actions, they are to be interpreted as thereby 
claiming that God acts with respect to some temporal event.  They are not to be 
interpreted as claiming that God’s acting is itself a temporal event.44 
 
To refute this theory from Thomas that God’s actions with respect to temporal events are not 
in themselves temporal, Wolterstorff argues based on God’s knowledge of a given temporal 
event.45  For someone to know that an event is happening, that event has to be occurring now.  
Every event has a beginning and an ending.  No one can know that an event is happening 
before it occurs, and once it ends no one can know that it is occurring.  Therefore, one can 
only know that an event occurs due to its temporal nature.  That is, the observer of a given 
event is not divorced from the time constraint of the event she is observing.  It necessarily 
affects her.  This, Wolterstorff reasons, is precisely why God is not atemporal.  God knows 
all that has happened, does happen, and will happen, and at least some of these events are 
temporally indexed, therefore, God must be temporal.  Further, in order for God to respond to 
an agent, he must know when that agent does something, which means that he must know 
temporal (tensed) facts.  If one knows when something is happening, then they have present 
knowledge that it is happening only as long as it does, then it becomes past.  If God has 
                                                 
41 Wolterstorff, “Response to Critics,” in Four Views: God and Time, 227. 
42 For his exposition of these passages see, Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” 190-93. 
43 Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” 78. 
44 Ibid., 91. 
45 Ibid., 93-5. 
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present-tensed knowledge of facts, then there is change in God’s knowledge, because those 
events become past, as they were once future.  So, if that is the case, then God has a history, 
therefore God is temporal.46  Wolterstorff believes that if God were atemporal, he would have 
no way to intervene in time because he has no tensed knowledge, i.e. he does not know the 
exact moment when an event is occurring.  Wolterstorff does not mean that God cannot know 
something like, “South Carolina secedes from the union in 1860.”  He can know the time 
every event occurs without being temporal, but he cannot know when an event is actually 
occurring without having temporal knowledge.47   
 Consider further two arguments from Richard Swinburne.48  The first notes the 
ramifications of God’s eternal present.  If, according to Swinburne, the theory of atemporality 
is correct, then God is simultaneously present with what one is doing today, and is also 
present with what one did two days ago, and is present with what one is doing three days 
from now. 
 
But if t1 is simultaneous with t2 and t2 with t3, then t1 is simultaneous with t3.  So 
if the instant at which God knows these things were simultaneous with both yesterday, 
today, and tomorrow, then these days would be simultaneous with each other.  So 
yesterday would be the same days as today and as tomorrow—which is clearly 
nonsense.49 
 
To say that all times are simultaneous with each other is absurd, and Swinburne believes that 
this is the necessary consequence of a belief in divine atemporality.50 
 A second argument from Swinburne relates to cause and effect.  The Christian 
believes that God does certain things in the world at certain times, e.g., speaks, redeems, 
forgives, performs miracles, etc.  The question naturally arises as to when these actions take 
place.  For example, if God forgives someone at a given point in time for committing a sin, 
then it is logical to assume that that person sinned prior to the time of God’s forgiveness.  Or, 
say that God at some point in time creates a human being.  It is logical to assume that the 
baby necessarily came into existence after God’s act of creating it.  Swinburne thus believes 
                                                 
46 Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” 206. 
47 Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” 94. 
48 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 220-21. 
49 Ibid., 221. 
50 See, William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 167-68; and Paul 
Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 27-28 for a counter to this 
argument.  
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that it is incoherent to say that God can timelessly produce these causes with their resulting 
effects being bound within time.  A temporal effect must have a temporal cause.51 
 So far in this section we have looked at the stronger arguments that support the idea of 
divine temporality, and we have only assumed a crucial element, that is, the nature of time 
and how that bears on God’s temporal status.  Following a brief discussion on the nature of 
time we will present the temporalist’s arguments against atemporality that flow from that 
discussion. 
Since J. M. E. McTaggart philosophers have spoken of time in terms of two 
perspectives: A-series and B-series.  The A-series view of time is one with an identifiable 
past, present, and future, based on the perspective of one’s present. An example of an A-
series sentence would be, “I went to the store yesterday.”  This sentence is not identifiable in 
an indexical way, rather only the speaker truly knows when her “now” is, thus being able to 
identify her “yesterday.”  We tend to think of A-series time in terms of the dynamic nature of 
time, i.e. its movement.  The past shapes the present and the future, and the future may 
impact the present.  The A-series theory (or, “tensed” view) is a world in which things are in 
a constant state of ontological change.  Something comes into being, exists, and then goes out 
of being.  The present is the only real existence, and in no way do the past and future exist in 
the tensed theory.  As will become more obvious below this is the highly disputed crux of the 
issue for contemporary proposals on divine temporality.  If our time is indeed dynamic, as 
many suggest, then how can God participate in it without losing at least some of his being to 
the past and anticipating from the future?  Most medievalists and the tradition as a whole 
have opted for atemporality, which negates the question, making it a non-problem.  Twenty-
first century Christian theology is not so convinced and would rather explore new 
possibilities.  I believe this is a positive step, though, to be sure, the new proposals must be 
faithful to God’s self-revelation in Jesus.   
A-series differs from B-series time in which we think of events in a “tenseless,” linear 
sequence. Something happens “earlier” or “later” than something else does.  An example of a 
B-series sentence would be, “Celtic won the Scottish Premier League in 2006.”  On this 
theory one need not presently exist in time and reference an event in the past or future as on 
the A-theory.  Since each event is tenseless, then it ontologically exists and does not change 
that status.  For example, we cannot say that someone is typing this paper now, and when the 
paper is delivered to the professor to be examined that someone has typed this paper.  In the 
                                                 
51 Swinburne, 221. 
 13 
B-series version of time, the typing of the paper simply occurs and does not change status 
into the past.  The same would hold true for the future.  The B-series does not deny that there 
is change, since it is obvious that more than one event will exist at a given time and other 
events immediately follow (in a tenseless sense) those events.  What it does deny is that there 
is ontological change in an object or event.52  Back to the typing example.  To say that 
someone is typing this paper in the present, then to say that someone is not typing this paper 
is not to say that there has been an ontological change, but only to say that not-typing occurs 
(tenselessly).  So, one might view B-series time on a linear model which all events occur, not 
at the same time, but nonetheless have the same ontological status, i.e. they occur at their 
particular present. 
Wolterstorff states that “no one disputes that the ordering of events in the B-series is 
objectively real; the issue under discussion is whether the distinction between past, present 
and future marks a difference in ontological status of events.”53  Hence, those who would 
view A-series time as not objectively real would hold to a tenseless model (B-series), and 
those who view it as objectively real hold to the tense theory.  If it can be shown that the 
tense theory is objectively real and things undergo ontological change as time passes, then 
that bolsters the arguments for divine temporality (though it does not offer an airtight case).54 
To borrow Wolterstorff’s illustration consider someone deciding to do something at a 
particular time that something else will occur.  If one wants to turn on the radio at one 
o’clock in order to hear the news, when would they do that act?  Presumably, the answer to 
that question is when it is now one o’clock.  The question he poses to the tenseless theorist is 
how would one decide when that time is?  One o’clock occurs twice a day every day—a 
veritable sea of events, which certainly poses a great difficulty in determining the exact 
moment to turn on the radio.  Additionally, Wolterstorff says, there are so many events over 
time that comprise one’s turning on the radio that it may prove difficult to know exactly 
which one coincides with the one o’clock news.  The answer to this dilemma is that one must 
know the present status of things.  That is, one must know when it is now one o’clock and 
that it is now time to turn on the radio.  Wolterstorff contends that on the tenseless theory of 
time all events have the same ontological status, and it is impossible to make proper temporal 
                                                 
52 Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 4-5. 
53 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” 195. 
54 Wolterstorff critiques the tenseless theory of time in two ways.  First, he refutes D. H. Mellor’s “tenseless 
token-reflexive theory” that “involves picking out some token of a tensed sentence and determining whether its 
truth condition is satisfied” (200).  Since this particular critique is too large to do justice to Wolterstorff’s 
reasoning I will forego an explanation and only examine his second critique of the tenseless theory. 
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determinations.  Therefore, the tenseless theory is incoherent and the tensed theory must be 
regarded as objectively real.55 
 
Ramifications of Time Theories 
  
Wolterstorff, Pike and others have criticized divine atemporality because it leaves us 
with a static, unresponsive God who is unable to engage in relationships with humans.56  For 
them, only if God is temporal and experiences some sort of succession can he truly respond 
to creaturely events.  This is a serious charge, for if God is unable to enter into personal 
relationships with humans, then many core Christian doctrines are up for debate or entirely 
nullified.  Can God even be a personal being?  What can we say about Jesus Christ?  If he 
was truly human and had personal relationships on earth, could he still be God (that is, if God 
is not personal)?  What are we to think of Christ’s work of redemption?  That teaching is 
predicated on the possibility of human-divine interaction, and if God is atemporal and static, 
then it could collapse.  Scripture itself presents God as temporally acting in the past, present, 
and the future.  A basic example would be the Exodus.  In order to foster present-day fidelity 
among its people Israel recounts this historical event on multiple occasions.  From a New 
Testament perspective the Exodus is a foreshadowing of Christ’s liberation of all humanity 
from bondage—something that is occurring now and will continue to occur.  Therefore, this 
is also a serious charge leveled against atemporality that it would strip God of his personal 
involvement with humanity in all our temporal moments.  For the Christian if it does not do 
justice to scripture, then it must not be worthy of serious consideration.  If Christians are left 
with a God that is static and unresponsive, then they have nothing on which to place their 
faith and hope, and theology is cut off at the knees.  Hence, one must ask why the classical 
                                                 
55 Swinburne also endorses A-series time as objectively real in his section on time in The Christian God 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 90-95.  Strong rebuttal has been given both to Swinburne’s assumptions and 
conclusions in Edward R. Wierenga, “Timelessness out of Mind: On the Alleged Incoherence of Divine 
Timelessness,” God and Time, eds., Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 157-62. 
56 Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” 78; Pike, 128.  Chiefly this argument surrounds the question of personhood 
and atemporality.  I will avoid an extended discussion here and merely summarize the objection by citing Pike: 
“A timeless being could not deliberate, anticipate, or remember.  It could not speak or write a letter, nor could it 
produce sounds or written words on a piece of paper.  It could not smile, grimace or weep.  Further, a timeless 
being could not be affected or prompted by another.  It could not respond to needs, overtures, delights or 
antagonisms of human beings.” 
 15 
writers retained this model in the face of such serious ramifications?  A major part of the 
answer lies in the debate on God’s foreknowledge and human freedom.57  
Stated simply, if God has exhaustive knowledge of all events, including future ones, 
then can we consider human agents to be free to do anything other than what God already 
knows will occur?  One can answer the question in at least three main ways: 1) human beings 
possess autonomy to the extent that they are free to do otherwise for any given decision; 
therefore, God’s omniscience concerning such future free acts is limited.  2) Humans possess 
freedom, but not the type that grants freedom to do otherwise; therefore, God possesses 
exhaustive foreknowledge of the future, yet without destroying human freedom.  3) God 
exists in a timeless eternity that sees all actions in their present; therefore, he does not 
foreknow them at all, but only knows them because they occur.  If God is outside time and 
lives in this eternal present, then, strictly speaking, he does not know the future because there 
is no future tense for him, only a present tense. 
It was Boethius’s concern that God’s foreknowledge and human freedom could not be 
reconciled, thus, he saw a timeless eternity as the only viable solution to the problem.58  
However, today generally both atemporalists and temporalists agree that Boethius was not 
successful in solving this dilemma.59  Atemporality in itself cannot adequately explain how 
God can have knowledge of the future, yet we still do not act by necessity. 
If one holds to atemporality, the temporalist does not see any escape from the divine 
cage of static unresponsiveness.  Yet if we are to talk of God as taking joy in his creation, 
being grieved by human actions, or expressing anger over sin, then we must reject 
atemporality.  All of these emotions or actions are responses to another being.  If God 
atemporally knows all actions including future ones, then the response is hardly a real one.  
The temporalist also believes that atemporality cannot properly account for human freedom.  
Without a libertarian view of human freedom many believe that ethical considerations are 
void, and Christianity is left with an unsuitable answer to the problem of evil.60  Therefore, it 
                                                 
57 Another portion of the answer surrounds immutability.  I believe that one can hold to God’s immutability in 
certain senses without being forced to embrace the Aristotelian version of it.  For a reconstruction of the 
doctrine of divine immutability see, Isaak August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration, 
trans., Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 131-95. 
58 Consolation, 5.6, 111. 
59 Helm, Eternal God, 95-108. 
60 See, Alvin Plantinga, “God, Evil and the Metaphysics of Freedom,” The Problem of Evil, eds., Marilyn 
McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 83-109.  Barth and 
Jenson both reject libertarian freedom and embrace divine temporality.  Thus, we are not necessarily required to 
take every step some divine temporalists take. 
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is crucial for scholars such as Swinburne to maintain God’s temporality because 
indeterministic freedom entails it.61   
Atemporalists, on the other hand, are quick to point out the radical nature of this 
approach.  In order to preserve libertarian freedom embracing God’s temporality causes one 
radically to redefine omniscience.  That is, God cannot know the future actions of free 
creatures, but can only know them as they occur.  Since he is temporal, he does not see the 
future (something that is impossible to know), but only knows the past and the present, albeit 
comprehensively.62  Atemporalists are also keen to point out that under this scheme God is 
conditioned by something outside his nature and changes because of free human actions.  
Some temporalists readily admit and defend both elements. 
Given the ramifications of each position one may detect a certain amount of fragility 
in atemporality, though it must be acknowledged that the arguments given for it are not 
altogether futile.  Is there sufficient reason, though, to defend atemporality in its classical 
form, or is continuity with the contemporary proposals possible?   
Wolterstorff’s challenges are compelling.  The classical model lacks sufficient 
explanation for God’s relationship with a changing world.  It is difficult to imagine how, as 
on the classical version, an atemporal being can relate, respond and cause effects in a 
temporal world, i.e. one of process or succession.  More importantly, however, the classical 
model fails properly to address scripture’s picture of God’s temporality.  Assigning it to 
anthropomorphism is arbitrarily opting for one model over the other, but not doing justice to 
God’s self-revelation.  Conversely, scripture also presents God as Creator, thus Lord and 
Ruler of all that is.  It is puzzling that God would subject himself to the whims of his 
creation, thereby abdicating aspects of his Lordship.  If our time is a created thing, then in 
some manner God must rule over it.  Could God transcend our time in the sense that he is not 
subject to its limitations or degeneration?  Could God enter into real relationships in a 
temporal way so that he does experience real change, yet not change that entails loss or 
deficiency? 
 This is the question that this thesis explores.  However, as stated above, I believe the 
best way to answer this question is from an explicitly theological approach.  I am persuaded 
that our time truly is dynamic (A-series), but I am also persuaded that conclusions regarding 
the nature of our time only yield what (probably) cannot be the case, i.e. that God cannot be 
atemporal and be in relationship to our world.  It is the via negativa all over again.  The 
                                                 
61 Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, 167-72, 220-21. 
62 Helm, Eternal God, 127. 
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nature of our time lacks the authority and resources to give a definitive picture of God’s 
eternity, though it may point us in a direction.  Karl Barth and Robert Jenson are also 
preoccupied with problems associated with atemporality, yet both resist the pull toward a 
philosophical or scientific resolution for it.  It is the trinitarian theology in particular relation 
to time and eternity of these two men that will constitute the rest of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
ROBERT W. JENSON ON THE TRIUNE IDENTITY 
 
When one surveys the theological landscape at the start of the twenty-first century it is 
evident that some have hearkened to the seriousness of Nelson Pike’s dictum given over 
thirty years ago, that “the position that a theologian takes on the topic of divine eternity has a 
kind of controlling effect on the general shape and texture of his broad theological view about 
the nature of God.”63  If Pike is correct in his evaluation, then the question of time and 
eternity is far from superfluous.   For the bulk of the Western Christian tradition the nature of 
God, theology proper, has been a starting point for subsequent doctrine.  Hence, following 
Pike’s thinking causes us to conceive of the possibility that many (dare we say, most?) within 
this tradition have erred as to God’s relation to time causing the rest of their system to go 
astray, or at least to contain damaging inconsistency.  Despite the alarmist tone to this 
assertion it is precisely what some contemporary theologians have concluded, and as I will 
argue, Robert W. Jenson is representative of this current trend to such an extent that he is a 
natural interlocutor for a discourse on divine temporality. 
 Primally, according to Jenson, it is the misguided appropriation of Greek philosophy 
that constitutes the church’s unwarranted diversion regarding the divine identity; specifically 
how the former defines deity as immunity to time and how the gospel “identifies its God by 
temporal events of Exodus and Resurrection.”64  It is not an overstatement to say that the 
remainder of Systematic Theology is an exposition of that proposal.  It is the aim of this and 
the next chapter to demonstrate how Jenson provides a theologically grounded view of divine 
temporality that relies on the tradition yet advances it beyond any integration with and 
dependence upon Mediterranean antiquity.  In so doing he attempts to avoid on the one hand, 
a god of process and on the other, one of static impassibility; or put another way, a god 
subject to the passage of creaturely time and one of atemporality.  Ultimately, Jenson’s 
theology is about “God who takes time for us.”65  My exposition will follow that designation 
in its sequence: “God”—his identity and character; “who takes time”—its nature and 
relationship to divine eternity; “for us”—our identity as temporally finite in relation to the 
Infinite, that is, God’s presence to the created order.   
                                                 
63 Pike, ix.  
64 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume I, The Triune God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
165.  Hereafter referred to as ST I followed by page number.16. 
65 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology: Volume II, The Works of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 35.  Hereafter referred to as ST II, followed by page number. 
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Since his approach is to overcome the debilitating effect of the god of the Greeks 
upon the Christian conception of God it is necessary for us to juxtapose the two, and in doing 
so, we will catch a clearer vision of Jenson’s project and how it is relevant for this thesis. 
 
The god of the Greeks and the God According to the Gospel 
 
 The question of whether God exists is superfluous, apart from identifying which 
particular god among the many possibilities we might mean.  Thus, Robert Jenson deems the 
identity of God as “an initial and determining theme of theology.”66  Of the many options 
available to us it is the Greek conception that has demonstrated itself most resilient to the 
consistent challenges of Christian theology and is the antecedent which especially early 
Christianity reinterpreted.67  Consequently, to understand the distinctively Christian 
formulation of Trinity this confrontation must be elucidated.68 
 According to Jenson, the divine identity is inextricably tied to one’s conception of 
eternity.  Thus, the chief diagnostic question about religion is, “What eternity does it posit?”  
Without question time is “the metaphysical horizon of specifically human life,” and such life 
is irreducibly past, present, and future.69  Jenson believes that as such human life is 
characterized by a passion to preserve meaning in the present by transcending the 
discontinuities of past and future.70  This “embrace” around created time in personal 
“dramatic coherence” is what we designate “eternity.”  Transcending these discontinuities by 
means of an eternity becomes the telos of religion, and understanding how it construes 
eternity directly relates to its perception of divine identity.  And if this religion’s eternity 
involves a conversation, it therefore entails a personal God or gods.  Hence, when we declare 
“God redeems” it is not as much a question of whether God exists, as it is of which god we 
regard as “eternal”—overcoming the discontinuities of this life.71   
                                                 
66 ST I, 42. 
67 Ibid., 54. 
68 Robert W. Jenson, The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2002), 57.  Hereafter referred to as TI, followed by page number. 
69 ST I, 54-55. 
70 And regardless of one’s position on divine (a)temporality this concept enjoys a rich theological tradition 
stretching from Boethius to Pannenberg. 
71 ST I, 55-56.  At this point it is worth recalling the terminology established in chapter one concerning 
“eternalists” and “temporalists.”  While the literature roughly equates eternalists with divine timelessness (and it 
is not wholly unreasonable to do so), Jenson’s perspective reminds us that viewing God as eternal does not 
entail atemporality.  Indeed, how could it, given his description of eternity?  That is, our eternity is this embrace 
in dramatic coherence and we are wholly temporal.  God’s being is also constituted in dramatic coherence (see 
below), thus being wholly temporal within his eternity.  It is precisely this point that I find most intriguing in 
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According to Jenson, the Greeks’ answer to this problem of temporal discontinuity 
was to define eternity in terms of timelessness.72  Aristotle framed the question by asking 
 
…what is the being of beings?  What is true of anything that is, just so that it is?  His 
answer was: that in anything which is changeless, that in which so long as it is what it 
is it always is just what it was.  The hidden unrest in all Greek philosophizing was the 
question: Can it be that all things pass away?  Aristotle answered: No.  That in the 




Time is the irretrievable force that demands such passing away, thus time must be overcome, 
destroyed.  Since human experience cannot envelope our past, present, and future giving us 
the coherence of life that we naturally desire the Greeks projected that ability onto God and, 
therefore, defined deity in terms of persistence or immutability.  Thus, Greek religion entered 
into the quest to discover such a deity, one that exists above or apart from temporal 
experience and also grounds temporal being.   
Jenson concludes that this theology is a negative theology and an analogical one.  
Negative in the sense that every reference to God must be a negation of those predicates of 
temporal reality, that is, God is “impassible,” “ineffable,” etc.  It is analogical in the sense 
that even though it negates temporally-bound predicates it does not entirely abandon them, 
for it has no other linguistic tools to speak of deity.  Therefore, Greek theology must say that 
God is “x,” but always qualify that “x” as something that is not like temporal reality.74   
Jenson notes that “only a sort of blink of the metaphysical eye was needed” to turn 
this mutual negation of time and eternity on its head.75  Hence, all meaning and value was 
transferred to the timeless, unchanging reality, leaving the temporal shut out, and the search 
for a mediator between the timeless and time had begun.76  Clearly, the Greek god who exists 
outside of time, characterized by changelessness, and located at a great distance from the 
created order is incompatible with the God of the gospel who operates within time, primally 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jenson’s project: how the eternal Trinity transcends temporal discontinuities, yet is temporal.  A verdict as to 
Jenson’s success on this issue awaits us in chapter six. 
72 TI, 57-64; ST I, 95-104; Robert W. Jenson, God After God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, 
Seen in the Work of Karl Barth (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), 10-13.  Hereafter referred to 
as GAG, followed by page number. 
73 GAG, 157-79. 
74 TI, 60.  For example, on the preponderance of negative theology in Plotinus, see L. P. Gerson, God and Greek 




witnessed in his fidelity to his people.77  Indeed, both are eternal, but a very different genus of 
eternity.  The question we now face is twofold: what was Christianity’s initial response to this 
Greek religion?  And did that initial strand of Christian thought persist, or was it eventually 
overcome?   
According to Jenson, the early church did not simply assimilate Hellenism into its 
theology, rather in the course of its mission the church Christianized Hellenism.78  That is, 
Jenson goes on to explain, “Christians took over the procedure of penetrating to the ‘real’ 
God by abstracting from time with negative analogies.”79  This juxtaposition of the two 
divine conceptions (specifically centering on the two natures question) could be illustrated 
from any number of historical figures.80  Jenson carefully traces the Greek influence through 
major Christian writers and events demonstrating how there existed a facile transference in 
the initial response to Hellenism, and the possibility of overcoming it entirely only being 
grounded in the creeds and the work of those such as the Cappadocian fathers.81  However, 
when the Western church began to assimilate these Christian trinitarian dogmas, it did so 
under the towering influence of men like Boethius and, particularly, Augustine.82  And what 
Augustine did, according to Jenson, was to lay “down this axiomatic status of divine 
timelessness for all subsequent Western theology,” and with it a thoroughgoing and far 
reaching doctrine of divine simplicity.83  Watson corroborates this, asserting that Augustine 
(and others) “helped to give Christian theology what might be called its classic shape in the 
works of Thomas Aquinas.”84  In Jenson’s perspective, the unfortunate consequence of this 
move by Augustine and his successors is, 1) it “is incompatible with the heart of Nicene 
trinitarianism,”85 and 2) it exposes the failure of Western theology to rid itself of the 
debilitating features of Greek religion regarding the divine identity. 
This, in a nutshell, is the backdrop to Jenson’s theological program, the culmination 
of which is embodied in his systematics.  Of course, Christianity is a religion of history and 
cannot accommodate a metaphysical axiom that so strikingly resists its core tenet.  Therefore, 
                                                 
77 Jenson’s brief evaluation may appear naively simplistic, ignoring discrepancies between thinkers and 
developments within Greek philosophy itself.  However, taking all the differences into account there remains an 
essential unity within the phenomenon on this score.  For a good study precisely on this point see, Gerard 
Watson, Greek Philosophy and the Christian Notion of God (Dublin: The Columba Press, 1994). 
78 ST I, 90; TI, 61-62. 
79 TI, 62. 
80 Jenson cites Justin Martyr as one example of this phenomenon in TI, 63-64. 
81 Ibid., 103-14.  Exposition of this comes in the next chapter. 
82 Augustine’s influence and teaching are well documented and do not need rehearsing here, other than to 
observe the connection with Greek religion (specifically, Neoplatonism) and the subsequent Christian tradition. 
83 TI, 117-18. 
84 Watson, 88.  For a detailed account of this thesis see pages 134-45. 
85 TI, 118. 
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in order to overcome the quandary I must first explore Jenson’s alternative proposal 
concerning both the path to take with regard to the knowledge of God and (in the next 
chapter) the triune identity. 
 
The Triune Identity and Character: 
Starting with the Gospel 
 
In the first two chapters of Systematic Theology the contrasts are immediately 
apparent with someone like Wolfhart Pannenberg.  Pannenberg tirelessly labors to provide a 
rational starting point for the doctrine of the Triune God, the hub of his theological wheel, so 
to speak.86  Jenson does not approach prolegomena in that fashion, but rather views it as 
incapable of anything other than to give a description of the enterprise in advance, since it is 
tied to and dependent upon theology itself.  If it is trying to describe theology, then it is 
discussing theology; thus, if the former is false, so is the latter.  Hence, according to Jenson, 
epistemological treatises in prolegomena are distinctively modern and are ultimately 
subsumed under theology, even in someone like Aquinas.87  Even though Thomas’s 
analytical approach is firmly grounded in faith-knowledge and not some body of knowledge 
that is common to humanity, nonetheless it blazed the trail for what would later become a 
full-orbed natural theology—a theology that is not dependent upon “historically particular 
divine dispositions,” but on some sort of cognitive content apart from such historical 
objectivity, yet common to all.  Jenson declares that it is the label of “natural” theology that 
is most problematic, and not necessarily the content.88  That is, it is impossible to demarcate 
“natural” and “revealed” theology and suppose they are on different levels.  This is the real 
problem, for even though “natural” became the title for a theology that was distinguished 
from gospel, its content was often closely related.   
A dependence upon full prolegomena began with the Enlightenment (i.e. Locke), 
which attempted to establish a basis for Christian theology that was natural to our being.  In 
other words, Lockeans wanted to evaluate any theology by “natural” theology—something 
                                                 
86 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology: Volume 1, trans., Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 1-258; hereafter referred to as ST 1, followed by page 
number.  Unquestionably, Jenson and Pannenberg overlap on many issues such as God’s identification with 
history (though divine temporality is nuanced), the primacy and ontology of the future, and the eschatological 
coherence of truth in God.  However, Jenson’s rejection of even any “tipping of the hat” toward natural theology 
is one significant and important point of departure. 
87 ST I, 6-11. 
88 Ibid., 7. 
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that even Christianity had acknowledged was characteristic of humanity in general—which 
turned out to be nothing less than “Mediterranean-pagan religious heritage.”  When German 
scholars set out to “overcome the Enlightenment” they did so on its terms.89  Therefore, 
Jenson concludes that the entire prolegomena program is flawed from the beginning because 
it elevates Greek thinking as judge of the whole and is therefore more “rational” or “natural” 
than Isaiah or Paul.90  Christian theology and philosophy (Greek or otherwise) are not 
different kinds of knowledge or thinking, but are both theology.  The latter is simply of the 
Olympian-Parmenidean type of theology and Christian theology is not obligated to defend 
itself against the more natural type of knowledge, i.e. philosophy.91  Hence, we engage 
philosophy, not because it is a different type of knowledge, but precisely because it is the 
same sort of knowledge.92  Therefore, Jenson wants to “eschew systematically pompous 
prolegomena” that submits theology’s content to a more pervasive, widespread human body 
of knowledge that, at the end of the day, turns out to be nothing more than the religion of 
Mediterranean antiquity.  Hence, on Jenson’s scheme, shall we accept theology’s unique 
starting point, its given, its proper object?  Or shall we give in to the temptation of alternative 
starting points, which turn out to be false religion?   
Clearly the question follows as to what precisely is theology’s “starting point?”  
Critically for Jenson the “given” here is that theology is inexorably tied to the church, which, 
in turn, is tied to gospel.93  Indeed the distinguishing mark of the church is its dependence 
upon and proclamation of “the gospel.”  Yet, the present-day proclamation of the gospel is 
dependent upon the first witnesses to the resurrection event, down to our reception of it.  It is 
God’s promise that not only opens up a future possibility to our vision, but possesses that 
very possibility it signifies.  Thus, according to Jenson, the gospel must have a history.  That 
is, the gospel is connected to and dependent upon its tradition or historical witness, so that we 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 8. 
90 Ibid., 9. 
91 Ibid., 10. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Even though Jenson’s reasoning here is not irresponsible I do find it problematic in that it has the tendency to 
place church and gospel on the same level.  Undoubtedly there is an organic connection between church and 
gospel (revelation), but the gospel must possess a prior standing in relation to the church, for it is the former that 
forms and shapes the latter.  To say that revelation has a history is true, but this history cannot be forced to be 
identical with the church.  It may include it, but it must remain distinct from it.  Jenson’s tendency to conflate 
ecclesiology and revelation is symptomatic of his overall tendency to blur the lines between God and the world 
and has brought on the charge of panentheism—a charge I will examine below.  Further, I will argue that a more 
Reformed understanding of God’s identity and his relation to the world would help Jenson overcome these 
problems.  However, the remaining question is whether that necessarily leaves us with atemporality.     
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have to ask: “Given what we have heard and seen as the gospel, what shall we now say and 
enact that the gospel may be spoken?”  This type of thinking is our “hermeneutic.”94     
Of central import to the gospel are the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of 
Nazareth.  The early church was sent out to proclaim that life and death, and, emphatically, 
his resurrection by God the Father.  Theology’s role in the gospel proclamation must 
inevitably address pressing questions concerning these historical events; therefore, Jenson 
approaches this theme by asking how and in what contexts God is identified. 
 




As to the question of how God is identified Jenson demonstrates that, for Israel, God 
was whoever rescued them from Egypt.95  In the New Testament, Jenson judges, God is 
“whoever raised Jesus from the dead.”96  The connection between God’s name and these 
temporal events should not be lost.  In presenting himself to Israel as JHWH he does more 
than simply give a name, but unites it with the accompanying description, viz., God’s 
deliverance of his people from Egypt.97  The temporal description within the narrative gives 
life to the name in such a way that it is folly to talk of the latter without the former.  There 
was no way for Israel to speak of JHWH without also speaking of his work.98  The reality is 
further illuminated when the apostles proclaim that Israel’s God is one and the same with this 
man Jesus and the Father who raised him from the dead.99  Thus, the “name and narrative 
description not only appear together…but are identical.”  And again, “Israel’s and the 
church’s God is thus identified by specific temporal actions and is known within certain 
temporal communities by personal names and identifying descriptions thereby provided.”100  
Therefore, according to Jenson, God identifies himself as “jealous,” for if he were immune to 
time he would have no need to guard his identity.  “In time, each thing must indeed be ‘itself 
                                                 
94 ST I, 15-16. 
95 Ibid., 44. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Exodus 20:2. 
98 Psalm 105. 
99 ST I, 45.  On this see, Christopher R. Seitz, “Handing Over the Name: Christian Reflection on the Divine 
name YHWH,” TTC, 23-41. 
100 ST I, 46. 
 25 
and not another’ or not be at all; temporal entities must be jealous of their identities or 
cease.”101   
Jenson underscores that God only reveals himself in and for a historical community, 
and there is no legitimacy in endeavoring to transcend that revelation and relationship.  
Because God had made certain promises to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, namely, that there 
would be Israel, Israel existed in them prior to the Exodus.  The latter remains the answer to 
the question of God’s identity, but this point demonstrates that he is identifiable based on the 
reality of his temporal promises that came to fruition in historical contingencies.  God is 
“identified by certain temporal events but is apprehended as himself temporally 
identifiable.”102  Explicitly, God is not only identified by the events of Exodus and 
Resurrection, but is identified with those temporal events.103  If God was only identifiable by 
the events, according to Jenson, then we could easily conclude that God is wearing a mask of 
some sort and is ontologically different than he appears in time and space.  “The revealing 
events would be our clues to God, but would not be God.”104  Additionally, if God was not 
identified with the events, then that puts a space between revelation and deity, the very place, 
says Jenson, where idolatry would enter.   
Religion fails exactly in this regard because it posits the “voice” of the deity, yet 
never gives deity in its fullness.  “The religious impulse is never satisfied with anything short 
of deity itself,” therefore if God were to hold something of his identity back from us our drive 
to worship and fulfill this religious impulse would result in idolatrous projections based on 
self-need.105  Thus, nothing less than God’s objectivity for us is at stake.106  The event that 
puts this point beyond dispute, for Jenson, is the death of Jesus.  That is, his death does not 
render the Trinity as a binity during Friday and Sunday morning, nor does it obliterate the 
incarnation.  The only answer is to say that the Trinity is always the Trinity and those 
temporal events must somehow belong to his deity.107  Therefore, the God of Israel and the 
church can be identified only by and with contingent events, and these historical events must 
take precedence as the way to God’s identification, as opposed to metaphysical reasoning.108 
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108 Since God’s identification is absorbed in the historical Jesus much has been made in recent years concerning 
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latter, given his overriding concern for history.   However, Nicholas Lash argues convincingly that these 
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Before proceeding with the question of the contexts in which God is identified it is 
worth asking whether Jenson’s theology qualifies as panentheistic.109  A recent work on 
Jenson claims that because he identifies God’s life as constituted with contingent events, and 
because our history is “in the one dramatic life that the triune God is,” then we must consider 
Jenson’s theology panentheistic.110  Certainly Jenson’s work has overtones that appear to 
chime with the “en” of this divine-world model, but does the label do justice to the entirety of 
Jenson’s program?  To make such a determination we must attempt a brief sketch of this 
complex phenomenon.111 
Drawing on Philip Clayton’s work we venture a definition of panentheism as “the 
view that the world is within God, though God is at the same time more than the world.”  
And to further clarify the definition Clayton adds, “…space functions metaphorically when 
referring to God; hence panentheism is not just a theology about the relative location of God 
and world.  Instead, it seeks to stress that the infinite God is ontologically as close to finite 
things as can possibly be thought without dissolving the distinction of Creator and created 
altogether.”112  Further to this, and prior to stating some of the finer points of the 
panentheistic analogy (PA), Clayton notes three presuppositions that ground the PA.  First, it 
operates on the assumption that God can suffer change conditioned by something other than 
himself “and hence that God has the property of being susceptible to causation.”  Second, 
because science affirms the strict law-like nature of the universe and because of the problem 
of evil panentheism posits a divine self-limitation in these spheres, while not abandoning 
                                                                                                                                                        
categories are often obscure and more complex than they appear on the surface.  One cannot simply opt for one 
or the other and expect simple conclusions concerning the way to God’s identity.  That Jenson is aware of these 
complexities and has not sided with one to the exclusion of the other (as does Pannenberg) is evident in his 
chapter “The Christological Problem.”  Nevertheless, if we understand “from below” Christology to mean 
something like, “Jesus’ being is constituted within the historical events narrated in the gospels,” then it is 
difficult to see how Jenson’s project would deviate from that.  See, Nicholas Lash, “Up and Down in 
Christology,” New Studies in Theology 1, eds., Stephen Sykes and Derek Holmes (London: Gerald Duckworth 
and Co. Ltd., 1980), 31-46.  For a more detailed account of the strengths and weaknesses in both approaches 
see, Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), 10-54. 
109 Clearly this is a question that will echo throughout the project, but a broad sketch here is not superfluous, 
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such.  The problem with panentheism is that it is too pantheistic, thus, the real enemy is pantheism.  Thus, my 
defense of Jenson on this point is ultimately against the charge of pantheism. 
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112 Clayton, “The Panentheistic Turn in Christian Theology,” Dialog 38 (Fall 1999): 289-90. 
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divine action altogether.113  Third, panentheism rejects a philosophy of substance, opting 
rather for a philosophy of personhood.  Clayton believes that by “using one’s understanding 
of personhood as the hermeneutical key to unlock the meaning of the ascription, one gets as 
close as humanly possible to an understanding of God’s nature.”114  Inseparable from 
personhood is embodiment; hence, on this scheme the world becomes God’s body, yet 
according to Clayton, he is more than that.  Thus, we encounter what Peterson has called the 
panentheism paradox—“God both is and is not the world.”115   
Thus far Clayton’s definition, aside from some questions of methodology, is not as 
radical as we might have anticipated.  However, Clayton goes on to affirm more specifically 
that since God is the world in the broadest sense he “is present in each physical interaction 
and at each point in space, each interaction being part of his being…”116  It is important to 
note that Clayton is asserting more than simply God’s presence at any historical event, but is 
claiming that those events are in him, i.e. in some fashion part of his being.  Importantly, 
however, he would not want to slide into pantheism and declare that the world is God, which 
is, according to Clayton, different than saying that God is the world because of the caveat that 
God is also more than the world.  Nonetheless, if we posit event x, and x is celebrating my 
son’s birthday, then somehow that has to be part of the being of God.  God’s being is in that 
birthday party, and if we take Clayton’s premise seriously, then the event must also partly 
constitute his being.  Therefore, ultimately God’s reality is not other than the world’s reality.   
Yet, and this is where some ambiguity arises, Clayton also believes that God’s 
creation of the world is not a necessary one and that as Creator God can exist separate from 
the world.117  If that is case, then one is surprised to discover the competing claim that 
historical events are ontologically connected to the divine being.  What if they were not so 
connected?  Would he be less than God?  According to Clayton, apparently not, but in light 
of Clayton’s PA we fail to see exactly what affirming this does establish.  As Vanhoozer 
observes this effort to maintain God’s transcendent sovereignty over creation is a significant 
departure for Clayton from other panentheists such as Moltmann and Cobb.  Thus, we are 
prompted to ask whether this Christian “correction” actually falsifies what the rest of 
panentheism affirms.118  With questions such as this one lingering among its own theorists it 
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is challenging to lay out a homogeneous panentheistic doctrine.  It is a thesis in progress.  
Therefore, labeling any theologian’s system as such is risky at best, unless he or she 
explicitly claims such a philosophy. 
We have barely even approached a treatment of panentheism, but we have identified 
enough of its elements to compare briefly our findings with Jenson’s program.  To 
demonstrate the argument we will simply note some of the ways Jenson draws an 
unambiguous distinction between God and all that is other than God.  First, as we have noted 
above Jenson insists that God is identified not only with certain contingent events, but by 
specific temporal actions.119  He states: 
 
A story has more than one agent.  In the story of God with his people, can the 
plurality of agents be constituted only by external relations between God and persons 
who are simply other than God, so that God is himself but one monadic agent of the 
history?  Since God’s identity is told by his story with creatures, this cannot be the 
case.  Either God’s identity would then be determined extrinsically by creatures or it 
would at some depth be after all immune to the gospel events.  But the God of Exodus 
and Resurrection is above all free and sovereign, and if his identity is determined in 
his relation with others, just so those others cannot be merely extrinsic to him.120   
 
 
In rejecting both options of God’s extrinsic identification and his immunity to gospel events 
Jenson is navigating a path that distinguishes itself from panentheism and timelessness.  God 
in time, according to Jenson, “must indeed be ‘itself and not another’ or not be at all…”121  
Thus, in being himself within time, God’s reality is triune, not one that is extrinsically 
determined.  We must also emphasize how God’s unity to time/created order is within the 
gospel events.  The detailed exposition of this comprises the next chapter.   
 Second, Jenson’s deviation from typical descriptions of panentheism is evidenced in 
his use of the concept of conversation to describe God’s being.  Interestingly, this move is 
also employed by Vanhoozer when he refutes Clayton’s panentheism in favor of classical 
philosophical or theological theism.122  Jenson states: 
 
Language is the possibility of historical being; the word as address and response is its 
actuality.  It is in that you who differ from me address me, that a possibility opens to 
me of becoming different than I am.  That is, it is in that you address me that I have a 
future: the word is the bearer of spirit and spirit is the power of the word.  If God’s 
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being, “into its furthest depths,” is historical, then precisely such address and response 
must be the actuality of his being.123 
 
 
Hence, Jenson affirms that God is a triune conversation in se between Father, Son, and Spirit, 
and it is only that conversational event that constitutes his being.  Yes, he is indeed historical 
and within time, but the inter-trinitarian conversation comprises his deity. 
 Third, and following from the previous sentence, the panentheistic blurring is further 
mitigated by Jenson’s Christology.  That God has created a world other than himself is 
grounded in and mediated by the Son, as is expressed in this passage: 
 
We may now recur to the Son’s mediation of creation.  The Father’s love of the Son 
is, we have seen, the possibility of creation.  Insofar as to be a creature is to be other 
than God, we may say that the Father’s love of the Son as other than himself is the 
possibility of creation’s otherness from God.  And the Son’s acceptance of being other 
than God is the condition of that possibility’s actualization.  Moreover, we now also 
see why we had to say that time was the “room” God made for us in his life: did not 
God set us other than himself, did he not make space between him and us, all time 
would just be his time and there would be no “accommodation” in him.124 
 
 
That is, Jenson is arguing against the precise idea that is panentheism, in that if the world is 
“en” God in the way that it says he is (whatever that is), then “all time would be his time.”  
But God is distinct from the creation and this fact is grounded in the Father’s relation to the 
Son.  Further, this grounding evidences that God does and can create space for other than 
himself because the Son mediates such a relation.  For Jenson, then, apart from a Christology 
God’s relation to the world is inconceivable, for the Son mediates the Father’s reality to 
creation.   
 We must admit, however, that Jenson’s language at times appears to be so committed 
to a “withinness” that the tendency is to read it in a panentheistic fashion.  If we were to 
identify panentheism with Irenaeus by arguing that anything that God does not contain must 
contain God and, thus, be God, then Jenson would qualify.125  Yet there is such an insistence 
that this “withinness” not be construed as a panentheistic blurring, much less pantheism itself, 
that it would be an unfortunate reading of Jenson to classify him thus.  Gunton has 
convincingly argued that Jenson’s position on creation and mediation is nothing short of 
trinitarian theism, in spite of his Lutheran tendency to emphasize “withinness.”  It is a spatial 
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metaphor, Gunton claims, whose Christological stress is accented differently than the 
Reformed, yet fully ground in Trinity and far from the Hegelian push toward pantheism.  
That it is in constant danger of sliding into panentheism or even pantheism does not imply 
they are identical.126 
 
In answering the question of how God is identified (by and with historical events) we 
have already encountered and integrated the second question concerning the context in which 
he is identified.  God is temporally identifiable and identified because of the biblical 
narrative.  Jenson is one of several theologians who have taken up this category “narrative 
identification” as integral to the theological enterprise.  Related to this many of his critics 
charge that Jenson’s project strays precisely because he claims God is identified with those 
inscripturated, narrated events.127  Thus, in order to get a clearer picture of Jenson’s doctrine 
of God we must more fully understand his theological hermeneutic.   
According to Jenson the Hebrews read the Torah as “an expansive telling of Exodus, 
and the Prophets and Writings became Holy Scripture because of their various relations to 
this narrative.”128  Similarly, the church reads the New Testament as the telling of the gospel 
and the non-narrative portions of it as comment and expansion on gospel.  Hence, the 
scriptures are narrative in that there is a central theme running throughout, namely the 
identity of the Christian God, and “[i]f we say the Christian God is the God identified by the 
biblical narrative, we must also say there is ‘the’ biblical narrative…”129  As such the biblical 
narrative stands as the centerpiece to God’s identity, hence we must grasp what the 
relationship between narrative and identity entails.   
According to Hans Frei, “identity” must be the sum total of all the physical and 
personality characteristics of a person in reference to him or herself, not in comparison or 
contrast to another person, though the latter is often necessary to talk about those 
characteristics.  Only the self can bridge the gap between the past, present, and future—
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something that identity requires to be complete.  “Identity, or the temporal continuity of the 
self, occurs when the sides or sequential aspects of the self are related to the same self that is 
doing the relating between them.”  In short, “[i]dentity is the specific uniqueness of a person, 
what really counts about him, quite apart from both comparison and contrast to others.”130  
Identity’s temporal dimension noted here reflects Frei’s awareness that identity is the 
sameness or unity of the unique individual.  One has identity because of the connection to his 
or her past and future.  The full import of this will appear in the next section, but our purpose 
at this point is simply to indicate the unity of identity over time and within the self. 
Yet there is a dialectic tension in Frei between this sameness of identity and the 
changes the unique person undergoes.  He states: 
 
We know that the self is not disconnected from the fundamental modifications it 
undergoes, but it is also true that we may discern the continuity of a person within 
these changing states, properties, and actions…Identity description is the ingathering 
into a connected story of both stages.  On the one hand, we have to say that that to 
which changing actions, states, and properties are ascribed or referred is nothing more 
than they themselves under a certain focus, the focus of self-referral.  And when the 
actions, states and properties change, their change is the self’s change.  On the other 
hand, no set of changing states, properties, and, in particular, set of actions, exhausts 
the self in such a way that it cannot also provide the bond of continuity between these 
distinct acts, states, and properties which it is.131   
 
In Frei’s scheme, it is identity constituted in changing events that pushes us to recognize the 
weight of narrative.  To further illuminate this idea Frei offers “intention-action” as a 
descriptor of identity.  An action is an explicit intention, and an intention is an implicit action.  
Thus, they are polar, yet connected.  So, when a person’s intention and action are most 
closely related or conjoined as nearly as possible he “gains his identity.”  “A person’s identity 
is constituted (not simply illustrated) by that intention which he carries into action.”132  The 
“intention-action” description answers the question as to what a person is like, and is 
demonstrated in the narrative events that constitute that life. 
 Frei’s overriding concern in narrative identification is found in his application of it to 
Jesus’ identity.  For Frei, Jesus’ identity “as the singular, unsubstitutable human individual 
that he is comes to its sharpest focus in the death-and-resurrection sequence taken as one 
unbroken sequence.”133  For Jesus to be who he is means that the narrative must have 
transpired as it did, and we are unable to discover Jesus’ identity apart from these narrative 
                                                 
130 Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ, 95-96. 
131 Ibid., 99. 
132 Ibid., 19. 
133 Ibid., 14 
 32 
events.  He was an unsubstitutable human participant in those events; thus, his identity is 
constituted by them.  All of this is to establish the fact that a person’s identity is “the 
inseparability of who he was and what he did…the identity of Jesus is focused in the 
circumstances of the action and not in back of them.  He is what he does and undergoes.  It is 
an intention-action sequence.  Indeed, in and by these transpirings he becomes what he is.”134  
Narrative, according to Frei, is integral to identity. 
 Any person’s identity within time is inseparable not only from his or her character or 
sameness, but also from those changes/events that the person undergoes.  According to 
Jenson, Jesus’ identity as the Son and the events that constitute his identity (chiefly death and 
resurrection) are taken up into the divine identity, i.e. the Godhead.  Thus, God is temporal 
and ontologically related to the historical events that identify him, i.e. as stated above—
Exodus and Resurrection.  The relationship of time to the divine identity immediately 
becomes apparent.  If God is identified by and with Exodus and Resurrection, and identity 
and narrative are inseparable, then God is temporal.  To turn it around, if God is not temporal, 
then those narrated events do not reveal God’s true identity. 
 However, with Frei’s insights we have seen that identity is temporal in that it 
constitutes an embrace of past, present, and future, not unlike the concern of Greek 
philosophy.  What happens when this is applied to God?  Or, to put it in Jenson’s terms, if 
God is really identifiable by and with the temporal events of Exodus and Resurrection, what 
sort of being might we conceive him to be?  What is God’s hypostatic being—one that best 
reflects all his diverse descriptions in the biblical narrative? 
 
The Triune Identity and Character: 
Dramatic Coherence 
 
Jenson’s answer to that question is that God’s hypostatic being is constituted in 
dramatic coherence.135  Jenson finds no problem (contra Aristotle) in saying that God’s 
identification with historical contingency is an “ontological perfection,” not a deficit.  God is 
identical with himself in and because of the “eventful actuality,” i.e. his identity with 
history.136  Jenson boldly states that we must admit God’s self-identity in dramatic coherence 
if we are discussing the God of the Bible.  “Otherwise than dramatically, the Bible’s 
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theological descriptions, accounts of divine action, and worshipful invocations are too 
mutually conflicted to suggest referral to a same someone.”137   
The striking feature of dramatic coherence is that it must be complete before one can 
truly identify the personal.  That is, “until I die, it remains uncertain who I shall have turned 
out to be.”138  Because God is united with the history of his creatures, he too “can have no 
identity except as he meets the temporal end toward which creatures live.”139  To put it 
another way, God’s very being and identity is united to history in such a way that he is not 
merely established in eternity past who he will be and continually persists in that decision, 
but rather his eternal identity is only seen or anticipated from the end of the story.  Hence, the 
biblical God is not a refuge against an uncertain future, but is the very future of our salvation 
history.  As Israel fled Egypt the great event was not simply leaving Egypt, but was the 
opening up of the future wilderness wandering with all its uncertainties.  Such is the Christian 
God, according to Jenson, for he does not guard us against the unknown, but is the future 
unknown.  God as our future moves the story along from that perspective and not from the 
past. 140 
In this chapter we are attempting to articulate Jenson’s construal of the divine identity.  
That is to say, who is the Christian God?  Thus far, the answer to this has been “the One who 
delivered Israel from Egypt and who raised Jesus from the dead.”  Therefore, this Christian 
God is part of the drama (narrative) that is God’s covenant with his people.  However, this is 
not all that must be said about God’s identity and we have barely considered his relation to 
time, for the Christian God is triune, and any account of God and time must be trinitarian. 
Jenson is wholly committed to a full trinitarianism, rejecting every line of thought in 
church history that deviates from it, i.e. modalism and subordinationism.  To achieve this 
Jenson relies on the Cappadocian trinitarian formula summarized by Gregory of Nyssa: “All 
action that impacts the creature from God…begins with the Father and is actual through the 
Son and is perfected in the Holy Spirit.”141  So, this is to say that any action of the triune God 
toward his creation is not divided among modes or actors in the Godhead, but is attributed 
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directly to “a perfect mutuality of the agencies of Father, Son, and Spirit.”142  Yet, according 
to Jenson, it is impossible to uphold the Cappadocian formula while one works within a 
timeless model that prohibits such eventful differentiation.143   
Augustine rejected this “eventful” or “narrative” differentiation in God, says Jenson, 
due to his superior commitment to Platonic theology, that is, God must be simple.  Temporal 
distinctions, in Augustine’s view, are impossible.144  For Augustine, God cannot work 
externally in a mutual fashion among the three persons, while each maintaining his own role 
or agency, for this would imply differentiation in God’s agency.  Augustine is forced to say 
that there is no difference at all between the agencies of the persons, because God is simple 
and cannot have temporal differentiation.  By stripping away the connection between self-
differentiation of the Trinity and God’s work within time he is saying that what we read 
about in the biblical narrative about self-differentiation in created time does not apply to who 
God is in reality.  If this indeed is Augustine’s position, then he is explicitly rejecting the 
Athanasian/Nicean formula that the three persons are God precisely in their relations to each 
other.  Jenson states Augustine’s proposal this way: “the three identities not only equally 
possess the one ousia but identically possess it, so that the differentiating relations between 
them are irrelevant to their being God.”145  Effectively, Augustine is rejecting a God that can 
be “contaminated” by temporality. 
According to Jenson the Western tradition needs to correct this idea that the persons 
are one because they are indistinguishable, by positing that they are perfectly mutual.  He 
states: “The distinction between the triune story as it is about God and as it is about creatures 
is not a distinction between the simplicity of timelessness and the differentiations of 
temporality: eventful differentiation is real on both sides.”146  What are the consequences of 
not embracing this proposed correction?  According to Jenson, Augustine identifies God, not 
as self-differentiated as in the biblical narrative, but as he “really” is, and we have already 
noted above that this, by Jenson’s account, runs the risk of identifying someone or something 
other that the true God.  Jenson believes that Western theology must abandon this type of 
trinitarian ontology because it does not give a clear picture as to our history, but rather 
                                                 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., 111.  Jenson notes in passing that Augustine is blind to Nicea’s affirmation of “eventful differentiation 
in God.” 
145 Ibid., 112.  For more on Augustine’s view of time and Trinity see his Confessions, book XI.  For a clear 
critique on Augustine’s influence on Western theology for good and for ill see, Colin Gunton, “Augustine, the 
Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West,” Scottish Journal of Theology, 43 (1990): 33-58. 
146 Ibid., 113. 
 35 
disconnects God from our history.  Our history is dependent upon the life of God with his 
people precisely because our history is a result of the Father’s originating, the Spirit’s 
perfecting, and the Son’s mediation of the two.147 
Indeed it is this summary—the mediation of the Son—that is of central concern for 
Jenson’s trinitarian ontology.  If Jenson’s project is an establishment and explication of a 
truly Christian doctrine of God as the starting and ending point of all Christian theology, as 
we hold that it is, the key to such a doctrine is Christology.  Jenson states: “A truly Christian 
doctrine of God is a description of Jesus Christ.  It says that this man shall come and every 
knee shall bow.  It says that he is the one who has hidden behind the mask of the absent 
‘God.’”148  A brief delineation of aspects of his Christology and the critics of it is in order.149   
Primally, Jenson firmly rejects a Logos asarkos—a sort of God behind God that bears 
little ontological resemblance to the human Jesus.  Based on Jesus’ words in John 8:58 that 
“Before Abraham was, I am,” Jenson believes that he eliminates the possibility of some sort 
of divine entity in his preexistence that is not identical with the Jesus of the Gospels.  Hence, 
Jesus the Son is not a Logos asarkos in his preexistence, but is precisely Jesus the Son even 
prior to birth.  Nevertheless, he is born at a point in time, so we must account for his eternal 
state prior to that event.  Jenson believes that the narrative pattern for Jesus’ life is that of 
“being going to be born.”  Prior to Bethlehem there is not an unincarnate state, but a pattern 
of movement within the incarnation event and the triune life of God.150  Herein one discovers 
a clear and longstanding divergence between the Reformed and Lutheran traditions—Jenson 
siding with the latter.  Jenson understands the strong Creator/creature distinction in 
Reformed teaching (which, applied to Christology, is the “one person in two natures” 
formula) as pushing toward the timeless entity devoid of Jesus’ history that is characteristic 
of “religion.”151  Alternatively, Jenson is so keen to relate the one hypostasis of the Son with 
the Father that Gunton claims he is guilty of downplaying “the necessary otherness of Jesus 
and the Father by overstressing their identity.”152  When this takes place Gunton believes that 
Jenson runs the risk of subsuming Jesus’ humanity under divinity.153   
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Yet, Jenson’s bias remains clear: “[T]he second identity of God is directly the human 
person of the Gospels, in that he is the one who stands to the Father in the relation of being 
eternally begotten of him.”154  Thus, Jenson’s aim in this rejection of a Logos asarkos is to 
be able unequivocally to state that God is as he reveals himself to be in Jesus Christ; 
therefore, that God is present within our history.  This is not to say that the Reformed 
tradition wants anything less, and Gunton is clear in his criticism of Jenson that he, too, does 
not want to sharply divide the humanity and deity that we revert to the fifth century error of 
identifying some of Jesus’ acts as divine and others as human.  Likewise, Gunton does not 
wish to extract God from history in the sense that one easily slips into deism.  But a doctrine 
rejecting the Logos asarkos must answer the inevitable complexities that arise with it. 
Jenson in not unaware of them155 and gives an epigrammatic answer to one such 
difficulty, viz., “What of God’s passibility or impassibility?”156  Because the God Jenson 
identifies in his work is the biblical God and that God is Lord over history and humanity, he 
concludes that it is impossible for him to be “subjected to created time’s contingencies.”  
This, he contends, does not necessarily imply impassibility as most of the tradition affirms.  
In fact, Jenson considers impassibility to be “alien,” yet it forces us to inquire, “How does 
God transcend time’s contingencies?”157  Unquestionably for Jenson Jesus suffers all the 
evils perpetrated against him, dies on Golgotha, and the Father raises him from the dead by 
the power of the Spirit.   
 
So and not otherwise the Father triumphs over suffering…The Father and the Spirit 
take the suffering of the creature who the Son is into the triune life and bring from it 
the final good of that creature, all other creatures, and of God.  So and not otherwise 
the true God transcends suffering—whatever unknowably might have been.158 
 
Jesus’ action, i.e. suffering, is unequivocally God’s action, but this does not subject Trinity to 
created time’s contingencies because of God’s victory over that suffering in the resurrection 
by the power of the Spirit.  How can this be so?  Jenson’s answer just seems to be, “Because 
that is the way God is.”  He states: 
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[O]nce it is clear that there truly is only one individual person who is the Christ, who 
lives as one of the Trinity and one of us, and that he is personal precisely as one of us, 
then to say that he as creature is our savior—or that he as creature exercises any 
divine power—is simply to say that he plays his role in the triune life and does not 
need to abstract from his human actuality to do so.159 
 
In sum, Jenson perceives a timeless Trinity as the roadblock to properly identifying God as he 
is and how he interacts with the world.  Indeed, Jenson’s proposal from the standpoint of the 
tradition is radical because it not only speaks of God’s capacity to enter and interact with 
time, but it asserts that God is identified by dramatic coherence.  Exactly how, then, is God’s 
eternity related to time, and to what does Jenson refer when he talks of time?  It is to those 
questions that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ROBERT W. JENSON ON THE DIVINE ETERNITY: 
TRINITY AND TIME 
 
If the previous chapter addressed the “who” question of divine identity and 
identification and answered it by saying that we can know God’s identity in the manner he 
has revealed himself (in dramatic coherence), then this chapter must ask the “what” question 
of character and action.  That is, how does God act in time and what does that tell us about 
God’s being and about time?  Indeed, for Jenson, it is inconceivable to consider God’s 
identity apart from the divine action within history, i.e. the Jesus events.160  This section 
initiates a more explicit discussion of Jenson’s axiom that God is what he does.  Or, to use 
Jenson’s terminology from previous discussions, God is identified both by and with certain 
contingent events.  This has two implications for our study: 1) Jenson’s concept of time is not 
intended as one of philosophical abstraction, but is linked with, to be sure, determined by, the 
triune identity; 2) that God’s being is determined by what he does in Jesus; that is, “the 
resurrection is this God’s ousia.”161  Thus, if God’s being is so intimately linked with time, 
then Jenson must articulate his trinitarian theology in a manner that accounts for our 
temporality.  He will attempt that, but because number one above is his overriding principle, 
he necessarily limits the role a “natural” understanding of time will play.  Consequently, I 
will argue throughout the thesis that he and Barth are essentially unified regarding the divine 
priority over time and that scientific or philosophical observations of it are subservient to 
revelation.  Additionally, I will argue that eternity’s intersection with humanity is a 
Christological one, yet the problem arises in his specific delineation of eternity among the 
triune identities.  I believe the move introduces unnecessary complexities for theology, and 
within Jenson’s overlap with Barth exist the crucial elements for a Christian doctrine of time 
and eternity.  
 
Triune Identity and the Gospel Claims 
 
Before becoming immersed in Jenson’s divine metaphysic we must briefly 
recapitulate exactly what is at stake in this discussion.  As the title of this section indicates, 
broadly speaking, Jenson is zealous to be faithful to a trinitarian gospel that is “now the 
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West’s only open alternative to nihilism.”162  Yet, in doing so he is turning aspects of the 
Western tradition on its head by positing God’s being as constituted by his act, as opposed to 
act as flowing from his being.  As a backdrop, then, to the weighty forthcoming exposition of 
Jenson’s trinitarian ontology we will allow Gunton to outline the significance of “act then 
being.”163   
According to Gunton Greek philosophy replaced the Old Testament as the controlling 
factor for knowing the being and attributes of God.  This has resulted in an “impoverishment 
of our grasp of the breadth and depth of the gospel’s meaning.”164  Thus, many “have been 
content…with a list of apparently intelligible and often rather abstract terms as ‘the contents 
of our idea of God’.”165  Because of this misuse of method it has resulted in faulty 
conclusions about God.  For example, looking at the Exodus account of the “I Am” Gunton 
demonstrates that the early exegesis was likely shaped by “Platonic abstraction,” and 
definitely foundational for subsequent negative theology.  So, the question becomes what “is 
the relation between a metaphysic of being in which God is named by what is essentially a 
method of philosophical abstraction and the biblical phenomenon of the revealed name?”166  
This last phrase is reminiscent of Jenson’s insistence that the Bible should serve to identify 
God as the One who has done certain temporal, historical activities, and not the one as the 
shadow on the cave.  He is the God who led his people out of Egypt and raised Jesus from the 
dead. 
As a result Gunton believes that within the discussion of philosophy and theology as it 
pertains to the attributes (or, we could say Greek religion and Christian religion) there seems 
to be an opposition of being and action respectively, and if placed alongside one another the 
metaphysic of being tends to swallow up that of action.  Or, we could put it this way: the 
metaphysic of being is the grid through which we understand the biblical revelation 
concerning God’s action and when something of the latter does not fit it is redefined or 
simply discarded in favor of the former.167   
Gunton summarizes his observations and objections: 1) God’s acts are not prioritized 
or taken as the controlling factor in systematizing his attributes; 2) the attributes are 
conceived in terms of a timeless eternity bearing down upon the temporal, instead of 
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“attributes suggested by divine action in time;” 3) this results in conceiving of a god who is 
opposed to the world.  “A properly trinitarian understanding of God would rather conceive of 
him as one who is known in his otherness only through his relation.”  That is, we know God 
first because of his positive relation to the world, then in terms of Creator, distinct from his 
creation; 4) this opposition of God and the world is a dualistic account, i.e. material vs. ideal.  
The result is that spirit is exclusively non-material and can give no account of God’s positive 
relation to the world.168 
Thus, what is at stake?  According to Jenson and Gunton nothing less than God’s 
positive, real relation to the world is at stake.  That is, gospel—soteriology—is intrinsically 
linked to the divine identity, and one must not opt for a divine ontology that marginalizes act 
in favor of being.  For Gunton and Jenson, God is what he does.  What we have not answered 
in this sketch is whether Jenson’s conclusions on divine identity constitute the best model for 
understanding this gospel-relation to the world.  Indeed, Gunton’s proposals differ from 
Jenson on several fronts in spite of their basic unity regarding the current theological crisis.169  
Therefore, by accepting Jenson’s axiom of the priority of the divine act we are not forced to 
consent to all of his conclusions.  Further, this reversal of act followed by being does not 
necessarily demand the priority of time over eternity.  God does not thereby become subject 
to the discontinuities of time merely because his act is primary and that act is in this world.  
Crucially, what he does in the world demonstrates his relation to time, not purely his 
existence in it; and for Jenson, what God does in this world is overcome the limits of time.  It 
is with these crucial gospel claims in mind that we proceed with Jenson’s metaphysic.   
 
To get at what it means to say “God’s being” Jenson follows Aquinas’ enforcement of 
the Creator/creature distinction and Gregory of Nyssa’s trinitarian concept of being.170  First, 
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according to Jenson Gregory does not believe “God” and “ousia” are equivalent.  If this were 
the case, says Gregory, when one asserts three instances of the divine ousia, then one quickly 
slides into tritheism.  Therefore, when we say “God” it “refers to the mutual action of the 
identities’ divine ‘energies,’ to the perichoretic triune life.”171  “God,” then, is never a 
reference to a form in and of itself, but is a life-in-action, “a going-on, a sequentially palpable 
event, like a kiss or a train wreck.”172  This, believes Jenson, is what sets the Cappadocian 
formula apart from “standard Christian metaphysics.”  He explains: 
 
By distinguishing ousia from hypostasis in the case of God, Basil and his protégés 
pushed God’s ousia unambiguously to the side of the possessed complex of attributes.  
Their possessor would now have to be either the event of which the Cappadocians 
predicate “God,” or the hypostases, singly or together.  The play of possessor and 
possessed, which animates Hellenic metaphysics, is thus dissolved; God only has an 
ousia; he is not one.  And then Gregory of Nyssa denied that God’s ousia could be 
any list of linked attributes which God must always continue to exemplify in order to 
be God.  The biblical God cannot be thus bounded, constrained by what already was 
and is true of him.  But what then can ousia mean?173 
 
Jenson understands Gregory to say exactly what he and Gunton assert: that the persons of the 
Godhead live this divine life, “other than and prior to the fact that God is.”174  That is, to say 
that God has being does not mean we look for something behind the mutual, active life of the 
Father, Son, and Spirit.  The communal life of the three persons precedes (in a logical sense) 
any notion of being.  Hence, what is the answer to Jenson’s question concerning the 
definition of ousia?  Again, relying on his interpretation of Gregory, Jenson believes the only 
way to characterize divine being is “infinite” or “limitlessness.”  Jenson understands Gregory 
as saying in a profoundly anti-Greek fashion that God is not infinite in the sense that he 
“extends indefinitely, but because no temporal activity can keep up with the activity that he 
is.”175  In the same manner as we earlier described God’s passibility it is not that boundaries 
do not exist for God, but that he overcomes the boundaries.  Jenson states it in this manner: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Three Gods,” refers to Jenson and intimates that he would disagree with at least part of Jenson’s conclusions.  If 
Jenson’s account of the Cappadocians is flawed, then I suppose it would undermine the force of his argument, 
but that is not to our point.  Our interest is Jenson’s doctrinal conclusions and whether they stand up to scrutiny, 
explicitly, next to Barth’s theology.  A study of whether those conclusions are historically properly grounded 
would be an interesting one, but one that is not a central focus of this thesis.   
171 Ibid., 214. 
172 Ibid.   
173 TI, 162-63. 
174 ST I, 215. 
175 Ibid., 216. 
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What Father, Son, and Spirit have from each other to be three identities of God, and 
what characterizes their mutual action as God, is limitlessness.  What happens among 
them accepts no boundaries; nothing can hinder what they enact.  If we label the 
triune action “love,” then we must say: the Father’s love can embrace whatever the 
Spirit’s coming brings; the Son’s love can endure whatever his Father sends him to 
do; the Spirit’s creativity of love is inexhaustible.  Just so, this love is God and not 
creature.176 
 
Thus, so as not to miss the point: “The divine ousia is the infinity…of the work done between 
Jesus and his Father in their Spirit.”177  While Greek metaphysics could not conceive of God 
as infinite since, for them, infinity necessarily collapses into nothingness178 Jenson interprets 
Gregory to claim that God is temporally infinite.  That is, he is precisely God because he 
overcomes the boundaries of time, while being within time.  Our immediate question must 
be: How could God participate within our time yet be unfettered by its limitations?  Or put 
another way, what is God’s eternity? 
 
Trinity as Temporal Infinity 
 
Jenson’s answer to those questions is that God’s being should be described as 
temporal infinity.  This term, in Jenson’s understanding, demonstrates God’s self-liberation 
from temporal contingencies, i.e., his eternity, without extracting him from history.  
Therefore, while one might believe that divine temporality necessarily leads one to a god in 
process or one lacking sovereign lordship, Jenson believes that it is precisely this 
“overcoming” of boundaries that demonstrates he is Lord.   
I would note that such a concept is not alien to the Christian tradition, despite its lack 
of application to the issue of temporality.  In Jesus Christianity affirms that God is fully 
human, but overcomes the sin that is so much a part of our identity.  It is not that God lacked 
boundaries in Jesus, precisely the opposite.  The gospel accounts labor the point that Jesus 
overcomes sin by passing the test in the wilderness and defeating it in the cross and 
resurrection.  The tendency in the tradition has been to answer the challenges regarding the 
person of Christ with a simplisitic, “well, he is divine.”  In other words, the reality of the 
wilderness temptation, the high priestly prayer, Jesus’ comments concerning his own 
ignorance of the hour of his return, and the garden of Gethsemane are underestimated and 
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swallowed up by his divinity—a divinity that is purportedly immune from such earthiness.179  
But if Jesus can be human and remain unstained by sin and defeat its power, is it so radical to 
say that the triune God embraces temporality, yet overcomes its limitations?  Does this not 
demonstrate his Lordship over time, rather than subject him (willingly or not) to time’s 
contingencies?  God did not lose anything by becoming human, nor did he gain something 
that he lacked.  Similarly, being temporal as demonstrated in Jesus Christ does not mean that 
God loses his being to the past or gains something from the future that he did not have.  
Why?  Because those limitations can be (and were) overcome.   
It is just this theological necessity (Christology)180 that lies behind Jenson’s passion to 
overthrow any remains of divine atemporality.  Just as being fully human means that those 
gospel episodes were real and not divine games, so being temporal means being fully 
temporal.   Temporal infinity in Jenson’s scheme is what it means to say “God is temporal”—
and this is true temporality, yet without the discontinuities and eventual end that awaits each 
of us. 
Even though we must await a full exposition in the coming chapters on this point here 
we must observe a striking similarity with Barth’s concept of “pure duration.”181  That is, 
God does not lose aspects of his life into the past, nor does he not yet have parts of his 
existence that lay in the future.  “Any eternity is some transcendence of temporal limits, but 
the biblical God’s eternity is not the simple contradiction of time.  What he transcends is not 
the having of beginnings and goals and reconciliations, but any personal limitation in having 
them.”182  Yet—and here we discover a crucial distinction for this thesis—he claims to go 
beyond Barth by explicitly emphasizing the temporal aspect of God’s being just in the Father 
and Spirit.  If the Spirit is the goal or future and the Father is source or past, then they must 
be “asymmetrical.”  According to Jenson this fact preserves a collapse into atemporality, 
something Jenson believes Pannenberg allows in spite of his Spirit-future orientation.183  
Therefore, “God is not eternal in that he adamantly remains as he began, but in that he always 
                                                 
179 For a good discussion on this essential issue see, Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, Volume 2, trans., 
Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1983), 154-64. 
180 More on this below. 
181 Jenson himself notes his unity with Barth on this point and essentially defers to Church Dogmatics for the 
details. 
182 ST I, 217.   
183 Ibid., 218.  In n. 61 Jenson states that Pannenberg errs when he says that “God is eternal, because he has no 
future beyond himself but is his own future and the future of all that is other than him.”  Jenson argues that just 
because God is infinite and is not subject to the march of time, it does not follow that he has no future apart 
from his present.  If God’s future is also his present, as Pannenberg seems to be saying, Jenson sees this as 
stripping away at God’s temporal infinity and collapsing right back into the old nemesis, timelessness.  For 
Pannenberg’s response to this see, “Eternity, Time, and the Trinitarian God,” TTC, 62-70, and for more on 
Pannenberg see chapter five of this thesis. 
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creatively opens to what he will be; not in that he hangs on, but in that he gives and receives; 
not in that he perfectly persists, but in that he perfectly anticipates.”184  God is always 
opening himself up to the new in and by his Spirit, and not some future unknown.  The Spirit 
is the future and actualizes it for the Father and for us. 
Yet, Jenson rightly anticipates the reader’s objection of this application of the divine 
being to time, which is, “To what kind of time could you possibly be referring?”  Here we 
note an anomaly in Jenson’s thought on divine temporality that may prove to be a dilemma 
for him.185  We will permit Jenson to speak for himself:  
 
Can we then speak of God’s own “time?”  To some extent, the question is surely a 
matter of linguistic choice.  If we speak of the triune God’s eternity as his “time,” we 
shall have to adjust our language about created time to allow for this.  If we choose 
the contrary, we shall have the continuing need of circumlocution in speaking of the 
true God’s eternity.186 
 
At least two suggestions arise from this quotation.  First, (and this will become more obvious 
below) not unlike Barth Jenson’s concept of time exhibits a fluidity since it is determined by 
Trinity.  That is, he is less concerned that we fit the triune God into our conception of time, as 
he is that we understand the divine temporality.  One should note his consistency in this 
regard to his overall divine metaphysic.  Second, and certainly more problematic, we have 
been led to believe in the entire first volume of Systematic Theology that overcoming 
atemporality demands positing divine temporality, presumably the kind of temporality we 
would recognize, given his insistence upon the divine unity with the historical events of 
exodus and resurrection.  Those historical events are certainly intrinsically connected to “our 
time.”  If he retracts this objective and posits “God’s own time” as something unique to God 
and distinct from created time, then I fail to see anything innovative in Jenson’s concept of 
temporal infinity beyond that of Barth or anyone else. 
One final step in the unpacking of this term, temporal infinity: specifically, how do we 
envisage the mutual action of Father, Son, and Spirit in relation to time?  Since the mutual 
triune identities are foundational for God’s eternity, which is temporal infinity, we must 
consider how that is the case.  According to Jenson, we might look at the Father as the origin 
of the divine life (“whence”), the Spirit as the goal (“whither”), and the Son as the present.  If 
                                                 
184 ST I, 217.  It seems to me that this fact has significant implications for providence.  Would this model lend 
itself to the notion of divine action that is new and responsive, not simply the acting out of a pre-determined 
script?   
185 A full evaluation is in chapter six. 
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origin and goal (past and present) hold together in the divine life so that God does not lose 
any “time” or duration, then that has to come together in the Son.187  The reason for this is 
that death, “time’s ultimate act,” is not transcended by immunity to it, but by conquering it.  
“Thus the way in which the whence and whither of the divine life are one, the way in which 
the triune God is eternal, is by the events of Jesus’ death and resurrection.”188  The Spirit 
brings the future Kingdom which Jesus came to establish.  The Spirit so rested on Christ, 
according to Jenson, that God’s infinity is apprehended in the “inexhaustibility” of Jesus’ 
work that continues undeterred.  In spite of the boundness of Jesus’ life the Kingdom 
possibilities are not so bounded because the Spirit takes up Jesus’ work and brings them from 
the goal of fulfilled Kingdom.  As to the Father he “intends himself in the Son,” and this 
loving consciousness on the part of the Father demonstrates his infinity.  That is, as creatures 
our consciousness can only identify itself within a finite object, hence it is finite.  The Father 
identifies himself in the Son, who in turn identifies himself, not only with the Father, but with 
those outside the Godhead.189  Therefore, believes Jenson, “the temporal infinity that opens 
before us and so embraces us as the triune God’s eternity is the inexhaustibility [or, we might 
say, the “inability to be limited or overcome”] of one event.  That event is the appropriation 
of all other events by the love actual as Jesus of Nazareth.”190  God transcends time by 
overcoming it in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, but that transcendence of our 
time is his time.  His time is the dynamic life of Father, Son, and Spirit that enters into time 
and overcomes its boundaries; hence (and this is crucial for this thesis), God’s temporal 
infinity is not time in the same sense that we experience it, i.e. losing to the past and gaining 
from the future.  We will discover very clear echoes in Barth’s theology.  Specifically, to say 
that the Father is past, the Son present, and the Spirit future, and to say that they coinhere in 
the Son’s temporal work is very much like saying God is pre-temporal, supra-temporal, and 
post-temporal.  It also dovetails nicely with the idea of “omnitemporality,” which I will 
examine below. 
 
For now, a brief excursus to consider one of Jenson’s critics is appropriate for 
evaluating both the soundness of his proposals and that of the criticisms proffered.  In so 
doing we are not attempting simply to vindicate Jenson or demonstrate his superiority to 
other theologies, but only desire to entertain the aims of his project, avoiding a kind of 
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simplistic, knee-jerk response that repudiates any perspective that deviates from any given 
accepted point of view.  One such critic is Paul Molnar.   
A close examination of Molnar’s critique of Jenson provides the rationale for Jenson’s 
curt response to it.191  It is apparent that Molnar, in spite of his somewhat courteous opening 
remarks, has not taken Jenson’s project seriously since he merely challenges the aspects of 
his thought that diverge from Molnar’s own interpretation of Barth, ignoring the fact that in 
almost every case Jenson shares the same concerns as Barth does, yet recognizes a need to 
improve upon Barth in order to address certain perceived deficiencies.  Thus, Molnar gives 
the impression that Jenson intends to affirm ideas that Barth viewed as problematic, such as 
natural theology, a god of process, refusing to acknowledge the divine freedom, etc.  In no 
way does Jenson intend this, for he explicitly rejects all of these in various places; hence, the 
question Molnar should be asking is, “How does Jenson avoid these same problems that 
Barth sought to avoid?”  If Molnar had framed his critique in this manner, then he might have 
discovered what Gunton and others have discerned: that Jenson is working within the same 
boundaries as Barth and depending heavily upon the crux of his theology, yet seeking to 
improve on Barth’s shortcomings.192  Because of Molnar’s failure in this regard he can only 
say that Jenson’s conclusions are “puzzling” or “confused.”193  Of course they are if one 
thinks Jenson is trying to say the opposite of what Barth said; or, worse, what the Christian 
tradition and scripture have said.  To be sure Jenson formulates certain issues differently than 
Barth, et al., but that is because he believes there is a better way to overcome the same 
problem Barth was trying to conquer.  Thus, Molnar does not appreciate Jenson’s work given 
Jenson’s own objectives, and, consequently, is blind to its value and contribution.  We must 
give a concrete example to illustrate the point and to do so we will identify Molnar’s repeated 
objection to Jenson, which directly corresponds to our exposition of Jenson’s trinitarian 
metaphysic in this section of the thesis. 
In each of the four categories Molnar uses as occasions to criticize Jenson his 
conclusion is that Jenson constructs a trinitarian ontology that depends upon history (or, 
created time) in order to have being.  That is, time/history determines the divine being:194 
                                                 
191 See, Jenson, “A Reply,” Scottish Journal of Theology 52 (1999): 132.  It amounted to two paragraphs and 
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192 See Gunton, “Creation and Mediation in the Theology of Robert W. Jenson,” TTC, 80-93. 
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page.  We might also wonder how Molnar can affirm anything good in Jenson’s theology, given this charge.  
Does this not set up a dualistic account of reality where God is anything but Lord?  If Molnar’s appraisal is 
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“the implication here is that God is not eternally self-sufficient but is becoming who he will 
be because of his relations ad extra…Here both time and suffering are allowed to define the 
divine nature.”195  According to Molnar collapsing the immanent and economic Trinity is the 
main culprit.196  However, Molnar has missed the center of disagreement between Barth and 
Jenson when he identifies this as the problem.  Indeed, Jenson never denies an immanent 
Trinity,197 only fails to fashion it as Barth (or Molnar) would.  Ironically, it is the first of his 
categories of assessment where Molnar (apparently unwittingly) identifies the point of 
departure for Jenson—it is a difference of Christology.  Molnar believes that Jenson’s 
emphasis on Jesus humanity “as such” as God’s self-revelation is an overemphasis that risks 
making the divine identity dependent upon history.198  After quoting Jenson that “What 
happens between Jesus and his Father and our future happens in God,”199 Molnar offers this 
startling evaluation: 
 
But what happened to Christ’s sonship here?  It appears to be equated with the human 
Jesus in his relation to the Father.  And to that extent one may either say that the 
human Jesus exists eternally, that is, before the Word became incarnate (in which case 
human existence is compromised), or one may say that the human Jesus became the 
Son of God in his actions in history (in which case he did not in fact pre-exist as the 
eternally begotten Son of the Father).  But one cannot say that Jesus as such is one of 
the trinitarian hypostases without blurring the distinction between God in se and God 
acting for us ad extra.  What happens in Jenson’s thinking, in my opinion, is that 
Jesus is actually stripped of his eternal uniqueness as Son. 
 
Molnar correctly concludes that Jenson wants to say that “the human Jesus in his relation to 
the Father” is the Logos, God revealed.  That is, Jenson is addressing the same problem Barth 
faced in conceiving of the divine identity in relation to the world, and the answer is centered 
on Christology.  Molnar is evidently advocating a greater distinction between the divine and 
human Christ so as to stress the otherness of God and creation.  On the other hand, Jenson’s 
language is “withinness” (as has been noted above), and this stress in the God-world relation 
prompts Molnar to conclude that Jenson is virtually a pantheist.200  Yet Molnar’s proposal 
faces a similar danger that Jenson faces, only the other side of the coin.  Such a radical 
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distinction between the Logos and the human Jesus brings a plethora of potential problems, 
not the least of which is the “God behind the God” that Barth himself unceasingly labored to 
avoid.  I would suggest that Molnar’s above quotation comes perilously close to this.   
Gunton has given a much more insightful analysis of the situation that demands we 
draw on his help.  First, concerning the above accusation from Molnar that “Jesus is actually 
stripped of his eternal uniqueness as Son,” Gunton’s conclusion reveals a different accent, 
namely, that Jenson’s strong adherence to a Lutheran doctrine of the communion of attributes 
“is likely to eventuate in the effective submerging of the human Jesus in the action of the 
divine.”201  Thus, according to Gunton, Jenson’s tendency is to overstress the identity of 
Jesus and the Father “that more effort should be devoted to demonstrating that the Logos 
speaks as human.”202  One might surmise that Gunton and Molnar are after the same thing, 
i.e. how Christ is Mediator between the Father and creation, yet the routes to get there are 
dissimilar.  Further, Gunton demonstrates an understanding of the nuances of Jenson’s 
theology that gives purchase to his eventual critique of him. 
Second, the consequence of this Christology is the question of the mediation of 
creation, or, how the divine being can be related to this world and be external to it at the same 
time.  We must strongly emphasize that Jenson is working within those parameters and is not 
giving an account that is so radical it could not be considered Christian.203  Molnar seems to 
think that Jenson offers us a god whose being is determined by something else, thus positing 
someone other than the biblical God.  Gunton, on the other hand, identifies the manner in 
which Jenson’s language of “withinness” is carefully qualified by externality,204 thus 
formulating the real question in this manner: “Is there a difference between saying, as Barth 
tends to say, that there is an analogy between God’s spatiality and that of the world he 
creates, and saying with Jenson that created space is in some way within God?  That answer 
to that is, we have just seen, not necessarily.”205   
Therefore, Gunton recognizes that just because Jenson insists that Father and Spirit 
unite in the event of Jesus Christ, namely death and resurrection, we are not forced to 
conclude that time and suffering define God’s being, as if God relies on or is subject to some 
greater power.  Somehow Christian theology must account for time and suffering in the Son 
within proper trinitarianism.  This is the Being, according to Jenson, who reveals himself to 
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us—one whose infinity coheres in the historical event of Jesus Christ.  This does not imply 
that he is powerless against time’s contingencies, but rather that he miraculously embraces 
time and overcomes it, a concept Molnar completely ignores in his analysis.  Molnar’s 
position, revealed within his criticism of Jenson, is precisely Jenson’s worry: by disregarding 
the unity of God and time trinitarian theology cannot suitably account for the temporality of 
Jesus,206 nor can it account for God’s redemptive work in Christ.  Jenson’s project is an 
attempt to deal with that question of mediation, and his response to Molnar exposes the 
latter’s inability to offer a constructive evaluation and critique:  
 
Thus my systematic theology urges that the metaphysics that construes being as 
perdurance, and contingency as an ontological deficit, is antithetical to the gospel.  If 
a reader takes this metaphysics as unchallengeable, and assumes that the writer also 
must at bottom depend on it, he will, of course, discover the most horrid 
consequences and absurdities.  But to the elucidation of the book or to critique of its 
claims, these discoveries will be neither here nor there.207 
 
 
Molnar’s response to Jenson has as its backdrop the classic atemporal approach, which is 
preeminently concerned that God remains uncontaminated from time and history.  Yet, if 
atemporality cannot account for God in Jesus (eternity in time), then Christian theology must 
demand its removal.  Therefore, the time/eternity issue is in reality a theological or 
metaphysical issue. 
 
In sum, Jenson’s position on the divine being: first, for Jenson, God is an event.208  
That is, history occurs in his being.  The implication for Jenson (though not drawn out in 
detail) is that since God opens himself to us in history in this “event that is himself,” we 
should discard the idea that his deity is opposed to the new and responsive.  God is not an 
atemporal, fixed entity that determines from the past without movement and creativity.  God 
as event is primally the persons of the Trinity in communion, which we have already 
discovered encompasses past, present, and future.  Yet God, as the triune mutual action of 
Father, Son, and Spirit, opens himself to that which is other than God.  “God is what happens 
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to the world,” and if we wanted to know what this Being would be like apart from the world, 
Jenson believes, is mere speculation since it is a counterfactual.209  Of course, the previous 
discussions have attempted to elucidate Jenson’s “withinness” language within trinitarian 
theism, and we would insist that a variant reading toward pantheism or its step-sister 
panentheism is a misreading.  To be sure, there are dangers with it, but that does not 
necessarily justify its condemnation any more than it does to condemn the strict distinction 
Molnar suggests simply because of its inherent dangers. 
Second, according to Jenson, God is a person.210  As to the consequence of this notion 
we must acknowledge his activities in the scriptures as personal.  He promises, repents, reacts 
and changes his mind.  “Persons do all these things, precisely to be personal, and in that the 
true God is personal they are ontological perfections, not deficiencies.”  Just like Jesus opens 
himself to human beings, God listens, responds, and opens himself up to human beings since 
God’s identity, according to Jenson, is in Jesus.  “God is not God in spite of changing his 
mind, in spite of answering prayer or failing to do so; he is God because he does and can do 
such things wholeheartedly.  Operatively: unabashed petitionary prayer is the one decisively 
appropriate creaturely act over against the true God.”211  Again, God as a person is not 
immune to history, but overcomes history’s discontinuities, and how is that a deficiency?   
Third, God is a decision.  Without much elaboration, Jenson affirms Barth’s 
insistence that election or predestination should be included in the doctrine of God as the 
logical outcome of God as event and as personal.  Again, I would note overlap between the 
two.212 
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It should be obvious, therefore, that Jenson’s definition of time relies upon his 
trinitarian theology, one that maintains a very close relation between God and the world—so 
close that he is accused of holding non-Christian, pantheistic beliefs.  Time, then, is a 
creation enveloped by the persons of the Trinity.  As Jenson puts it: “for God to create is for 
him to make accommodation in his triune life for other persons and things than the three 
whose mutual life he is.  In himself, he opens room, and that act is the event of creation.  We 
call this accommodation in the triune life ‘time.’”213  Whatever Jenson asserts regarding the 
nature of time and God’s relation to it, within his theology it must be clearly understood that, 
as Creator, God is the Lord of time who transcends its discontinuities.  At least on this he 
cannot be said to be at odds with the tradition. 
 Yet this “roominess” within the divine life implies a relationship to our time in some 
sense.  What is that sense?214  Jenson states: 
  
[W]e may say that the Son mediates the Father’s originating and the Spirit’s 
liberating, thereby to hold open the creatures’ space in being.  The relation of the 
creature to the Creator, by which the creature is, holds in the present tense of created 
time without thereby being a timeless relation, in that one of the three, the Son, has 
his own individual entity within created time, in that he is himself one of those among 
whom and upon whom creatures’ participation in God’s story is being “worked out.”  
The envelopment of our time by God is itself accomplished in the course of our 
time.215 
 
The significance of the above for our purposes is that because of Jesus Jenson has 
irretrievably linked Trinity with created time.  That is, our time is created by God, dependent 
upon his providential hand for its continuance, yet is only real inasmuch as the Son exists 
within it.  And if the Son has his existence within time and is the mediation of it to the Father 
and Spirit, as Jenson appears to indicate, then when he speaks of “divine temporality” there 
can be little doubt that he intends created time.  Even if he were to go on to posit some 
version of “God’s time” over against created time, such a divine time is nevertheless united 
to, indeed, “accomplished in” created time.  Therefore, a resolution of this divine 
envelopment (or, transcending) yet existence within created time is still to come.  Before 
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approaching a resolution however, we must begin with basic definitions.  What does Jenson 
mean when he says, “time?” 
Concerning the nature of time itself Jenson discusses two views: the first from 
Augustine and the second stemming from Aristotle. 
According to Jenson, Augustine created a paradox for himself when he determined 
that if our present always remained so, it would be eternity.  Hence, even the present must 
lack temporality and can only function as a geometrical point in the transition from past to 
future.  This leads to time as “nothingness,” but Augustine cannot accept this since he is a 
Christian.  Thus, the soul becomes the place where past, present and future are there for 
humans, yet not in the same fashion as it is for God.  That is, the past and future simply 
cannot exist for the finite soul, while they do for God.  But Augustine does not want to be 
pressed into this solution, so he sees memory and expectation as the places where they are 
real as a distentio of the soul.  Jenson calls this Augustinian version of time “the inner 
horizon of human experience.”216  Augustine seems to view time as a stretched-out line 
within the creature. 
Another version of time handed down in Western thought is Aristotelian: “time is the 
metric of external physical movement provided by a standard of such movement.”  That is, 
time is something external to us built into the fabric of the universe.  Yet, says Jenson, this 
model does not do justice to the experiential question that we have in relation to time, that is, 
how it is we are “transcendentally” shaped by it.217  So, what contemporary interpretations 
exist of our time?   
According to Jenson, classic relativity theory describes the world in which we live 
and move, in which there are causes and effects—relationality.  This theory is “real world,” 
so to speak, and regards it as irreducibly tensed.  Quantum mechanics supposes that there is 
an imaginary time that is detached from our experience of time.  If we think of the previous 
version as “real time,” we might understand this version, according to Jenson, as “imaginary 
time.”  “Two moments of this time…are like points on a map, so that which way the arrow 
points depends on from which side the two moments are viewed; this time is indeed a ‘fourth 
dimension’ indistinguishable from the other three.”218  As Jenson notes in passing, these two 
categories might roughly correspond to A- and B-theories of time.  While not entering into 
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the philosophical debate on the merits of them Jenson does offer a judgment for theology’s 
role here: theology must side with A-theorists. 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to what he will do with “real” and “imaginary” 
time.  He states: 
 
Surely our primal intuition of time is that it must possess the characters of both 
Augustine’s “time” and Aristotle’s “time,” of both “real” time and “imaginary” time.  
Time is precisely the horizon of experience, with both nouns demanding full weight.  
A resolution suggests itself: that time is indeed, a la Augustine, the “distention” of a 
personal reality, and that just so it provides creatures with an external metric of 
created events.  That is: the “stretching out” that makes time is an extension not of 
finite consciousness but of an infinite enveloping consciousness.219  
 
 
This solution highlights the key concept around which this chapter revolves: the God who 
“takes time” for us.  For Jenson, creation is that act of taking time or “making room” for us.  
Hence, creation provides the matrix of our living in him and in this sense time is external to 
us.  Yet, as we move within creation we are participating and experiencing this matrix in a 
sense that is more integral to our being—as Augustine would say.220  We experience time in 
the way we do because God created us to experience him, hence time must be his being and 
experience, as it is ours.  Jenson believes Augustine’s understanding of divine simplicity 
blinded him to God’s complexity as a being of temporal infinity; rather he projected those 
complexities onto the human soul.  Instead, Jenson asserts, we should understand God as a 
“life among persons.  And therefore creation’s temporality is not awkwardly related to God’s 
eternity, and its sequentiality imposes no strain on its participation in being.”221  Here again 
arises the absolute necessity of formulating a trinitarian theology of time and eternity instead 
of one that rests on what the divine being should be like.  If we think in terms of God, not as a 
static being, but as the mutual life of Father, Son, and Spirit, then we discover an alternative 
to Augustine’s distentio that is far more theologically suitable.  God himself—Father, Son, 
and Spirit—is the location of our time.  Past, present, and future are not lost in him, just as for 
Augustine they were not lost in the human soul.  
The consequence of all this, according to Jenson, is that we must affirm a “past and 
future” in God’s very being, which is identical to the self-differentiated Father and Spirit.  
Still, as we have already affirmed above, nothing in the divine being is subject to time’s 
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fleetingness and he does not gain from the future something that he does not already have.  
Indeed, the Spirit is the future, hence what or who could give to the Godhead?  Further, this 
triune structure to past, present, and future is prior to our time and holds it together.222  “It 
indeed better suits the gospel’s God to speak of ‘God’s time’ and ‘created time,’ taking ‘time’ 
as an analogous concept, than to think of God as not having time and then resort to such 
circumlocutions as Barth’s ‘sheer duration.’”223   
And here again arises the anomaly.  It seems that Jenson concedes at the very end of 
his argument that all he wants to do is free theology from an atemporal God, yet he is really 
unable to affirm anything concrete about God’s temporality, only that he has it.  Jenson has 
labored to demonstrate that earthly, real time is within God’s being, which enables such time 
to exist, yet by referring to God’s time and our time as “analogous” does he not undercut 
what he has just stated?  One supposes that to say “God’s time” can now mean just about 
anything, and discriminating between him and other theologians might prove challenging.  
Further, it is this very point for which Jenson criticizes Barth, asserting that he has not truly 
avoided atemporality because of his use of analogy.224  By insisting that God is not subject to 
the discontinuities of time, yet he is temporally present with us in Jesus, he has not broken 
new the new ground he claims.   
However, while Jenson’s own aims might go unmet, or, at the very least not clearly 
stated, it does not follow that his proposals lack any merit whatsoever.  It might be possible to 
accomplish exactly what Augustine wanted to with divine timelessness by saying with Jenson 
that God has his own time that is only analogous to ours.  On this scheme God is not tainted 
by the vicissitudes of created temporality if he exists in his own time, even though it appears 
(at times) that this is precisely the idea that Jenson’s entire project zealously avoids—
escaping created time to find the God of eternity behind the God of temporality.  The crucial 
points to bear in mind here are: 1) Jenson’s project is not rendered useless by this discrepancy 
between our time and God’s time, and 2) he does not actually clearly state how our time and 
God’s time are united—only that they are analogous.  I will argue in the coming chapters that 
this indeed does not create the kind of distance between Barth and him that he might desire. 
In sum, Jenson’s definition or description of time is that it is the room created for that 
which is other than God and bracketed by the persons of the Trinity.  Further, it is the internal 
experience of human consciousness, coupled with the structure of the natural world that 
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together constitute the nature of time.  Yet, I must reiterate that this latter temporal 
“structure” of the natural world is Trinity.  That is, God brackets the created world as Father, 
Son, and Spirit (past, present, and future).  Therefore, time and eternity are not antithetical, 
but an integrated whole, the former depending upon the latter for its existence.  To the non-
Christian a definition of time such as this one sounds unusual, to say the least.  Thus, is it 
legitimate to define time in such an explicitly theological manner?  Jenson, somewhat 
surprisingly, does not concern himself with a detailed definition of the nature of time, but 
rather treats scientific theory as an add-on to his theological framework,225 which is all the 
more surprising given the central role temporality takes in his project.  Does the absence of a 
physical understanding of time as a central feature of Jenson’s program create a deficit for his 
theology? 
Ted Peters believes that such an interaction between contemporary physics and 
cosmology with theology is certainly necessary.226  Like Jenson, Peters believes that relativity 
theory describes the real world in such a way that, even though time has different reference 
points and there is no universal “now,” there is still past, present, and future moving in one 
direction.227  However, it is Hawking’s “quantum theory of gravity” that, according to Peters, 
serves to challenge theology to an extent that we must seriously consider its ramifications.228 
This theory combines relativity theory and quantum mechanics in an effort to produce 
a mathematical model of the universe dependent upon physics alone.  The interesting aspect 
of the theory is that it posits a universe with no boundaries or edges, and instead offers a view 
of a sort of timeless nature enveloping our world, which currently pictures time with 
boundaries.  That is, big bang cosmology implies a beginning and ending point to the 
universe.  Time has edges, and, traditionally, what is beyond the edges was often understood 
as eternity (for theology, God).  In Hawking’s theory “no present moment can be isolated 
from its past and future,”229 which is what he calls imaginary time.  Hawking goes on to say 
that this imaginary time may be the way the universe really is, and that real time is merely a 
human construct to aid us in our explanation of our experience.  Thus, according to Peters, 
Hawking concludes that a universe without a space-time boundary frees us from assuming a 
Creator or an eternity beyond the boundary.230 
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Clearly, Hawking’s formulation of imaginary time is closely related to what we have 
identified in chapter one as B-series time.231  There we noted Wolterstorff’s contention that 
the existence of B-series time is not really disputed, but rather it is A-series that is 
controversial.  Hawking’s theory seems to lend credence to this, yet he affords imaginary 
time a much greater position than either Wolterstorff or Jenson would.  For Jenson, imaginary 
time is relegated to the inner experience of humanity—not that it is unreal, but that we were 
created in such a way to experience God and to do that we must be temporal (i.e. past, 
present, and future in succession), for his eternity envelopes time.   
To summarize Hawking’s broad sketch of real and imaginary time: A (real) time is 
the human construct that aids us in everyday experience; B (imaginary) time is the quantum 
realm that envelopes the universe in a boundless, edgeless fashion.  It is the latter, Hawking 
theorizes, that is the way the world really is.  Jenson, on the other hand, does not aggressively 
delineate A and B-series, but offers a juxtaposition of “real” (A-series) and “imaginary” (B-
series?) time.  It appears that Jenson has preferred to reverse Hawking’s ordering and 
prioritizes real over imaginary time,232 though he has not abandoned all aspects of Hawking’s 
theory, since he understands God’s temporal infinity (eternity) as transcending our time, just 
as imaginary time does for Hawking.  Is Jenson justified in this move?   
We would affirm, along with Peters, that Hawking’s theory is speculation and is yet to 
establish any sort of empirical evidence.233  Hence, to force Jenson’s definition of time into 
strict conformity with Hawking would be premature.  However, Jenson’s configuration has 
not violated any obvious scientific data, but rather accepts the reality of A-series and B-series 
time as the way the world is, and as humans are in the world.  Jenson is certainly not 
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unjustified in attributing imaginary time to human cognition, and real time to the external 
world.  Hawking has not denied the possibility of such a move, but only wants to move a step 
further and make imaginary time the force that holds nature together—for Jenson, the very 
place that God holds. 
 It appears that Jenson’s construal of time is not antithetical to our current 
understanding of physics, and despite the theological difficulties that it poses (as I will 
outline in the rest of the thesis) his theories are certainly feasible.  Garrett DeWeese has 
proposed thinking of God’s time in terms of his “omnitemporality,” which serves as a 
philosophical support for Jenson’s aims.  There are discrepancies, but I believe a brief 
examination of his work will demonstrate that Jenson is well within the realm of logical 
possibility, even though ultimately I will suggest theological refinements.    
 According to DeWeese, the omnitemporal being (entity) would be a metaphysically 
necessary being who is temporal, but not physically so.  “But it follows from the topology of 
dynamic time that the ‘now’ of metaphysical time coincides with the ‘now’ of any possible 
physical time, so an omnitemporal entity will be temporally present at every present moment 
of any possible physical time.”234  Immediately the definition signals the adherence to the 
belief of traditional theism that God is necessary and independent of the created order.  He is 
temporal, but he is not dependent upon physical time, i.e. he transcends the discontinuities of 
our past, present, and future.  Thus, again we encounter, just as we did with Jenson (and will 
also with Barth), that God has his own time (what DeWeese and others call metaphysical 
time).  However, there are two elements that differentiate DeWeese’s theory from others: 1) 
there is a type of congruence between metaphysical time and physical time, and 2) he 
attempts an explanation of how metaphysical time might be understood as a process albeit in 
a way that transcends the limitations of our time.   
 The congruence is that at any given present within physical time, God’s metaphysical 
time is present to that actual present.  It might be more accurate to put it the other way 
around: any given physical (actual) present is present to the metaphysical time, though it 
would be impossible to measure the duration of the metaphysical time in terms of our metric.  
Thus, as Padgett has also claimed, God’s time for DeWeese is also “timeless” in the sense 
that it cannot be measured in seconds, years, etc., yet it does have an A-series property, viz., 
presentness.235 
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 For this thesis most interesting aspect of DeWeese’s theory is how he accounts for 
temporal process in the divine life that is not the process of physical time.  He states: 
 
What constitutes metaphysical temporality is the same relation that constitutes any 
other temporality: causation.  My suggestion is that the causal succession of mental 
states in God’s conscious life grounds the flow and direction of metaphysical time.  
And, given that God is creator and sustainer of the contingent order, his causal 
sustenance of every world will ground the time of that world.236 
 
There is a crucial aspect to this theory that echoes Jenson and, as I will demonstrate, Barth as 
well: our time and God’s time are both constituted by relations.  Our time is not the clock, but 
the measurement of the relationship of past, present, and future within our world and in our 
minds.  God’s time is the measurement of the relations of the Godhead and the succession is 
what DeWeese has called his “mental states.”  I would want to modify that statement 
theologically and call it the succession of the dynamic life between the persons, and in doing 
so bring it precisely in line with the theological positions of both Barth and Jenson.  DeWeese 
recognizes how this succession of mental states might be theologically expressed and points 
in that direction in a footnote:  
 
It is an interesting question of philosophical theology whether God’s mental life 
consists essentially in a causal succession of mental states.  If this were so, it would 
not be a limitation on God, since he is the cause of his own being, including his own 
mentality.  Further, it would aid our understanding of the dynamic relations among 
the persons of the Trinity prior to creation (cf. the doctrine of perichoresis, the 
‘interpenetration’ of the persons of the Trinity).237 
 
Are we not very close to Jenson (and Barth, as I will outline in the next chapter)?  To preview 
Barth’s language, God is in becoming because he is God for us, as well as God in himself, 
and God in himself cannot be static if God is also for and with us.  Thus, God’s temporality is 
the relationship and succession of (back to Jenson’s terminology) asymmetrical interaction 
between the persons.  At no “time” is that succession lost or overcome by the limitations of 
our time, but rather it overcomes our time whilst participating in it (or, rather, we in it!).  But 
this is simply a description of God’s presentness with creation.  However, I have already 
signified the centrality of the future for trinitarian ontology and our time; thus, what happens 
to the future in a theory of omnitemporality? 
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 From a theological point of view this is where DeWeese’s argument encounters 
potential difficulties.  He summarizes it this way: “If time is dynamic and God is temporal, 
some account must be given of how God can now know future contingent propositions (or 
states of affairs) that do not yet exist…if future contingents are logically indeterminate, then 
we must abandon the idea that omniscience entails knowledge of future contingents.”238  
Given the grave consequence for theists of this possible outcome it is not surprising that 
DeWeese is keen to find a logical possibility.  Again, according to DeWeese, God is not 
dependent upon or subject to the discontinuities of our time, yet his eternity marches along 
with our time, being present to it at each actual moment.  But if the future does not exist, then 
how can God have knowledge of those non-existent events, as the Bible describes him as 
having?  In addition to possessing knowledge of his infallible will and what he determines to 
do God, according to DeWeese, can know true counterfactuals of freedom.  The solution is 
really a Molinist one, i.e. middle knowledge.239  If the middle knowledge option fails, 
however, then DeWeese is left in a position regarding time and eternity that significantly 
departs from the Christian understanding of God, for our future would be an unknown to him. 
 I believe that Christian theology has sufficiently demonstrated the crucial nature of 
the future for the divine being and for our history—that God is there, and overcoming our 
discontinuities by bringing in his eschatological kingdom is what it means for God to be 
united to our world, whilst remaining free.  It is the fulfillment of all that has gone before, so 
that what appears to be irretrievably lost in our time will be a completed whole in the 
eschaton.  As Peters claims, “If we refuse to define eternity as some sort of timeless reality 
that sits contiguous and parallel to temporal history as we know it, then it will be the future 
that brings eternity to time.”240  This is the eschatological kingdom where the immanent and 
economic Trinity complete the work begun at creation.  This is a future event and though it is 
not a scientific necessity,241 it is certainly a theological necessity.  Thus, is it possible to hold 
to an A-series view of our time whose divine counterpart is the theory of omnitemporality, 
                                                 
238 Ibid., 262. 
239 Ibid., 264.  Space does not allow a full discussion of middle knowledge, but the possibilities are intriguing.  
For a full discussion see, William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1991) and The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987); Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 
174-80.  However, as with much of the philosophical discussion regarding time and eternity, God’s knowledge 
takes on a strangely unitarian flavor, instead of a trinitarian one.  I would rather say, especially with Jenson but 
also with Barth, that the Spirit brings the kingdom to us and that kingdom is an eschatological one.  This means 
that in some sense, the kingdom is already there, though to be sure, not in its fullness, for our time and its 
salvation history lacks completion.   
240 Peters, 177. 
241 Ibid., 176. 
 60 
yet maintain “God as future”?  I believe that it is in the same way that middle knowledge may 
provide insight into omniscience.  That is, if God knows all true counterfactuals, then in some 
sense he is “there,” for I cannot think of a situation where one could have knowledge of true 
events, apart from someone’s mind being there to observe it.  To be sure, we can know many 
facts of which we have never personally witnessed, but someone at some temporal moment 
did (or will), and we can assimilate that information.  Therefore, how could God know true 
future events apart from being there?242  But whether God occupies the space that contains 
our future is not as much to our point as what he does from the future.243  God’s activity from 
the future is one that is overcoming contingency and sin in response to our free activity and 
not one that is statically unmoved.  He is making all things new.  His eternity is “becoming” 
in the sense that he is ever-responding within the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit, who are 
also in ongoing relations with the created order in a way that establishes and does not detract 
from our freedom.  God’s work in the future is what brings this relation to its climax, so that 
eternity is not antithetical to time, but has been interacting with it and will embrace it in the 
eschaton.  This is in stark contrast to the atemporal view that presents God as in parallel 
relation to the world and immune to its contingency.   
   Here again, the heart of the time/eternity question that every Christian theologian 
encounters: how is that we hold together the doctrine that God transcends or overcomes all 
limitations of the external world without being describing that transcendence as immunity?  
DeWeese gives us a model for understanding God’s temporal relation to the world, but lacks 
a fail-safe explanation of what it means for God to perform some of the intrinsic qualities the 
Bible claims he has, namely (exhaustive) omniscience.  Is this the inevitable trade-off?  Must 
we make statements that either tend to one side or the other?  DeWeese has done just that by 
emphasizing God’s presentness over his futurity, and it seems that every proposal has an 
inherent weakness, giving up something that someone deems crucial to the faith.244  
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However, this is not to say that omnitemporality cannot play its part.  Surely his arguments 
against atemporality carry weight and are instructive for theology, though, to be sure, this 
thesis contends that those concerns also reside in theologians and spring from 
trinitarian/theological concerns and not (as much) from science.  Furthermore, Jenson 
contends that God is with us as the Father (past) and the Spirit (future) unite in Jesus 
(present).  DeWeese corroborates this presentness of God with us.  If this is true, then God is 
temporal.  But again, the question of how God can be at the same time future (transcending 
time) and present (temporal) remains unanswered in Jenson.  In this sense, he falls in line 
with Barth. 
I have attempted to demonstrate that Jenson’s doctrine of Trinity and time is not 
extreme, but rather is reasonable, especially for Christian theology.  Nevertheless, there are 
weaknesses, most of which I will address in chapter six.  For now, I want to ask whether 
Jenson undermines or unnecessarily strains his project by placing Father, Son, and Spirit at 
each temporal location?  Jeremy Ive thinks so.245 
 Ive poses the question: “How can the great conversation, which makes time possible, 
take place if the persons themselves are elements in the temporal process?”  The major 
problem for Jenson, according to Ive, is that he, 1) focuses so strongly on the temporal roles 
of the persons that he detracts from the involvement of each in every moment of history, i.e. 
he is guilty of some sort of temporal modalism; and 2) risks reducing God’s transcendent 
actions in history to the historical process itself.246  Ive wants to highlight what he perceives 
as Jenson’s overstress on the temporal Trinity as actually detracting from Jesus as Creator 
and future King.  According to Ive, the persons must be seen in a mutual way in order to 
preserve their acting in all of history.  Ive believes that we must view the relations as 
mutually transcending all of history and constitutive of the historical process, as opposed to 
within it.  He states: “Through the coordinate relation, thus, of all three persons, our 
understanding of the irreducible transcendence of their joint operation in history from 
beginning to end is secured.”247 
 As to the second objection we simply reiterate what has already been stated.  For 
Jenson, God is unambiguously temporal (historical), yet that fact does not subject him to time 
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in the same way we are, nor does his being become so integrated into the historical process 
that he is dependent upon it for his own existence, that is, gathering his being from elsewhere.  
Citations from Jenson have already appeared in this and the previous chapter and many more 
could be given.  God is within history, but he overcomes time’s contingencies, such that 
Jenson can claim that the resurrection is God’s ousia. 
 Ive’s first objection—that of uniting the divine identities with specific temporal 
location—at the end of the day does not enlighten us to some hidden weakness, since Jenson 
adopts this structure for reasons he makes explicit.248  Ive is correct to observe that Jenson 
has no problem attributing God’s works to the identities and not Trinity as a whole for at least 
two reasons: 1) if each work is identically each person’s, then names like “Son of God” 
become meaningless metaphysical ideas; 2) it is precisely such a view that Jenson associates 
with Augustianian timelessness.  It is the rejection of the latter that moves Jenson to assume 
the Cappadocian view of mutuality of persons, rather than persons as identical.  Ironically, 
Ive calls for a view that makes more of mutuality, yet he obviously understands mutual as 
tending toward identical—the very feature Jenson wants to avoid.  Further, Jenson mitigates 
against any perceived weakness here by clearly affirming the one God/Creator/Trinity as 
personal in “itself.”249  That is, God is still One, though thrice repeated in the divine 
identities, so that when we say “God created” that is not a statement of the Father to the 
exclusion of Son and Spirit, since each are active in temporal history and his temporal 
eternity is marching.250   
I believe Ive has touched a matter of importance, yet I do not believe he really reaches 
the heart of the matter.  That Jenson identifies the persons with the temporal moments of past, 
present and future is a weakness that I wish to challenge, in particular, because I simply do 
not believe it is necessary for a robust doctrine of divine temporality.  That which Jenson has 
already affirmed, apart from this specific construal, points in the right direction.  Therefore, I 
want to echo a significant portion of Jenson’s systematic theology and state unapologetically 
that it is valuable for contemporary Christian theology’s doctrine of time and eternity.  
However, I would like to take the rest of the thesis to challenge and shape some of his 
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proposals for a better understanding of Trinity and time, and to do that I turn to Karl Barth.  
Barth does not give us a flawless doctrine of time and eternity and I am not uncritical of him, 
but the pieces are present and simply need some supplementation.  
 64 
CHAPTER FOUR 
KARL BARTH ON TIME AND ETERNITY: 
THE PRIORITY OF TRINITY AND INCARNATION 
 
If Whitehead was right to quip that “all of Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato,” 
then it is equally correct to claim that virtually all contemporary theology is a footnote to 
Barth.  Barth’s program reoriented theology in such a way as to think first in terms of Trinity 
and revelation, then our place in that revelation.  The questions of time and eternity strike at 
the very heart of that effort and shape much of his dogmatic enterprise.  The aim of this 
chapter is briefly to delineate Barth’s break with liberalism as seen through the lens of the 
second edition of The Epistle to the Romans, then principally to give an exposition of his 
trinitarian formula—the grounding of time and eternity.  By considering it in this manner I 
will attempt first, to lay the groundwork for the coming chapters that will explicitly 
demonstrate the overlap between Barth and Jenson, and second, to argue that their approach 
to the question of time and eternity is properly grounded and must play a influential part in 
the discussion.  Therefore, the historical background to Barth’s theology is not superfluous, 
but rather is essential for an appreciation of his method, which profoundly speaks to the 
content of his doctrine of time and eternity.  The next chapter is a closer analysis of that 
content, and whether it is suitably articulated in its entirety is the subject of chapter six.   
 
Schleiermacher and the Theology of the Day 
 
“How is theology possible?”  The question explores the rationale for theology and 
method, even to the extent of allowing us to replace the “how” with “whether.”  How can we 
say that theology is “true?”  It arises against the backdrop of the Enlightenment and an ever-
increasing suspicion of the old orthodoxy, particularly in relation to its dependence on the 
scripture.  Further, Hume and Kant had dealt a mortal wound to natural theology and the 
older metaphysics.251  Schleiermacher’s answer to this challenge was to turn theology inward 
toward the self.  Any talk of God is inextricably tied to the religious subject—the self-
conscious mind and will.  For him this implied a redefinition of revelation, thus the nature of 
true religion came to be located in the realm of feeling (Gefühl), so that anything considered 
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doctrine must be understood in conjunction with affections.252  Feeling, according to 
Schleiermacher, is not on the same plane as knowing and doing.  Religion has to be distinct 
from metaphysics and ethics, though this is not to imply that the tie is completely severed.  
Feeling is at a deeper conscious level than intellect and will, which Schleiermacher calls “an 
immediate self-consciousness.”253  He states: 
 
But while Knowing, in the sense of possessing knowledge is an abiding-in-self on the 
part of the subject, nevertheless as the act of knowing it only becomes real by a 
passing-beyond-self of the subject, and in this sense it is Doing.  As regards Feeling, 
on the other hand, it is not only in its duration as a result of stimulation that it is an 
abiding-in-self: even as the process of being stimulated, it is not effected by the 
subject, but simply takes place in the subject, and thus, since it belong altogether to 
the realm of receptivity, it is entirely an abiding-in-self; and in this sense it stands 
along in antithesis to the other two—Knowing and Doing.254 
 
 
In order for knowing and doing to occur the subject must self-initiate toward the thing outside 
itself.  On the other hand, feeling is not something the subject can creatively enact, rather it 
simply occurs within the subject who can merely receive it or recognize its existence.  The 
essential nature of this immediate self-consciousness is an “absolute dependence” on that 
outside the self.  Schleiermacher identifies this dependence as both springing from and 
moving toward God.255  This absolute dependence takes place not in the intellect and will but 
in feeling, which does not allow for any “give and take” between God and humanity in the 
same sense that objects are perceived within the created order.  Religious truth comes about 
through self-consciousness.  As Mackintosh describes Schleiermacher’s perspective, “[I]t is 
only human reflection on the content of our religious feelings or affections which requires 
[doctrine], or calls it into being.”256  However, he did not intend for the self to be in isolation 
and, thus, possess religious feeling apart from God.  Nor did he intend religion to be abstract 
or universal, but rather particular and historical.  Out of all the infinite reflections on feeling, 
doctrines arise, but this, for Schleiermacher, did not lead to a radical individualism, since he 
always held that Christianity is inherently social.257   
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Schleiermacher successfully revolutionized the theological world by undercutting the 
rationalist-orthodox debate,258 and by surpassing Kant’s restrictions on the impossibility of 
theoretical knowledge of God.259  His truly was an era that came to dominate the nineteenth 
century and beyond in spite of Ritschl’s attempts at correction.260  It was this world—
Schleiermacher’s world—that Barth entered, primarily under the tutelage of his teacher, 
Wilhelm Herrmann.  Herrmann did not uncritically assimilate Schleiermacher, he was, at 
least initially, Ritschl’s most zealous exponent.  Yet there is no mistaking his rejection of 
aspects of Ritschlianism and his decided adherence to a neo-Kantian philosophy, which 
necessitated that theology be independent from, among other things, the bounds of Kant’s 
theoretical knowledge.  Religion is confirmed in “self-authenticating religious experience.”261  
Herrmann’s influence upon Barth’s thinking is indisputable in that the latter would always 
maintain the independence of religious thought from the bounds of philosophy, etc., yet there 
was also a clear break.  As Robert Jenson puts it: 
 
The defining character of liberalism, as Barth came to look back at it, was that it took 
the Christian religion as its starting point.  It began with religion, i.e., with man’s 
strange propensity to reach beyond himself and beyond the realities which limit his 
life to a unity and completion which everything in life drives him to seek but does not 
provide.  Then it tried to grasp the faith as the species of this genus.262 
 
 
Barth’s break with liberalism was not centered on historico-critical method, metaphysics, or 
epistemology, per se.  He discovered that liberalism was founded upon the recognition of the 
phenomenon of human religiousness, then after that supposition, asked what the coming of 
Christ did to impact that reality.  In countering this state of affairs Barth attempted a new sort 
of direction, one that McCormack calls a “critically realistic starting point.”263  That is, “if the 
unintuitable God is truly to be known, God must make Godself intuitable.”264  Notice that this 
starting point is not anti-Kantian or anti-idealistic, but rather assumes some of its 
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foundational concepts.  Barth’s realism is not of the classical variety, which started with the 
assumption of objective empirical reality, to which we have immediate access.  Rather, it is a 
critical realism because it is sustained by: 1) “the validity of Kant’s epistemology (where it 
touched upon knowledge of empirical reality), and 2) the success of Kant’s critique of 
metaphysics.”265  Additionally, unlike the uncritical realism of classical theology, Barth 
understood the human being’s propensity to create “objects of knowledge,” thus potentially 
distorting reality.266  Liberalism, likewise assuming the success of Kant’s critique, turned 
religion (revelation) toward the self and disconnected the God who is objectively real in 
himself from reality.  This, for Barth, was the fatal move; for though naïve empiricism cannot 
lead us to God, it does not follow that God cannot cause himself to be known.   
Barth is often charged with removing God from historical reality by means of a 
radically transcendent perspective.  However, this is precisely the opposite of what he is 
attempting to do.  His quest is to make “the transcendent God whose transcendence is not that 
of the terminus of our alienation from the things of this world, and of the religious quest in 
which we enact that alienation, but rather the transcendence which limits us to the tasks of 
time, and just so frees us from and for them.” 267  When people charge Barth with radical 
transcendence they level against him a charge that was his very target.   
This “religious quest” that Jenson mentions is the human self’s effort to find some 
transcendent reality beyond the confines of time.  Barth objected to the fact that the Christian 
God was the outcome merely as a result of this intuitive, religious quest.  This was the 
essence of what he called “religion,” and was the focus of his initial attacks in The Epistle to 
the Romans.  Barth found it utterly preposterous that one could find the eternal God, the 
Christian God of the Bible, by gazing inward at the religious nature of humankind.268  Here is 
an ironic state of affairs: in liberalism we find that God is detached from our temporality, 
seen in that our goal is to get beyond our restraints to the infinite; yet, that journey is a very 
short one that begins and ends with religious self-awareness.  Indeed, Schleiermacher’s 
lifelong struggle was between pantheism and Christian belief.269  At the end of the day, 
however, the “Infinite is only a projection; it is the finite, stripped of all its limitations and 
                                                 
265 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 
1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130.  Hereafter referred to as CRDT, followed by page 
number. 
266 Ibid. 
267 GAG, 6. 
268 See his, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 240-
57.  Hereafter referred to as Romans II, followed by page number. 
269 Mackintosh, 51. 
 68 
projected on to a higher being.  But because it is a projection, it always remains inseparably 
bound to the finite as its antithesis, its mirror opposite.”270  Hence, what path did Barth take 
to destroy “religion” avoiding this radical divine transcendence, expressed in self-
transcendence?  Or, we could ask it this way: what is the relationship of time and eternity? 
 
Romans II and the Time-Eternity Dialectic 
 
Barth’s commentary on Romans is a radically one-sided effort to break with and leave 
broken the core of liberalism.271  The fundamental operating principle of Romans II is the 
“infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity;” a result of Barth’s perception that 
the essential problem in liberalism is the temporal encroachment upon eternity.  Religion 
forgets how far above us God really is, and subsequently elevates the human possibility to a 
divine status.  Thus, “Barth’s dialectics are born of a basic contradiction between time and 
eternity.”272  Eternity described as atemporality emerges in direct relation to his break with 
liberalism because he posits humanity as understood only in terms of the transcendent above 
created time.  The best way, according to the early Barth, to rid the world of religion was to 
demonstrate that God is wholly detached and set against humanity—he is eternally atemporal 
and we are finitely temporal, and it is impossible to overcome this boundary.273  That is, 
Barth believed that humanity must come to grips with Overbeck’s No as part of the hope of 
objective knowledge of God.274 
Therefore, it is in this sense that Barth intended the time-eternity dialectic to function: 
it was an “apparatus” to witness to God’s self-revelation (objective knowledge of God) 
without being transformed into something creaturely.275  It was a tool to eliminate all human 
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possibilities for religion.  Eternity does not become time, but encounters it at a particular 
point that is without temporal extension.  
  
In this name two worlds meet and go apart, two planes intersect, the one known and 
the other unknown…This known plane is intersected by another plane that is 
unknown—the world of the Father, of the Primal Creation, and of the final 
Redemption.  The relation between us and God, between this world and His world, 
presses for recognition, but the line of intersection is not self-evident.  The point on 
the line of intersection at which the relation become observable and observed is 
Jesus…In the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of 
the flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it.276 
 
 
Even though it appears that Barth is naming the person of Jesus as the point of intersection, 
he goes on to narrow it even further to the event of the cross.277  Yet, even the cross is 
“unhistorical” in the sense that it does not arise from historical possibilities, but from eternity.  
Time and eternity are unified behind and above the separation of the two, but “we hear it only 
as a No.”  Since we are utterly separate from God’s eternity we can only know that eternity in 
the face of God’s judgment—the only connection with eternity.278  As a ground-clearing 
device of religion the time-eternity dialectic was very effective, yet it revealed weaknesses 
that Barth clearly did not intend.  That is, atemporality or, eternity as a limit to time, could 
not operate in the manner in which Barth envisioned the Christian God acting.  God is not 
restricted to the past and barred from the present, but rather brings about the new within 
time—something the time-eternity dialectic should not have allowed, yet Barth affirmed 
concepts such as the supernatural event of faith as a gift from God, actualized within time.  
The same is true of Jesus’ resurrection, and of knowledge of God.279   
That Barth did not intend this outcome is evident in the structure and emphasis of 
Romans II itself, i.e. in its eschatology.  It is this point where Jenson notes Barth’s divergence 
from traditional models of atemporality.  Jenson claims that Romans falls directly in line with 
this Western tradition in that it is not much more that “pure Platonism”—time as the image of 
eternity.  Yet, in a different way than his Greek predecessors, Barth’s time-eternity dialectic 
is not designed to push us toward eternity when we finally come to the end of our “temporal 
rope,” so to speak, but to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of movement in either 
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direction and forces us to live in the “in-between.”280  Thus, Barth intends to stand both 
Greek atemporality and liberal theology on its head by positing God as “the One who justifies 
the ungodly,” or, the One who overcomes the infinite gap (the “No”) and unites himself to 
humanity (the “Yes”).281  Herein is the key for Barth that Jenson attempts to illuminate: 
“…life and its meaning is the distinction between past and future…”282  Faith in life is 
designed to look toward the future, and the past paints a picture of God in order that we might 
understand how he is the new, unexpected way.  Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom brought the 
future into present reality.  His death signified “a victory of the future over the past and for 
the past…”  “So the life called for by the exilic prophets was lived—and it was revealed why 
it was not lived before.  Alienated, past-bound, man can be free for the future only in death—
and then it is too late.  Only the success of death, only resurrection, can be the act of life from 
the future free from and for the past.”283  His risenness means that we look for him in the 
future, not just as a past event, which is exactly what he would be if he had not risen.  So, it is 
the future, not eternity, that triumphs and Jesus is that future.  Clearly, Barth’s desire even in 
this early stage is to reach Blumhardt’s Yes by way of the No.284  Granted, the Yes is more 
vivid in the Church Dogmatics, since the No was “a necessary purgation of the 
anthropocentric debris of Liberal Neo-protestantism,”285 yet it would be difficult to deny its 
existence.  
In spite of Barth’s intentions that God be understood as free to act in the present 
within creation the time-eternity dialectic was an overemphasis on post-temporality286 that he 
had to modify to prevent creating this vision of a disconnected, radically transcendent God, 
understood in terms of an abstract eternity.  These modifications began in Göttingen and 
continued through the Church Dogmatics. 
“Barth’s first [Göttingen] lectures in dogmatics mark a distinct advance over against 
the theology of Romans II,” and McCormack includes in such advances his concern for 
doctrine and the Scripture-principle.287   However, it would be a mistake to think that the 
                                                 
280 GAG, 14-15. 
281 Thus, we would expect Barth to navigate some other course regarding time and eternity, and in the Church 
Dogmatics that is precisely what we find him doing. 
282 Ibid., 16. 
283 Ibid., 18. 
284 Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction..., 43.  Ironically, in the face of his just noted evaluation Jenson seems 
to believe the opposite, viz., that Barth had to move beyond Romans II because it was a dialectic stuck on the 
No.  See, GAG, 68. 
285 Colwell, 21. 
286 Ibid., 20.  Colwell rightly notes that he did not dispense with post-temporality, but only reoriented it in CD.  
In this sense much of Romans II is not abandoned, but honed and modified. 
287 McCormack, CRDT, 302. 
 71 
modifications we have in mind entail Barth’s disavowing Romans II in favor of a 
fundamentally new theology.  Barth never abandons the aim of Romans II, which, we must 
constantly remind ourselves, centered on the possibility of objective knowledge of God 
whilst preserving the critical and infinite distance between God and humankind.  The shift is 
not a “relaxation here of Barth’s fundamental radicalism.  What is in view here is an advance 
along the same line which Barth had first entered in 1915; not a break with it.”288  However—
and here we transition with Barth from the broad assertion of revelation to the question of 
time—how should we define or describe that “distance?”  Is it one of eternity set against time 
(timelessness)—the critical moment of intersection that is like the tangent on a circle that 
does not actually touch the circle?  Simply stated, Barth replaces the time-eternity dialectic in 
Romans II with the event of Jesus Christ.  As Jenson notes: 
 
Not one word of what is said in the Commentary on Romans is withdrawn.  But where 
abstract eternity was, Jesus of Nazareth now stands.  All human works are relativized 
quite as radically as before, but from the event of Jesus’ existence rather than from the 
event of the contentless moment of eternity…Indeed, the entire pattern of the dialectic 
we traced remains quite unaltered in Barth’s post-1930 theology.  If one went through 
the Commentary on Romans and replaced the tangential intersection of time and 
eternity with the story narrated by the second article of the Apostles’ Creed, he would 
obtain the theology of the Church Dogmatics.289 
 
Given the centrality of the relationship of Jesus Christ to time and eternity that Jenson posits 
we must briefly sketch Barth’s Christological grounding of revelation before we approach his 
mature view on time/eternity.  This will serve to demonstrate that, regardless of exactly how 
he stated it at various times, Barth always ardently maintained the infinite qualitative 
difference between God and humankind, along with the objectivity and actuality of the 
knowledge of God.  He is with us, but he is not of us.  The event of God’s self-revelation is in 
time, but is not of time.  Barth never intended—and this is crucial for a doctrine like that of 
providence—to disconnect God from history as if his transcendence is antithetical to his 
immanence.  Additionally, it is precisely this pattern that shapes his understanding of time 
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The Christological Grounding of Revelation 
 
 Even though it is impossible for Christian preachers to speak about God they do and 
they must.  It is impossible because “[w]e are human…and so cannot speak of God.  For to 
speak of God seriously would mean to speak in the realm of revelation and faith.  To speak of 
God would be to speak God’s word, the word which can come only from him, the word that 
God becomes man.”290  Preachers must speak about God because “Man as man cries for God.  
He cries not for a truth, but for truth; not for something good but for the good…He does not 
cry for solutions but for salvation; not for something human, but for God, for God as his 
Saviour from humanity.”291  These statements emphasize what we previously noted how that 
Barth cut off every escape for “religion.”  Humanity cannot build the bridge to God, or find 
meaning within their religiosity.  If preachers are going to be able to escape the morass and 
contradictory nature of their task,292 there is only one hope: “Deus dixit, God has spoken.”293  
Revelation is the only permission humans have to speak of God, and this permission is a 
miracle of God.  Further, God and revelation are identical, and only so, for revelation is not 
the same as its historical media. 
   
In distinction from scripture, however, revelation is God’s Word itself, God’s own 
speaking in which he alone is the subject, in which no flesh also speaks, but he and he 
alone.  This is found in scripture, this pregnant Deus dixit, God speaking personally as 
the subject, God as the author, God not only giving authentic information about 
himself but himself speaking about himself…The fact that God himself is on the 
scene, speaking about himself, is an adequate reason to speak about him…God in his 
revelation, God as speaking subject, is a possible object of human speech which at 
once becomes a necessary object.294 
 
 
Therefore, the “Deus dixit means that God spoke about himself.”295  God’s self-revelation is 
God, and even though this proceeds in the scripture and preaching296 it is not possible to 
equate revelation with any of them, “[a]s no thing, no contingent entity, no historical fact as 
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such is the speaker, so none can be what is said, the content of revelation.”297  Yet, it does not 
follow that revelation is an eternal event that is outside of history.  “…[C]ontingency lies in 
the nature of revelation.  Deus dixit indicates a special, once-for-all, contingent event to 
which these specific writings rather than any possible writings bear witness.”298  Thus, the 
difference between Romans II and what Barth says here should be evident.  God’s revelation 
is not simply an eternal event wholly disconnected from time, but is contingent, even though 
it does not spring from time it nevertheless exists within time.  God does not encounter 
humanity in an “eternal moment” that touches, yet does not touch, but rather the location of 
God’s self-revelation is in the temporal person of Jesus Christ. 
It remains programmatic for Barth from Romans II onward that theology does not 
reverse the process in the doctrine of revelation.  That is, we do not delimit what would be 
possible or what revelation should look like, and then subsequently demonstrate how God fits 
into our preconceptions.  “The position to be maintained against this is, simply, that 
theological judgments and convictions can only be reached when what a man acknowledges 
and confesses to be appropriate to God and salutary for himself is that which God has 
previously determined and revealed to be appropriate to Himself and salutary for man.”299  
We must do this, according to Barth, because in order to be doing real theology it must be 
dependent upon scripture as it speaks God’s revelation to us.  It cannot be theology if it is 
arbitrary or grounded elsewhere.  Therefore, when Barth inquires as to what the scripture says 
concerning God’s revelation and the answer is unequivocally Jesus Christ, such discussion 
must proceed from the fact of Jesus to the possibility involved and God’s freedom in the 
event.300  
The facts are, according to Barth, that “the first and the last thing to be said about the 
bearer of this name is that He is very God and very Man.  In this unity He is the objective 
reality of divine revelation.”301  Nothing can supplement the revelation of God, hence, when 
we want to talk about God it must only be “a reading and exegesis of this reality.”302  
Revelation in Jesus Christ immediately presses Barth to conclude that it is contingent. 
First, because of Jesus “we infer…that He is God not only in Himself but also in and 
among us, in our cosmos, as one of the realities that meet us.”303  Revelation is contingent.  
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Barth has two purposes in mind here: 1) he sets up the insurmountable boundaries for humans 
to build bridges to God, crushing the hopes of “religion,” even though it does not follow that 
God is not capable of crossing over into our location, which we find is exactly the case in 
Jesus.304  The event of Jesus is where time and eternity meet.  It replaces “eternity” in the 
time-eternity dialectic of Romans II.  The history of Jesus is eternity 
 
without becoming something other than the temporal event in Palestine…He [Barth] 
proclaims the life of the man Jesus, just as it was, as the presupposition of all other 
reality.  Here escape from time and history is shut off for good for our search for the 
sense of our lives in time is directed exactly to a temporal event—not merely as its 
revelation or facilitation, but as its occurrence.305 
 
   
Jenson believes this illumines Barth’s dialectical attack on the synthesis of religion and faith.  
The problem is not that time is so distant from eternity that it demands we strive to reach the 
latter, but rather that that attempt to reach eternity presupposes the idea that God is gone from 
us.  That is, religion assumes that we have life apart from Christ’s life, so it is religion’s call 
to try to get to God, but Barth rejects the possibility of that effort mainly on the grounds that 
God is here with us in Christ.306  2) Only God can reveal himself, hence if Christ reveals God, 
then he must be God.  There can be no revealer that is “more or less” or “almost.”  “What 
God reveals must be God himself, wholly God, equal to God.  Would revelation be revelation 
if something smaller, intermediate, or partial were its content?”307  Kyrios is God, but only 
God is God, so when the early church calls Jesus “Lord” that is to say that they hear the 
revelation of God in the voice of Jesus of Nazareth.308   
Second, because of Jesus we must conclude that the Son must be in the form 
recognizable to us, i.e. a human being.  By being human he is immediately demonstrating his 
solidarity with humanity and its sacred status.  Yet, he is veiled in flesh, which “has to take 
place in order that it may lead to His unveiling and exaltation and so to the completion of 
revelation.”309   
Third, because of Jesus we understand that “His Word by becoming Man at the same 
time is and remains what He is, the true and eternal God, the same as He is in Himself at the 
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Father’s right hand for ever and ever.”310  The veiling of the divinity does not mean that Jesus 
is any less the Word as he is in eternity.  He is veiled, but he does not abandon or lessen his 
divinity.  “He who the third day arose from the dead was no less true God in the manger than 
on the cross.  By becoming flesh the Word is no less true and entire God than he was 
previously in eternity in Himself.”311  “It can be God’s revelation as the presence of the 
Word, undiminished though veiled in its God-ness, in the fleshly reality different from God.  
In this way God may be present to us, but present precisely as God.”312  Barth insists that we 
can only talk of the incarnation as it is revealed to us in Holy Scripture.  Thus, God must be 
with us in only the way that he is in fact with us in Jesus. 
Fourth, because of Jesus we understand that revelation is possible only because Jesus 
became man, that is, human.  He became exactly that which is objective to us—the one thing 
we can most intimately recognize—our humanity.313 
As the above evidences Barth moves beyond the time-eternity dialectic of Romans II 
and replaces the eternal moment of nothingness with Jesus of Nazareth as the locus of unity 
between God and humankind, and therefore, a discussion of the person of Christ is directly 
correlative to the relationship of time and eternity.  Time and eternity are what Jesus Christ is.  
Yet a treatment of time and eternity cannot stop there for revelation does not end at Jesus, but 
directly leads us to God’s being in Triunity.  Thus, since revelation is seen in Jesus Christ, a 
temporal event, God himself must be temporal, a conclusion that is inevitable given Barth’s 
insistence that revelation is the source of all God-talk.  The critical nature of this for Barth’s 
theology as a whole and for understanding his view of time and eternity cannot be overstated, 
and Jenson has eloquently summarized it: 
 
It is the absolute priority of Jesus’ existence, of the life of our brother-man, which is 
the key to the otherwise puzzling convolutions of the great dogmatic theology which 
Barth has developed through his years at Göttingen, Bonn and Basel, and recorded in 
the twelve huge volumes of the Church Dogmatics.  That one starts with the story of 
this man, is the key to a thinking which hammers on the sole and absolute majesty of 
God and the irrelevance of all our works and thoughts to reach him, yet finds anything 
human an appropriate object of dogmatic reflection.  It is the key to a theology which 
is really one vast doctrine of God…If we forget the priority of Christ in considering 
any Barthian doctrine we will infallibly turn it into its direct opposite, the kind of 
isolation of God which people have mislabeled “Barthianism.”  Barth can insist on the 
otherness of God because his God is from the beginning one person with the man 
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Jesus; God’s otherness is therefore the otherness of one man from another, which is 
the very condition of mutual involvement.314 
 
 
This shift in Barth’s focus shapes the Church Dogmatics into nothing less than an expansive 
doctrine of God.  It is important when reading both Barth and Jenson always to bear in mind 
the controlling effect that incarnation and Trinity have on their theological project as a whole, 
and particularly upon time and eternity.  In both the classical formulation and contemporary 
theology much of the discussion on God and time assumes a natural understanding of time 
then posits temporal theories upon the divine. 
As Barth puts it: “God has time for us…Moreover in the interpretation of the concept 
of this time, which is now our task, we shall not have to take as a basis any time concept 
gained independently of revelation itself.”  That is, revelation has to dictate 1) what time is; 
and 2) what it means for God to take up that time.315  Barth rejects arriving at a definition of 
time by any other means precisely because of his “basic subordination of the investigation 
here instituted to the revelation attested in Holy Scripture.”316  He identifies the contrasting 
figures of Augustine317 and Martin Heidegger318 as examples of poor methodology, resulting 
in incorrect conceptions of time.  Both of them regard “time definitively and unequivocally as 
a self-determination of man’s existence as a creature.”  Neither one of them suggests that 
time is something God gives and reveals, but rather they both look for the answer to time 
within humanity itself.  Humanity “possesses time—and he possesses it undisturbed through 
realising himself.”319  The reality of time is determined by man’s being in existence.  The self 
posits time.  Even though Augustine believes God creates time, he only does so inasmuch as 
he creates being, “which as a distentio on its own account is the creator of time.”  We cannot 
define time, says Barth, or understand God’s possession of it “as the product of man’s 
existence interpreted as distentio; it must be regarded as a proper reality, as accessible to God 
as is human existence.”320 
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Here is the line of demarcation between Barth and his critics, not only of his own day, 
but also among contemporary thinkers.  Barth is clearly endorsing the view that time flows 
from the concept of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, not unlike that, for him, theology 
proper and anthropology flow from and are intrinsically bound to Christology.  The failures 
that accompany an alternative approach to time are, for Barth, obvious, and such failures 
compel us to look to revelation for our concept of what “real” time should be.  Why, 
according to Barth, must we reject a “natural” or human-oriented understanding of time in 
favor of a revelational or theological view?  Or, to put it another way, in the determination of 
what our time is, who has priority, physics or theology?  Barth’s answer: 
First, to say that God created time is not to say that created time is identical with what 
we presently claim as “our” time.  Between God’s created time and our time stands the Fall, 
and what we possess now is not created time.  Thus, “[i]f God’s revelation has a time also, if 
God has time for us, if we really…know and possess time, it must be a different time, a third 
time, created alongside of our time and the time originally created by God.”321  Thus, a 
theology of the Fall imposes an immediate hindrance to an apprehension of time in the same 
way that other concepts elude our self-determined grasp, i.e. our own humanity.  To define 
time from an anthropological or natural starting point is to ignore the basic human problem of 
the Fall.322 
Second, in addition to the Fall as a barrier to apprehending time there are questions 
about our condition that press upon us, which, at the end of the day, Barth believes to be 
unanswerable.  What is meant by the present?  Is it not simply a relegation to the past or the 
future?  “What do we know of time, if we have to admit that we know nothing of the present, 
which is apparently its so manifest medium, and which, so they say, is supposed to be its 
ground as well?”323  Does time have a beginning and ending?  And probably most troubling, 
what is the relation between time and eternity? Barth’s aim is to elucidate the incongruence 
of our time with created time.  If we truly understood created time, he believes, then these 
questions would not be difficult for us, yet since they are approaching unanswerable, we must 
be blind to created time.  
  
To assert the reality of time in face of and in spite of these difficulties without the 
desire or the ability to set them aside, or even without letting one-self be worried by 
them, is perhaps in practice only possible for theology when it is revelation theology, 
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and as such in a position to reckon not only with these two times, but in addition, with 
a quite different time.324 
   
Significantly, Barth is not only saying that one cannot know “real” time or “God’s” time 
apart from revelation, but he is saying that one cannot even recognize what our time is apart 
from revelation.  The complexities and unanswerable questions are too prevalent to determine 
what we mean by earthly time, much less what can be said of God.325  Therefore, Barth’s 
rejection of any “natural” path to knowledge of the divine applies to time—ours and his.  
Further, to posit a human comprehension of time would be to impinge upon God as creator—
something that is simply not possible for the creature to do. Hence, Barth’s method of the 
Christological determination of time rests upon the infinite qualitative difference between 
God and humanity, the essence of which is an inherent lack of ability fully to comprehend 
this natural world.  Science has made huge advances since Barth wrote these words, and it 
might be argued that we know more about time than ever before.  However, Barth is correct 
in that no matter how great the advances, our knowledge is never exhaustive and cannot be 
so, given our status as created, rather than Creator. 
Moreover, much of the contemporary discussion focuses on the idea that if we are to 
say something is real, it is temporal.  If God is real and he is with us, then he is temporal, and, 
as far as this goes, perhaps Barth would agree.  But by “temporal” what is it that we suggest?  
Most contemporary philosophers intend “time like we have,” though what that signifies is 
incessantly disputed. But since Barth posits revelation as the determination of concepts such 
as time the divine event cannot spring from historical time, but from eternity.  From Jesus, 
Barth believes, we know God is historical and temporal, but not temporal in the sense of 
being subject to a general law of history or time, since revelation maintains the infinite 
qualitative difference between Creator and creature, and breaks into the created order.  
Immediately, questions arise concerning the place of the natural order (time) in such a 
scheme.  If revelation determines time and God is temporal but not in the sense of being 
subject to some absolute, then would not “our” time be some sort of unreality or swallowed 
up into God’s time?  Further, should a theological account of divine temporality be 
scrutinized by current scientific theory, since the latter can merely offer observations of our 
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time, observations that Barth insists cannot reflect the real because they fall outside the realm 
of faith?326 
That would be an unfortunate construal of Barth’s view of God’s relation to the 
world.  Never is it the case that Barth operated independently of “natural” categories of time 
or that he consciously ignored them.  How, then, does Barth do justice to the external world 
outside of faith and at the same time the reality and priority of the Trinity?  Dalferth 
persuasively argues that Barth stands in stark contrast to his theological predecessors in the 
manner in which he treats the relationship of what he calls the “perspective of faith” and the 
“perspective of the world.”327  According to Dalferth: 
 
Barth takes neither a simple theological [Reformation theology] nor a twofold 
theological and philosophical approach [Schleiermacher], but a twofold theological 
approach to the problem of the external perspective.  He interiorises the whole 
problem and thus reproduces the discontinuity between the external and internal 
perspectives as a categorical distinction within the structure of the internal perspective 
of faith.328 
 
This “interiorisation” that Dalferth refers to is Barth’s method of constructing a dogmatic grid 
through which he then interprets the external world.  More crudely put the world of faith does 
not swallow up and extinguish external reality, nor do they stand side by side as disciplines in 
a never ending search for synthesis.  Rather, Barth’s approach was clearly to give precedence 
to theology as that which is truly real, yet afford the external world its existence “only in so 
far as it is incorporated into the concrete reality of God’s saving self-realisation in Christ.”329  
We learn of true reality in Jesus Christ, and then we take what we have learned and interpret 
the world around us.  To be sure, under this scheme the natural world assumes a status that 
would seem to run cross-grain to common sense.  It becomes “an anhypostatic abstraction, 
unable to exist on its own and systematically at one remove from the texture of concrete 
reality.”330  Nonetheless, according to Barth, this does not render it unreal, and his effort to 
include our experience of the natural world within his dogmatic enterprise is evidence that a 
retreat into a “separatist fideism” is hardly his intention.331 
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It was never Barth’s objective to create a theology isolated from the external world, 
deaf to other vital contributions outwith dogmatics.  Indeed, merely positing theological 
priority does not absolve one from the burden of giving a rigorous account of divine 
temporality.  Certainly for Barth time flows from God’s triune act, yet it is still time—still 
part of our created order—which is precisely the reason for a thorough examination of the 
issue.  Barth’s doctrine of revelation is designed to accomplish the very task of giving an 
account of the reality of our world by means of a theological priority.  Theology is not a 
discipline set alongside many others, which turns a deaf ear to their contributions.  Rather, 
theology listens to those other disciplines, for it is the grid through which they must be 
interpreted.  T. F. Torrance aptly portrays both sides of the coin, and when commenting on 
Barth’s position in this regard he states:  
 
What, then, is the relation between theology and philosophy?  Between theology and 
a philosophy that remains strictly philosophy, there can be and will be, not only a 
                                                                                                                                                        
both ontologically and epistemologically “within the confines of Christology and the doctrine of God” (63).  
This, he claims, renders the created order unreal and Barth’s use of the analogia fidei leads to such 
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benevolent neutrality, not only peace, but, at least for theology, the most instructive 
co-operation.  But between theology and a philosophy which insists on being a 
theosophy there can only be war to the knife.332 
 
And to clarify the point even further Torrance states:  
 
In this involvement with epistemological and methodological questions theological 
science is inevitably committed to dialogue with the other sciences and with 
philosophy, as well as with ordinary experience, for they too are engaged in 
disciplined activity to clarify the referential relations of human thought and speech 
and are continually at work refining and enlarging their range to in hitherto unknown 
realities.333     
 
It is precisely this that I am suggesting fills in a missing piece within contemporary studies on 
time and eternity.  Time and eternity are theological determinations.  If we begin with time, 
judge its nature or characteristics (e.g. process, illusory, or what have you), then move to 
God’s eternity we have necessarily constructed God’s nature out of that which is created, 
rather than the Creator. 
The time/eternity discussion tends to be dominated by philosophers who are 
preoccupied with arguing for the possibility (or impossibility) of atemporality.  Yet, what 
happens if or when that argument succeeds?  Presumably we must simply transpose the 
findings to the Christian God, and if we do that, what has made this distinctly Christian any 
more than pagan Greek philosophy?  I suppose establishing the possibility of something has 
its place, but it is a very different thing to apply the argument to Christian theology.  For 
example, Hasker has argued against timelessness (by which he means atemporality) by 
attempting to demonstrate the incoherence of divine timeless intuitive knowledge, i.e. a 
timeless God cannot have immediate knowledge of a temporal world.  The argument is 
thorough and detailed, yet it is only in the conclusion that anything distinctly Christian 
appears.  He states:  
 
I believe these considerations add up to a compelling case for rejecting the doctrine of 
timelessness.  It is with considerable relief—indeed, with a powerful sense of 
liberation—that we turn from the labyrinth of timelessness to the biblical conception 
of a God who has freely created our spatiotemporal world and involves himself 
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actively in its history.  God calls things into existence, he orders and arranges them, 
he speaks to his rational creatures and involves himself intimately in their lives.  He 
issues promises and commands and suffers grief when the promises are spurned and 
the commandments broken.  He frames a plan for the redemption of the broken world 
and executes that plan at great cost to himself.  He places before us his children the 
goal of a Kingdom that shall have no end.334     
 
I find this type of argument (not his theological statements) problematic.  As a Christian and 
given his assertions in the above quotation Hasker presumably believes how the Bible attests 
to God in Jesus Christ, yet apparently that revelation is not persuasive enough to debunk 
atemporality.  Instead a further argument from analytic philosophy is the only one that brings 
incomparable relief that we are no longer bound by this.  Additionally, apparently rejecting 
the possibility of atemporality automatically leads one to the Christian God—a dubious 
assumption, especially given that the reworking of God’s eternity by many (Christian) 
philosophers today centers on “everlastingness,” which is explicitly rejected by Barth and 
other theologians as the core of the divine eternity.  It is not at all clear, then, that these 
philosophical arguments lead us where the authors want us to go, but rather they drive us 
right back to revelation for the answers.  In order to make this even more obvious I shall 
examine a recent proposal on time and eternity from Alan Padgett on God as “relatively 
timeless.”335 
 
The progression of Padgett’s thesis can be summarized in the following points: 1) the 
Christian tradition has, by and large, taught that God is atemporal, having no temporal 
extension, i.e. time is absent from his being; 2) It can coherently be said that God is 
absolutely timeless and absolutely immutable only if the stasis theory of time is true; 3) the 
stasis theory of time is not true; 4) God really changes because he is in relationship with the 
world, therefore God is temporal; 5) God as Creator transcends our time and his time is not 
Measured Time.  Even without any further comment it should be obvious that Padgett shares 
much with our theologians.  However, I will, for the sake of clarity, flesh out some of his 
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assertions, and then specifically interact with his comments on Barth to demonstrate that my 
thesis would dovetail nicely with his. 
 Points three through five are the most relevant for us, hence, I will omit his historical 
discussion and the detailed treatment of contemporary defenders of the stasis theory.  
Furthermore, in chapter one I have sufficiently covered the theories of time and the 
possibility of atemporality/timeless causation.  What is most interesting about Padgett’s 
evaluation of the stasis theory is that since he believes it must be rejected on philosophical 
grounds, any theological use of it also is unwarranted.  As we will see below, he believes 
Barth assumes it in his doctrine of time, thus it too is fatally flawed. 
   It seems to me that Padgett’s fundamental and overriding argument against the stasis 
theory of time is that “it leads to incoherence with our fundamental intuitions about the 
world,” and those intuitions should not be abandoned without overwhelming grounds to do 
so.336  Thus, Padgett is less interested in proposing his own theory of time337 as he is in 
dismantling the theory of time that underpins an atemporal view of God.  According to 
Padgett, both the scientific and philosophical arguments supporting the stasis theory are not 
sufficiently sound to merit the abandoning of the intuitive process view of time.338  “Of 
course the utility and necessity of a stasis type of perspective on time, as a kind of ‘fourth 
dimension’ for certain reflective activities, is not in question.  What we want are reasons for 
adopting a stasis view of time as the only proper view of the physical universe as it is in 
itself.”339  Padgett’s conclusion is that if some process view of time is the way the world 
actually is, then the stasis theory is not the way the world actually is; and if it is not, then the 
theory of divine atemporality upon which it rests must be rejected.340  Instead, some other 
version of divine temporality must be adopted that resonates with a process view of time.  
That theory is what he calls “relative timelessness.” 
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 Of course, from the title alone we should infer similarities with Barth and Jenson, and, 
indeed, that is the case.  Padgett begins the explication of what it means for God to be 
relatively timeless by reaffirming that God really changes and must, therefore, be temporal.341  
Yet, rightly, he notes how we cannot simply make such a statement and proceed, lest we 
commit critical theological errors.  The fact is, according to Padgett, that God is the “ground” 
and “Lord” of time.  By the former he suggests that God has made an eternal decision to live 
a dynamic life within himself, and this is entirely possible.  He has also decided to live in 
relation with the created order and given that this world is temporal, then the dynamic nature 
of our world must be grounded in the dynamic nature of its Creator.342  By “Lord of time” 
Padgett, like Barth and Jenson, emphasizes God’s power over time as an aspect of his 
creation, which cannot limit or overcome him as our experience of time does to us by losing 
being to the past and by death.  Entailed in this concept is divine aseity and immutability.  
However, it is immutability that depends upon Dorner’s343 definition of it—that “God is 
necessarily or essentially immutable with respect to a limited set of predicates, which are his 
character and perfections.”344  Similarly, Barth endorses Dorner’s view of immutability and 
even credits him with the source of Barth’s discussion of what he prefers to call God’s 
“constancy.”345  To borrow Jenson’s idiom, so far, so very good. 
 The answer to the conundrum of God’s changing and his immutability—we might 
say, his temporality and his timelessness—is that he is relatively timeless.  For this Padgett 
argues in the following way.  First, causes and effects that are temporal in themselves are also 
temporally related.  God is temporal and the world is his causal relationship, therefore, there 
must be some kind of temporal relationship between God’s eternity and our time.346  As “is 
the case with God, no duration occurs between direct divine act and immediate effect, then 
                                                 
341 See especially chapter one of God, Eternity.  This assertion, however, can only be stated to prove that God is 
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the divine cause will be Zero Time Related to the created effect.”347  Thus, Padgett believes 
that the temporal relation God has to creation is not a one-to-one relation, or, God’s time is 
distinct from our time and cannot be measured in the same way we measure our time.  In this 
sense, he is “timeless;” that is, God has a temporal relation to the world because he lives a 
dynamic, temporal life in himself, but that temporal relation has no metric.  The reasons for 
this are twofold: 1) “God is not subject to the laws of nature, as anything in Measured Time 
must be,” because our measurement of time depends upon the regular law-like activity of the 
created order; and 2) “any Measured Time is relative to a particular frame of reference, which 
need not apply to God’s time.”348  Therefore, since creation and our time do not envelope 
God, but rather the reverse, God cannot be measured by something that depends upon a law 
subordinate to himself.  Moreover, the question based on STR concerning which temporal 
frame of reference God is in is meaningless for Padgett since such contingent facts cannot be 
established even within our world.  “If, then, for different observers in our own space-time 
the difference between E1 and E2 is not always one Stund, how can we insist…that the 
duration between E1 and E2 will be one Stund in God’s time?”349  I would suggest that this 
further supports Barth’s method that we must look to revelation if we want to perceive the 
divine eternity. 
 To summarize, Padgett has developed a proposal where God is sovereign Creator, not 
subject to the laws of nature and is possessor of his own time; where an A-series, process 
theory of time is built into the fabric of our world; where God and the world have a temporal 
relation, yet that relation lacks duration and is Zero Time Related; and since God’s time 
grounds our time and we live in his time rather than the reverse, there is no congruence 
between God’s time and our physical time.  I should further clarify what Padgett has and has 
not accomplished.  By making a strong argument against the stasis theory of time and for 
some sort of process view of time he has effectively made conclusions only regarding our 
time.  That we live in process is intuitively what we believe and he has provided good reasons 
for sustaining that belief.  Additionally, he has claimed—notably, based on what he believes 
                                                 
347 Ibid., 126.  This Zero Time Related theory concerns the relationship of God’s direct (as opposed to indirect), 
causal sustaining of the world apart from any causal sequence or chain of events.  There is no duration between 
God’s act to sustain and that sustaining itself.  “This is as it should be, since God is omnipotent and 
omnipresent, and is not limited in causal powers in the same way that physical things are” (21).  But here is 
where confusion arises: If God’s direct act to sustain the world is lacking duration, then what is temporal about 
that relation?  Zero Time Relation supports Padgett’s view that God is in one sense “timeless,” yet it does not 
illuminate how that relation can be in process.  Given the weight of his arguments against absolute timelessness 
and for the process theory of time, we would expect more clarity regarding exactly what it means for God’s 
direct sustaining of the universe to lack duration, yet the God/world relation remains a temporal one. 
348 Ibid., 127. 
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to be true of God, i.e. a theological argument—that God is temporal because he changes not 
by doing the same thing throughout time but by doing new things,350 sustains the world 
whose time is in process, and, nevertheless, that he transcends A-series time.  Missing from 
this theory is the component we would expect, viz., a theological model of exactly what 
God’s time is and how it can be a time of process, yet transcend the discontinuities of our 
processional time.  Put another way, how can God be in a temporal relation to an A-series 
world, yet not be constrained by the very elements that make A-series what it is, viz., past, 
present, and future?  Presumably, the answer is that since the created order is A-series time 
and God is in relation to this time, then he, too, must experience some sort of process time, 
though it is his own.  Merely coming to this conclusion and giving an account of it are 
certainly very different animals, and the explanation of how these times relate is 
conspicuously absent.  
 This is not to say that Padgett’s thesis is irrelevant, but only to demonstrate that at the 
end of the day he makes similar theological conclusions Barth and Jenson do, albeit without a 
rigorous effort at trinitarian theologizing, and coming at precisely in the opposite direction 
that Barth does.  To make the theological conclusions that he does he must rely on revelation, 
just as Barth implores us to, so why not center his work there?  Padgett’s work is helpful in 
that it confirms or supports many of the conclusions in Barth, Jenson, and even this thesis, yet 
it should be evident that his method falls short of being theologically satisfactory since it 
cannot offer a strong statement on divine temporality merely by means of a natural 
understanding of time. 
 
Therefore, due to Barth’s unambiguous theological approach we can progress toward his 
understanding of time and eternity only by way of Trinity, and we will do so by asking the 
following questions: 1) what is the relationship of God’s being in eternity with his temporal 
action?  2) What of the “immanent” and “economic” Trinity?  3) What account does Barth 





                                                 
350 “Response to Critics,” God and Time: Four Views, 125. 
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God’s Triunity: Divine Being and Act 
 
“God reveals Himself.  He reveals Himself through Himself.  He reveals Himself.”  
That is, God is Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness.  Thus, one cannot begin a doctrine of 
revelation apart from a doctrine of the triune God.352  “Revelation is not made real and true 
by anything else, whether in itself or for us.  Both in itself and for us it is real and true 
through itself…”353  So, even scripture is God’s Word not because it is revelation, but 
because “revelation has become an event in it.”  God’s revealing is such that to make himself 
known he causes scripture to be related to himself, therefore, nothing can identify itself as 
revelation, save Trinity.  For Barth, this is to say that God is Lord, and is only so because he 
is free.  Revelation is so only because of his freedom as Lord, thus revelation is God himself.  
Hence, Barth concludes, God reveals himself as the Lord, which is revelation itself, and we 
call this “the root of the doctrine of the Trinity.”354 
One implication of this for Barth is that the statements about the Trinity are only 
summaries that cannot be regarded as identical to Trinity itself.  That is, theology and 
exegesis and interpretation always “make use of other concepts besides those in the 
original.”355  Accordingly, when the theologian takes from the text what is there, he 
necessarily and unavoidably adds concepts to the original, rendering the doctrine dissimilar to 
the thing itself.  Thus, “we are not saying, then, that revelation is the basis of the Trinity, as 
though God were the triune God only in His revelation and only for the sake of His 
revelation.  What we are saying is that revelation is the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity; 
the doctrine of the Trinity has no other basis apart from this.”  That is, revelation is God in se, 
and our doctrine of the Trinity can only derive itself from revelation without being identical 
to it.356  Thus, even though language is insufficient and cannot be identified with God, 
nevertheless God empowers it to “fit the object” he intends.357 
Yet, to speak of the root of the doctrine of the Trinity this way means that God is at 
one and the same time Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness—concepts derived, according 
to Barth, from subordination to scripture, which intend to show “to what extent we are in fact 
led by revelation itself to the problem of triunity.”358  Not only is Barth indicating that the 
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sole criterion of God’s identity is God himself, but also that the God who in himself cannot 
be unveiled to humans has unveiled himself within history, within a particular form.  That is, 
his self-unveiling takes the form of a self-distinction within God between the hidden mode of 
being and the revealed mode of being, and the fact that it is self-distinction demonstrates 
there is a real difference, but no subordination.  Barth maintains that this self-distinction is 
proper to God, “i.e., to be God in Himself and in concealment, and yet at the same time to be 
God a second time in a very different way, namely, in manifestation, i.e., in the form of 
something He Himself is not.”359  But for God to take form does not mean that he abandons 
his veiling.  “He assumes a form, yet not in such a way that any form will compass Him…His 
‘second time in a different way’ does not really prevent Him from remaining the same.”360 
Crucially, Barth views the divine identity through the temporal existence of Jesus 
Christ, therefore the God that is hidden is the same God that reveals himself in Jesus, “for the 
decisive word about its proclamation the Church cannot listen to any other voice than the 
voice of its Lord.”361  Once again, “Jesus is Lord,” according to Barth, leads us directly into 
the question of the divine being; thus, we must say that what God does in Jesus, i.e. in time, 
he is in eternity, for there are not two gods, but one God who is fully present in Jesus Christ. 
Further, God is one in his eternal being, but that eternal being is not disconnected from his 
being in Christ, and though they are different, they are the same.  Thus, in the same way that 
humanity and divinity are perfectly united in Jesus and this presents no hindrance to God, so 
time and eternity are perfectly united in Jesus Christ as Lord, who is one with the Father and 
Spirit. 
 
Excursus: History as Urgeschichte 
 
Because Barth relies on the Christological grounding of revelation it means that 
revelation is a historical event, yet, again, Barth’s view of history (and time) is controversial.  
Indeed, Pannenberg frames the problem by rejecting both the existential historicity of 
Bultmann and the “suprahistorical ground of faith” he perceives in Barth.362  That is, 
Pannenberg’s charge is that Barth’s theology is stripped of its meaning due to his doctrine of 
Urgeschichte—that the “transition from the Christological to the anthropological sphere [can] 
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consist in anything but an assertion that the latter has been displaced altogether by the 
former.”363  To evaluate this charge, I will begin with a summary of Barth’s view of history.   
First, when Barth talks about revelation being “historical” he does not intend it to 
mean that revelation is “apprehensible by a neutral observer.”  That is, one may have seen the 
temple or the crucifixion since those events took place in history, but that does not mean, for 
Barth, that they saw revelation.  They very easily could have interpreted it to mean something 
other than God, thus not seeing revelation.  Hence revelation is not historical in the sense that 
anyone can observe it, grasp it, and control it as and when they wish.364   
Second, “historical” does not indicate a general relation between God and humanity 
that always obtains, but the Bible marks out the specific time and event that is revelation.  So 
then, revelation does not take place, then continually so as some sort of process or state of 
being that anyone in any epoch can merely observe.  “History” means that it took place then 
and there.365 
Third, some general concept of history cannot be the judge of biblical history.  It can 
neither “claim nor deny that this point or that God has acted on men.”  To do so, according to 
Barth is to abandon neutrality and opt for faith or unbelief.  Thus, what kind of judge could 
general history claim to be if it adopts either one of these positions?  “General historicity” 
cannot decide the question of the “hearing or non-hearing of the biblical history.”  According 
to Barth, if revelation was something that could arise out of history as the “realization of a 
general possibility,” then we should reject such a revelation.  It cannot spring from any 
general historical principles or possibility.  It does not come from our history.  It is historical, 
but not in the sense of being subject to our rules.366  This is where Barth’s use of analogy 
comes to the fore in the sense that even though revelation is historical it is only analogously 
so and not a generally existing relationship.367 
Thus, it is Barth’s use of the word Urgeschichte368 that summarizes this view of 
history.  Though the precise impact of this concept becomes more evident in the next chapter 
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under the discussion of resurrection and incarnation, it is appropriate to lay the groundwork 
here.  The problem, as it has been throughout the history of theology, is “how that which is 
proper to Him be recognized as proper to us?”  Or, what right do we have to say that what 
Jesus has done can rightly and justly be applied to us?369  At the root of this problem for 
Barth is the question of time; or, how is it that redemptive events can truly participate in our 
time whilst avoiding the twofold consequence of existential historicity and “critical-historical 
investigation as the scientific verification of events?”370 That is, how is God both eternal and 
temporal whilst remaining free from the constraints of our time? 
The answer Barth gives to this is that the history of Jesus Christ is the primal history, 
or the one that is of prime order, the ground of all other history.  It is history that truly occurs 
in our space and time, even though its historicity is not that of the types described above.  He 
uses the term in relation to several realities including the incarnation, the divine eternal 
decision that precedes this event,371 creation,372 and the resurrection.373  Each of these 
realities is a pure act of God that is played out in the theater of his relation with the world.  
Thus, the primary “history” is not that of everyday events as such (Historie), but is the 
Urgeschichte of God’s pure act ad intra and ad extra.  And in the foregoing statement rests 
the key to Barth’s view of history: God is identical in his being-for-himself (eternity) with his 
being-for-us (temporality/history).  Thus, to be certain that the one does not collapse into the 
other bringing fatal consequences to the Christian gospel Barth forges this conception of 
history where God’s act in time is “non-historical” in the sense that it is purely from God and 
“it cannot be deduced and compared and therefore perceived and comprehended.”374  Yet, it 
is historical in the sense that God’s unique history has taken place in our time. 
 This may indeed sound like a classic case of Barth having his cake and eating it, yet 
the ground it is on, in my opinion, is certainly more stable than that of the alternatives.  Barth 
discounts as “sheer superstition” the idea that something can only be verified to have 
occurred in time when it is judged so “by the methods, and above all the tacit assumption, of 
modern historical scholarship.”375  Not only would such historicist methodology rule out the 
possibility of something like the resurrection, but it is also, once again, a graphic illustration 
                                                 
369 CD IV.1, 286. 
370 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 16. 
371 CD II.2, 105, 124. 
372 CD III.1, 78-81. 
373 CD IV.1, 336.  Though, as we have already argued, the terminology here when taken in context is 
synonymous to Urgeschichte.   
374 CD III.1, 80. 
375 CD III.2, 446. 
 91 
that the fundamental difference between Barth and many of his critics is in the understanding 
of rationality and the knowledge of God.  For Barth, actuality determines rationality, and 
what is actual is God’s self-revelation.  For his opponents, what is actual is human rationality 
and what must be assimilated into that is the gospel.   
Ultimately, this is Pannenberg’s objection to Barth because Pannenberg is operating 
under the presupposition that “all theological questions and answers are meaningful only 
within the framework of the history which God has with humanity and through humanity 
with his whole creation.”376  Now, if you mean by that there is no other possible world than 
our present one from which to determine the reality of the gospel, the answer is obviously 
affirmative.  But if you mean (as Pannenberg does) that faith in the resurrection depends upon 
rational, historical investigation, then God’s freedom in his redemptive act is necessarily tied 
to the created order and, for Barth, that obliterates the freedom of God for himself, collapsing 
him into a necessary existence with history.377  The correspondence between Urgeschichte 
and Barth’s doctrine of time is basic—both flow from Barth’s understanding of God-for-
himself and God-for-us.  Thus, just as God’s history is historical in the sense that it actually 
happened within our history, but is not historical in the sense that it can be subjected to 
historical investigation because it is of a different kind, so God is temporal in that he 
“happens” in our time, yet we cannot subject him to our time because it is of a different kind. 
 
Returning to the subject of this section, “God is who He is in His works.”  By this 
statement Barth intends that we cannot identify God as someone separate from the works he 
demonstrates to us, because it is in them that he reveals himself.  We do not see his works on 
the one hand, and then on the other identify his being apart from them.  “The reality of God 
which encounters us in His revelation is His reality in all the depths of eternity.”378  
Nevertheless, the works do not exhaust God.  “They are bound to Him, but He is not bound to 
them…But He is who He is without them…Yet in Himself He is not another than He is in 
His works.”379   As expected, Barth warns that the doctrine of God should not collapse into 
the doctrine of being.  The works manifest him, yet he is distinct from them.  Hence, he is 
opposed to “a concept of being that is common, neutral and free to choose, but with one 
which is from the first filled out in a quite definite way.”380  So, when Barth titles this section 
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the “Being of God in Act” he means that “God is who He is in the act of His revelation.”  His 
acts declare the nature of his being.  Or, as Jüngel puts it, “God’s Being is in Becoming.”  
God’s revelation—the content of the Word—is intrinsically related to his act, which causes 
us to recognize it as an event.  God is in becoming (ist im werden) because God is a particular 
event.  That particular event is God’s revelation to humanity in Jesus Christ, and by doing so 
he is making himself an object to be known.  Therefore, he is the God of revelation and of 
concealment, and that tells us that “it is proper to Him to distinguish Himself from Himself, 
i.e. to be God in Himself and in concealment, and yet at the same time to be God a second 
time in a very different way, namely, in manifestation, i.e. in the form of something He 
Himself is not.”381  If God is becoming in his nature, then this implies that what we know 
scripture attributes to him, that he can do.  This is Barth’s attack on religion—on a priori 
theological method.  Barth is adamantly opposed to a decision on what is and is not 
appropriate for God prior to or above revelation.  Likewise, it puts no strain on the being of 
God temporally to distinguish himself from himself, so that when the scripture testifies that 
God is temporal in Jesus, yet he also transcends our earthly boundaries, we can recognize this 
is proper to him.  Yet, if God is what he does among us, then why include the distinction of 
“immanent” and “economic” Trinity—God in his being for himself and in his being for us?  
Surely we have reached the center of Barth’s doctrine of God that is not without controversy.   
 
God’s Triunity: Immanent and Economic Trinity 
 
In revealing himself to us in this gracious way, God must remain free from necessity 
or condition.  He reveals himself to humanity, but is not thereby man’s “prisoner.”  Gunton 
puts it another way: “The asymmetry consists in the fact that while act is indeed a true guide 
to essence, knowledge of essence does not entail knowledge of the particular acts that God is 
going to perform.”  Further, God always retains his freedom to reveal himself, even “in the 
form He assumes when He reveals Himself…It is not the form, but God in the form, that 
reveals, speaks, comforts, works and aids…God’s self-unveiling remains an act of sovereign 
divine freedom.”  This undergirds Barth’s understanding of the veiling and unveiling.  They 
are not in contradiction with one another, but there must be the veiling in order to recognize 
that there is an unveiling.  “The upshot is that there is not imbalance between God’s 
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becoming God in the form of something that he himself is not, and his remaining true to 
himself in this becoming.”382   
In sum, there is a unity and distinction in God’s being for us and God’s being for 
himself.  God’s being corresponds to itself in both, the former ontologically and relationally 
grounded in the latter.383  Moreover, “God’s being for us does not define God’s being but, in 
his being for us, God does indeed interpret his being.”384  Therefore, the “is” in Barth’s 
phrase “God is who he is in his works” should not be construed to mean God’s being is 
identical to, or the sum total of his works, but should understood as “correctly reflecting,” or 
“distinct, but not separate from.”  
To say, however, that God’s being for us is grounded in his being for himself is also 
to open the door to potential misunderstanding and speculation.  It does not mean that Barth 
did not consider God’s works ad extra to constitute the divine being, which would, of course, 
include the incarnation and Jesus’ temporal existence.  McCormack carefully considers the 
weight Barth places upon the extent to which God’s being for us is “constitutive” of his 
triunity.  He concludes that the only sense in which it is correct to say that Barth considered 
God’s external works as constitutive of his eternal being is “as a consequence of the primal 
decision in which God assigned to himself the being he would have throughout eternity (a 
being-for the human race), God is already in a pre-temporal eternity—by way of 
anticipation—that which he would become in time.”385  McCormack also claims that Barth 
himself has inconsistently applied his commitment to the unity of God’s being for himself 
and God’s being for us by opening the door to a radical distinction between the immanent and 
economic Trinity in places like CD IV.1, 52.386  We might consider it in this manner: at times 
Barth seems to have classic Reformation theology in the back of his mind as he writes 
concerning the unity of God’s being for himself and his being for us.  Indeed, as McCormack 
rightly points out, the difference between Barth and Calvin is an onto-theological one: there 
is no god behind the God we know in the revelation of the man, Jesus Christ.  At other times 
Barth seems to have the nineteenth century historicizing of theology in the back of his mind 
when he insists on God’s otherness from history and our time.  That Jesus had his own time, 
eternal time, real time creates that distance lacking in the natural, historicized religion of 
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Schleiermacher’s era.  Finding a way to give full and proper weight to both proved difficult, 
and Barth seems on the whole to have left some gaps.  Nevertheless, the gaps here and the 
resulting ones in time and eternity, though they most certainly call for further development or 
revision, do not prove fatal for Barth’s entire theology.   
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how these gaps must be resolved.  McCormack’s 
proposed correction, for example, is to take Barth’s guiding principle of God’s being for 
himself is his being in act to the logical conclusion that election determines Trinity, rather 
than the reverse.  It may be, as McCormack claims, that Barth was simply unwilling to revise 
his earlier work on revelation and Triunity in view of his mature thought on election; or it 
may be that Barth recognized the potential pitfall into which McCormack has fallen and he 
decided to avoid it.  Jenson offers his own version of corrections to which we will turn in 
chapter six, along with further critical evaluation of Barth.  Thus, there appears to be 
theological reasons that Barth maintains this unity in distinction between God’s being for 
himself and God’s being for us.  We must now turn to the question of how he expects to hold 
this together. 
 
God’s Triunity: The Divine Freedom 
 
A feature constantly to keep before us: this unity in distinction is held together by 
God’s freedom; it is the “crucial proviso” in his relation to the world.  The fact that he can 
and does relate himself to the world does not entail that he must.387  God is the God of grace 
and love, not compelled to do something he may or may not wish to do.  What is unique 
about God’s freedom (since God defines God’s self) is that it is more than the negative sense 
of an absence of limits or restrictions, but rather includes the positive sense of being 
“grounded in one’s own being, to be determined and moved by oneself.”388  This relates to 
the old orthodox term aseity, though the current idea of freedom or independentia tends to 
emphasize the positive aspect, rather than the negative.389  It is crucial to recognize this fact 
in Barth, for it is a point of contention in some modern Barthian commentators.390  Barth 
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refuses to define freedom solely in terms of the negative, even though he acknowledges that 
concept is indispensable to a proper understanding of God’s relation to the created order.391 
The Bible, says Barth, testifies to a transcendent God who is so not only because of 
the Creator/creature distinction, but in exercising his freedom he enters into full communion 
with reality other than Himself.  He goes on: “God has the prerogative to be free without 
being limited by His freedom, free not to surrender Himself to it, but to use it to give Himself 
to this communion and to practice this faithfulness in it…”392  All this serves the idea that we 
cannot view God’s freedom as transcendence in strictly the negative sense of distinction from 
the created order.  If we do, according to Barth, then we fall back into a view of God that is 
oriented toward abstraction and laden with preconceived or philosophical notions of God that 
in no way resemble the God of the Bible.  Time and eternity follow the same pattern.  If God 
as timeless is viewed in the sense that it has been in the tradition—the negative side of our 
temporal existence—then we risk positing a God that is little more than the god of Greek 
metaphysics.  God is not abstractly and obscurely everything that we are not, especially 
atemporal.  He is timeless, not in the sense that his being is absolutely independent from 
created time, but in that he enters into our time and yet remains eternal. 
A comparison with Jenson on this idea of God’s freedom is instructive: that God’s 
being is identified by and with the temporal works within history, i.e., the Exodus and 
Resurrection.  By claiming that we cannot know God through any other means than his works 
Barth is challenging any natural theology that would posit the knowledge or being of God 
through some path other than God himself; consequently, of a priori theological method.  
Still, he falls short of Jenson’s move to make the divine being identical to those temporal 
events (though, as detailed in previous chapters Jenson recognizes the panentheistic 
tendencies his position brings and makes an effort to militate against it).  However, the reality 
is that Barth has more clearly distinguished ontology and epistemology in that God is Father, 
Son, and Spirit a se, while Jenson has pushed Barth’s position a step further and intermingled 
the two.  To use Jenson’s terminology we might say that Barth believes that God is identified 
by Exodus and Resurrection, and is united to those events, with the caveat that he retains 
freedom in that unity; while Jenson believes he is identified (freely—in Barth’s sense) by and 
with the temporal events.  The goal for both theologians is the same— God is with us as he is 
in himself —yet the paths diverge, which will lead us directly into the issue of time.  Barth is 
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happier with the distinction between God in himself and God for us, which also gives him the 
theological freedom to say the same about time—God’s eternity is different than ours, though 
not in contradiction with it.  Likewise, God is who he is in himself apart from the created 
order, though the divine act that we meet within that order is not in contradiction with who he 
is in himself.  Jenson desires a more explicit relationship between God and our time, though, 
as I have alluded to in previous chapters and will expand upon in chapter six, he does not 
clearly outline what that is and, consequently, remains closer to Barth than he might think 
(albeit introducing problematic elements). 
One final step is needed before expositing Barth’s full perspective on time and 
eternity, and that is briefly to examine its triune structure. 
 
God’s Triunity: Unity in Multiplicity 
 
By now it should be obvious that God’s eternity is grounded and structured in Trinity.  
Strictly speaking, it is Christology that reveals divine eternity and time, yet it is axiomatic for 
Barth that Christology directly leads us into God’s triunity.393  Thus, as Barth unfolds his 
understanding of Trinity a corresponding unfolding of eternity could accompany it.  This 
does not imply that all our answers concerning time are thereby unambiguously answered, 
though it does go far in explicating Barth’s understanding of it.  The structure is roughly as 
follows: Unity in Trinity (ousia), Trinity in Unity (hypostases), and Triunity (perichoresis). 
It is significant that for Barth that discussion of the divine ousia (the One) is logically 
prior to that of the hypostases (the Three), for so he claims: “The doctrine of the triunity of 
God…does not entail—this above all must be emphasized and established—any abrogation 
or even questioning but rather the final and decisive confirmation of the insight that God is 
One.”394  Thus, according to Barth, the task of the church has always been to answer the 
question how it is that God is One.  Though Barth, as evidenced by his doctrine of revelation, 
may appear to lay a foundation for a priority of threeness not oneness,395 he does not pursue 
this line of thought.  This is not to say that he follows a scholastic understanding of divine 
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simplicity, or oneness in the sense of singularity or isolation.  Rather, oneness is what 
revelation determines it to be, and oneness for God includes his “threefold repetition” of 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, “in such a way also that He is the one God only in this 
repetition.”396  Barth clearly maintains that the threeness of the persons do not subvert the 
unity of the one God, for it is not “threeness of essence,” an essence of plurality, individuals 
or parts.  Therefore, while threeness in revelation is what it means to be one, the threeness 
cannot rule over the oneness, for it is that oneness that is the name “Yahweh-Kyrios.”  In 
other words, according to Barth, to say “God” is to speak of the One God in his essence as 
Lord, or, his ousia.397  To substantiate this point even further Barth believes that today when 
we say “personality” of God, we refer to the ousia, “which the doctrine of the Trinity does 
not seek to triple but rather to recognize in its simplicity.”  That is, God is “He,” not “It.”  
“Person” does not equal “personality” in the sense that is intended in this doctrine.  The latter 
is to safeguard against the “It,” and the former denotes the identities of Trinity without saying 
there are three personalities.  “Identity of substance implies the equality of substance of ‘the 
persons.’”398  Therefore, Hunsinger’s judgment is correct when he claims that “although there 
is no ousia without the hypostases, and no hypostases without the perichoresis, the divine 
ousia is, in Barth’s judgment, logically prior and determinative.”399  Yet, Barth refuses to 
deduce the nature of Trinity from the common concept of the number one.  Numerical unity 
in its general understanding has the limitations of singularity and isolation, that is, “one” 
cannot be understood apart from the accompanying “two” or “three.”  But Barth rejects this 
when applied to God, saying that he is not limited or isolated in relation to others; thus, he 
does not need a second or third in order to be the one God.400 
Consequently, God is one, i.e. Unity in Trinity, and that above all is to be affirmed.  
Yet, he is not one apart from the hypostases, i.e. he is also Trinity in Unity.  What are we to 
say about Father, Son, and Spirit that establishes their unity?  Barth proceeds by means of a 
discussion vis-à-vis the term “person” that has traditionally been used to designate the 
distinction within Trinity.  Barth prefers the term “modes of being” due to the fact that he is 
uncomfortable with the evolution of the term in modern studies, namely, the problems of 
translation between East and West, and the evolution of the term to denote a close association 
between “person” and “essence.”  With the addition of the idea of self-consciousness to the 
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term “personality” it becomes nearly interchangeable with the patristic and medieval persona, 
creating problems for trinitarian theology.  Rather than make an attempt to return to that 
ancient connotation Barth opts for a different term on the basis that it is not a new idea, but 
reflects the central one in the history of this discussion, viz., that “God is God in a special 
way as Father, as Son, and as Spirit.”401  Without a doubt this has caused confusion for 
Barth’s readers over the years; nevertheless there is little ground on which to accuse him of 
modalism. 
God is the one God only in the three modes of being; thus the distinction between the 
modes of being is essential to what it means to be God to such an extent that if we were to 
say the Father could just as easily be the Son or, put another way, could have died and risen 
from the dead, makes the modes of being unessential to the divine being and disposes of 
Trinity.402  Similarly, when describing God with something like love or righteousness it 
would be wholly unacceptable to apply it to one mode of being and not the other, for they are 
true of the one God.403  Consequently, if the modes of being are not distinguishable 
materially, then how are they distinguished?  Barth says that they are distinguished 
relationally.  Or put another way, the modes of being “can be derived from the regularly 
recurring relations of the three concepts to one another as these occur most simply between 
the concepts of Father, Son and Spirit.”404  “He brings forth Himself and in two distinctive 
ways He is brought forth by Himself.  He possesses Himself as Father, i.e., pure Giver, as 
Son, i.e., Receiver and Giver, and as Spirit, i.e., pure Receiver.”405  Therefore, Barth, along 
with Jenson, rejects the doctrine of simplicity in its tendency to reduce in importance the 
threeness in favor of the oneness.   
This would roughly correspond to time and eternity in that there exists the tendency to 
assign temporality to the persons and atemporality to the divine unity.  Indeed, most talk of 
God’s atemporality gives a strangely unitarian impression.  For Barth, the truth is that God is 
not exclusively unity or multiplicity, timeless or temporal, but rather he is one, timeless God 
who is also three and temporal.  And this is so because of the dynamic, relational life of the 
hypostases.  This will play a more prominent role in chapter six as I outline my own 
suggestions on time and eternity. 
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With a view toward preserving more of a balance between “unity in trinity and trinity 
in unity” Barth adopts the term “Triunity.”  Each time we talk about one, according to Barth, 
we tip the scales in favor of that one to the detriment of the other.  By adopting Triunity 
(Dreieinigkeit) Barth is trying to marginalize further this inherent weakness.406 
The specific concept that combines both emphases is that of perichoresis, and Barth 
employs it by asserting that there is not a separation of the modes of being, but “a complete 
participation of each…in the other…”  Yet perichoresis does not in any sense imply “the 
identity of one mode of being with the others but the co-presence of the others in the one.”407  
And the divine perichoresis is not merely the unity of Father, Son, and Spirit among 
themselves, but is “their unity ad extra.”  God’s essence and work are not twofold but 
one.”408  We can only know of God because of his work, so that anything we say about God 
(attributes, etc.) is about his work.  Thus, that work is God’s essence.  Yet, Barth is quick to 
add the caveat that this does not abrogate his freedom, for that work is a free decision of his 
grace that is grounded “but not constrained” by his essence.  In other words, it is still 
important for Barth to distinguish between his essence and his work.  So it might be proper 
from our viewpoint to say that God’s work is his essence, but this is more than his work 
because he is free and not bound by it.409 
Hence, the distinction between the essence of God from “His essence as the One who 
works and reveals Himself,” or, we could say, immanent and economic Trinity is his 
freedom.410  Yet, what is the actual content of these assertions?  Barth has labored to assure 
us that the hypostases are one in their relations, and the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit are 
soteriological relations, i.e. temporal.  Consequently, the work of the hypostases, according to 
Barth, is one with the essence, which is an obvious claim to make if it is the very relations of 
the modes of being that are God.  That this is so prompts Barth to declare that “these three 
names are really in their threeness the one name of the one God.”411  Nevertheless, he appears 
to backtrack and say almost exactly the opposite of what he has just said.  No surprise, then, 
that this declaration of divine freedom in God’s work ad extra is immediately followed by a 
lengthy passage on God’s incomprehensibility and mystery.412  If the unity of God is the 
relations of the hypostases to such an extent that there is no name for God other than Father, 
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Son, and Spirit, then who is it that maintains this freedom?  Is the Son’s redemptive work and 
his essence one and not one (free) at the same time?  Even being careful to apply Barth’s 
definition of freedom it is confounding how this can hold any content.  When we approach 
the issue of time and eternity in the next chapter and we encounter the sticky matter of 
assigning temporality and timelessness to God, we would do well to bear in mind that it is not 
merely an issue of temporality for Barth, though it is that, but it is fundamentally a question 
of how to speak of Trinity.  This accentuates the problem theologians encounter who are 
committed to orthodoxy, yet sensitive both to the failures of classical theism and of modern 
scientific insight.  In such a circumstance does one side of the debate necessarily diminish the 
other?  Can theologians posit an omniscient, omnipresent God who is also temporal?  Some 
answer this question in the negative and have opted for nearly a complete reversal of the 
tradition on Trinity.413   
God, as we will see in the next chapter, according to Barth is both timeless and 
temporal.  If we are only saying God could have been without the world, then that is a 
legitimate theological assertion with its proper place (a notion Jenson shares).  However, 
Barth is saying more than that.  He is not merely saying that God could have been without the 
world, but rather he is saying that God’s essence is united to his temporal work and it 
(essence, ousia) is free from it.  Again, what is the sense of this if God’s very ousia is Father, 
Son, and Spirit, i.e. temporal relations?   
In sum, Barth grounds revelation and the reality of the created order in Jesus Christ, 
which in turn leads us to God’s Triunity.  This raises the related issues of the unity/distinction 
of the immanent and economic Trinity, God’s freedom, and the triune structure of unity and 
multiplicity. 
Once again, a comparison of where Jenson and Barth overlap and diverge on the 
question of divine unity and multiplicity is a useful tool to clarify their positions on time and 
eternity.  Jenson, similar to Pannenberg,414 Moltmann415 and others, does not view ousia or 
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oneness as logically prior for God—though he works it out in a unique way that also 
distinguishes him from his otherwise closely allied contemporaries.  To grasp this distinction 
we will follow Jenson’s argument concerning his use of the term “identity” in reference to 
Father, Son, and Spirit. 
The essential question in the post-Nicean church, according to Jenson, was “how one 
could avoid both polytheism and modalism otherwise than by subordinationism.”416  This 
new way was forged by the Cappadocians: Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory 
Nazianzus, and the first step was to differentiate between ousia and hypostasis.  The former 
was to refer to God’s being, while the latter would refer to the persons of Father, Son and 
Spirit.  They drew the comparison with humans in that we share humanity (ousia), but are 
distinct persons (hypostases).  So, why are Father, Son and Spirit not three gods as humans 
would be three persons?  The answer is that human beings are differentiated by 
characteristics that are not endemic to humanity, i.e. short stature, race, etc.  God cannot have 
those types of characteristics, so the analogy breaks down; yet if he does have individuating 
characteristics they must belong to his essence, just like it would be to our humanity.  “The 
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three can in fact be individually identified, by their relations to one another, precisely with 
respect to their joint possession of one and the same deity.”417  As Gregory of Nazianzus puts 
it, “Differentiated though the hypostases are, the entire and undivided godhead is one in 
each.”418  Hence, the three persons can only be named or described in relation to the other 
two.  Jenson puts the Cappadocian formula another way: “each identity’s relation to each of 
the others is to that other as the possessor of deity, and just so constitutes his own reality as 
an identity of that same deity.”419  Thus, we might say that the relation of the hypostases not 
only defines the hypostases, but also defines the ousia—this, in contrast to the substance-
oriented approach to divine unity.420 
The scholastic formulation sharpened the Cappadocian trinitarian formula by saying 
that a trinitarian person is “a relation…in the mode of substance, a relation that itself subsists 
and is not merely a connection between subsistents” (a definition from Aquinas, ST, 1, 29, 
a.4.).421  How, then, would such a metaphysical definition cohere with God’s narrated reality?  
The answer relies on Pannenberg: all three persons of the Trinity refer to the other two as the 
one God, indicating that all three are perfectly “correlate to that other.”  That is, if all three 
refer to the other as the one God, then there can be no higher being than the persons of that 
Trinity.422  Each points to the other as God, thus all three are possessors of full deity.  Father, 
Son, and Spirit are agents in the external operations of the Creator upon the creation.  Yet, 
they comprise the one agency of God.  That is, in Cappadocian terms, any action from God 
that impacts creation must begin with the Father, be actualized through the Son, and perfected 
in the Holy Spirit.  The formula is in concert with Barth’s doctrine of God’s being in 
becoming, being revealed in and with act; so that “it is by the temporal dynamic between 
Jesus and his Father and our Destiny, that the three are God.”423  All this is designed to affirm 
for Jenson Trinity’s temporal reference and the unity of the hypostases and ousia. 
What about the use and definition of “person,” and why would Jenson opt for 
“identity?”  “Person” in the Latin West, following Tertullian, came to signify a “subsistent 
social relation.”  Hence, a person is constituted in its social relations of address and response, 
so that “the Father’s speaking his Word, the act in which the Son is constituted, is in itself a 
call for response, thereby constituting the Son as himself a speaking being like the Father.  
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The Father’s breathing the Spirit, the act in which the Spirit is constituted, is in itself the 
Father’s entry into the communal freedom that the Spirit gives, to constitute the Spirit a 
personal agent also over against the Father.”424  To borrow Jenson’s phrase, so far, so very 
good. 
Yet Jenson seems to share Barth’s aversion to the modern sense of “person” and 
prefers “identity” because “it is exactly the ontological function…that the trinitarian 
hypostasis, in its separation from ousia, invoked.425  However, even though the Father, Son, 
and Spirit are “identities” the Trinity is not an identity, for if we said that, then there would be 
four identities and we would fall back into modalism.  Hence, must we be forced to say that 
the Trinity is not personal or is not one in essence due to this linguistic configuration?  To 
answer this Jenson refers to Jonathan Edwards who thought of identity and person as distinct.  
That is, Adam and his descendants and Christ and his believers are different identities, yet 
“one complex person.”  So, suggests Jenson, it might be that being personal is not singular in 
its meaning, but we may be one person with Adam, yet a different identity.426 
To conclude this matter, we are able to say that Jenson gives a greater priority to 
threeness, not in the way Moltmann does, but by placing the term “person” or “personality” 
on the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit, and by designating them as the divine proper 
name.  It is the threeness of the identities that gives the oneness.  There is one divine 
personality (Trinity) with three “identities” whose relations are that divine ousia.  God is One 
not in that he subsists timelessly in some set of attributes, but in that he perfectly and 
mutually relates in Father, Son, and Spirit—the only name of God.  There is no name for the 
divine ousia, according to Jenson, save only the three names of the divine identities.  The 
following passage from Jenson illustrates his concern for threeness, without losing oneness: 
 
Let me once more state the problem at its simplest.  The three derive from God’s 
reality in time, from time’s past/present/future.  But if the One is one precisely by 
abstraction from time, the one-and-three can never be made to work.  The relations 
are either temporal relations or empty verbiage.  In Western trinitarianism, which will 
not let the relations be temporal, that God is “one and three” becomes the sheer 
mystification Western churchgoers accept—or reject—it as: something we assert 
because we are supposed to, not knowing even what we are asserting.427 
 
Clearly, then, given the previous exposition of Barth’s doctrine of Triunity Jenson is 
following him almost to the letter, yet he believes that Barth, by insisting on oneness and 
                                                 
424 ST I, 119. 
425 TI, 108.  For his argument regarding the meaning of identity in modern usage see TI, 108-11. 
426 ST I, 120. 
427 TI, 125-26. 
 104 
substantial priority in order to preserve God’s freedom is reverting to the failure of Western 
trinitarianism.  According to Jenson, Barth’s initial insights concerning Trinity and revelation 
must be carried through and this is accomplished by designating the divine identities with the 
temporal moments of past, present, and future.  The ousia is the relations—the relation of 
Father, Son, and Spirit in past, present, and future, and it is exactly that temporal happening 
that is God’s ousia.  Because of his shortcoming in this regard Jenson believes Barth has no 
conceptual scheme both for transcendence and God’s being as what happens in Jesus.  In 
Jenson’s estimation the result is, despite his best efforts, an atemporal eternity.428   
 By examining Barth’s trinitarian theology this chapter set out to establish the overlap 
between Barth and Jenson and, consequently, for time and eternity.  Additionally, a second 
aim was to endorse the trinitarian approach to the nature of time and eternity which both 
adhere to.  I believe that in doing so I have highlighted the need for the contemporary 
discussion to be infiltrated with a more robust treatment of the doctrine of God if the question 
of time and eternity will be given due course.  Furthermore, the chapter has demonstrated that 
there are gaps in Barth’s trinitarian theology that raise questions concerning God’s relation to 
time, and Jenson has brought those to the fore.  Whether he properly overcomes the problems 
is the subject of chapter six, but before that can be evaluated, I must give Barth a chance to 
outline the content of this doctrine of time and eternity.  It is to this that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
KARL BARTH ON TIME AND ETERNITY: 
TRINITY, JESUS CHRIST, AND HUMANITY 
 
Colin Gunton has noted the modern tendency to make time absolute and exhibit a 
reticence to speak of eternity.  “If a thing cannot be reduced to temporal relationships, we 
doubt whether it can exist at all, or, if it does, whether it can be spoken of.”429  Though 
humanity is interwoven with earthly time as we know it (recalling Barth’s challenge 
regarding exactly what it is we know about time) does it follow that this earthly time 
absolutely encompasses all existence, both inside and outside this universe?  Or put a 
different way, there is certain resilience on the part of humanity to insist upon 
anthropological or temporal primacy.  Barth presses in the opposite direction, demanding that 
because of the primacy of God’s self revelation we can and must speak of eternity, and, 
further, eternity is prior to our temporality.  This is certainly counterintuitive for most 
contemporary thinkers and, for that matter, for teaching that has found its way into the 
Christian tradition.  Divine atemporality, as I have explicitly and implicitly noted in this 
thesis, springs from a pattern of thought that begins outside of the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ, then maneuvers its way into back into that teaching.  The same is true for the opposite 
tendency, namely, that God is wholly temporal in terms of time that has limitations, as is the 
case in some Christian theologians of our day.  Both approaches ultimately depend upon a 
non-theological or non-revelational foundation, but rather rest on some sort of empirical 
observation of our world.  Barth and Jenson resist this pressure and insist that any conception 
regarding our time, humanity, and the time of Father, Son, and Spirit must depend upon 
God’s own revelation.  That is, time and eternity are theological problems.  However, the 
unique place that Barth and Jenson hold is that they do not fall for either extreme—that of 
divine atemporality or divine temporality in a sense where God is limited by time.  For Barth, 
eternity is inextricably temporal; yet, it is eternity and temporality of an unexpected sort. 
 I begin this chapter with Barth’s understanding of the divine eternity, which is the 
most immediate and explicit consequence of the Christological grounding of revelation 
discussed in the previous chapter.  Proper understanding of the divine eternity (God’s time) is 
only possible for Barth through an examination of the time of Jesus Christ; thus, the second 
section will discuss his treatment of time and eternity in light of incarnation and, specifically, 
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resurrection.  The third section, logically following on from the previous two, is Barth’s 
conception of “man’s” time, also established by revelation time (the time of Jesus Christ). 
 
The Divine Eternity 
 
Barth begins his exposition of the divine eternity with the standard assertion of Christian 
theology that God is eternal.  Yet, as Leftow reminds us, today “eternal” has come to signify 
a variety of conceptions, many of which seem incompatible.430  Barth weighs in with his 
understanding of eternal as God having “pure duration” (reine Dauer), i.e. beginning, middle 
and end are undivided but exist in simultaneity (Gleichzeitigkeit).  “God is 
simultaneous…without separation, distance or contradiction.”431  Eternity and time, therefore, 
are not correlates since the duration in eternity (NB the use of the temporal term “duration”) 
is unified not divided, as in our temporality.  Thus, we might say that eternity is duration in a 
similar way to our time in that it has duration, movement, and succession, yet without the 
separation of past, present, and future. 
Immediately one recognizes trinitarian echoes in Barth’s structure of eternity.  It 
might be possible to associate Barth’s idea of “pure duration” with God’s ousia, “beginning, 
middle and end” with God’s hypostases, and “simultaneity” with perichoresis.  There is a 
unified, undivided being that exists in three distinct moments.  Hunsinger recognizes this 
trinitarian melody in Barth but attempts to create a stricter parallelism than is perhaps present 
in Barth’s work.432  While Hunsinger recognizes the potential for misunderstanding if the 
comparison is pushed too far, he nonetheless wants to give greater weight to Barth’s doctrine 
of eternity as a logical and necessary result of his trinitarianism than even Barth does.  I find 
it intriguing that from the start, though there exists these trinitarian overtones, Barth does not 
explicitly state the comparison that Hunsinger makes, until the very end of his exposition.  
Even at that point, however, Barth’s allusion to Trinity is only meant to demonstrate what he 
had been arguing in the preceding twenty pages, viz., that we should not overemphasize pre-, 
supra-, or post-temporality to the exclusion of the others.  They exist in a perichoretic unity.  
Barth specifically avoids a direct association of the divine eternity with ousia and hypostases 
in the discussion of divine eternity in II.1—the section under scrutiny by Hunsinger.  
                                                 
430 Brian Leftow, “Response to Mysterium Trinitatis: Barth’s Conception of Eternity,” For the Sake of the 
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431 CD II.1, 608. 
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Furthermore, the allusion to Trinity is a formal one that is more like a comparison as opposed 
to a direct relation between the persons of the Trinity and the temporal moments, which 
Hunsinger is correct to point out.  Thus, the point here is that while it is instructive to 
consider Barth’s doctrine of eternity within its trinitarian background, it is not as if you could 
place it like a template, as it were, on top of Trinity and have a carbon copy.   
 If we were to press in this direction, Barth’s doctrine of eternity (as no doubt he 
realized) could very well lend itself to identifying the hypostases with the temporal moments 
of the created order, the identification that Jenson explicitly carries out.  Given the structure 
of pure duration, beginning-middle-end, and simultaneity, it would appear natural to equate 
each with being, persons, and life, but Barth hedges and applies each to God himself: “Pre-
temporality, supra-temporality and post-temporality are equally God’s eternity and therefore 
the living God Himself.”433  Here again arises the difficulty of relating God to time in that 
Barth struggles to find a way of articulating God’s transcendence over time, whilst being 
aware that a trinitarian theology requires his interaction with that time.  No doubt Barth 
recognized that if he made the simple move of merging the hypostases with the temporal 
moments of the created order, then perichoresis would be placed in jeopardy, if not rendered 
impossible.  Interestingly, this is part of Jenson’s solution to Barth’s doctrine.  It appears to 
me that Barth is perfectly aware of the path Jenson has chosen, yet instead he emphasizes the 
uniqueness of God’s eternity as the ground of our time.  In other words, rather than 
attempting to force too close a fit between God’s eternity and our time, he is content to leave 
a measure of mystery to the exact nature of both.  Jenson, on the other hand, is pushing for 
higher proximity, and as a result encounters theological dilemmas that Barth sought to avoid.   
A further qualification of Barth’s initial definition: eternity is not “an infinite 
extension of time both backwards and forwards.”  If this were the case, according to Barth, 
then the eternal being would still be in a time that is separated by past, present and future.  
Thus, everlasting is not a synonym for eternal,434 and Barth concludes that “time can have 
nothing to do with God.”435 
At face value this appears to be nothing short of Barth’s support of atemporality; 
however, this is the only sense in which eternity can mean non-temporality, viz. in the sense 
that God is not hindered by the separation of past, present, and future.  God’s eternity, he has 
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434 Ibid., 608-09.  Barth takes the biblical passages that affirm God’s everlastingness such as Psalm 90:2 to 
denote “from duration to duration,” i.e. pure duration.  It is unclear how he reaches this conclusion or what kind 
of compelling evidence he might offer for it.   
435 Ibid., 608. 
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already affirmed “is a quality of His freedom.”436  Therefore, God is free to be constant, 
according to Barth, because time does not have power over him.  This is the first clear 
indication that Barth is associating change and flux with time, and that this change and flux is 
unreliable.  “Eternity has and is the duration which is lacking to time.  It has and is 
simultaneity.”437  For God to be a reliable being not subject to that sort of change he must be 
free from the constraints of time; therefore, for Barth, “timelessness” when applied to God 
can only signify God’s freedom from the discontinuities of time, rather than an absolute 
freedom from time. 
Moreover, eternity is unique to God and, even though as creatures we may taste of it, 
this eternity is exclusive to God’s being.  In terms of God’s freedom, time is the “formal 
principle of His free activity outwards.  Eternity is the principle of His freedom inwards.”438  
That is to say, Barth is rejecting the notion that being is the dominant divine concept and 
instead replaces that with the concept of eternity.  “Eternity is the source of the deity of God 
in so far as this consists in His freedom, independence and lordship.”439  The Bible, Barth 
believes, places the emphasis on that which endures and even duration itself as that which can 
be identified as divine.  “God Himself is eternal, and for that reason and in that way He is.”  
Eternity encompasses being, not the reverse.440  Hence, Barth seems to be laying some 
foundations in this section for eternity to be understood trinitarianly, for to say “eternity” is to 
say “God.”  Admittedly, Barth’s language lends itself toward misunderstanding, but if we 
bear in mind his overall method in this section on God’s perfections, then we might avoid 
such confusion.  God does not possess a thing called, “love,” “constancy,” or “eternity.”  God 
is each of those.  I believe this is all Barth is trying to say here: to be eternal is to be God, and 
there is not a thing or god behind Trinity determining its being.  Eternity is God’s being.   
Yet, in spite of Barth’s unambiguous assertion of God’s eternity as “having nothing to 
do with time” it is not, by consequence, a negation of time for the following reasons: 1) it 
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 109 
possesses, but is not possessed by time.  God’s eternity is true duration because it holds all 
three moments of time—beginning, succession and end—in its total possession.  2) It 
grounds, make possible, controls, and conditions our time’s moments—beginning, 
succession, and end.  In this connection Barth favorably quotes Boethius’ definition and 
rejects Augustine’s and Anselm’s as unnecessarily negative.441  The total, simultaneous 
possession of life is, again, the eternity of God, not the eternity of being itself, and because 
we cannot directly compare his “now” with our time as in the analogia entis, consequently 
his totality and undividedness is not the flip side of the coin to our non-simultaneity—it is an 
eternity unique to God, known only by revelation and not through some natural possibility of 
timelessness.442  That is, eternity is not forced to mean timelessness in the sense of 
atemporality—absolute disconnectedness with time.  If we posit our time, then try to think of 
eternity, then we might perceive eternity as the negation of time; yet Barth does not follow 
this method and believes that eternity is temporal, even though the moments of time are 
simultaneous and total in God’s life.  Indeed, according to Barth, if eternity denoted “abstract 
non-temporality” it would be too close to time in that it would “be only an image of time in 
the mirror of our reflection.”443  Because it is not non-temporality proves it is God’s eternity 
and not an anthropological construct. 
 
Barth’s consistency regarding this positive conception of God’s relation to the world is also 
evident in his treatment of God’s omnipresence.  Everything external to God has presence 
only because of God’s presence with it.  God is sovereignly present to everything else, which 
is the ground of the creature’s presence, or, space.444  In God’s sovereign omnipresence he is 
both near and distant at the same time.  That is, he is Creator and independent of the creation.  
This corresponds to Barth’s assertion that God in his eternity is both temporal and timeless; 
he is immanent and economic; he is Creator and Creature.445  God’s omnipresence, as far as a 
formal definition is concerned, is his distinction from everything else and his possession of 
his own place.  He is present to himself and to everything else, though “presence does not 
                                                 
441 CD II.1, 610.  Though, interestingly, this is the only aspect to Augustine’s concept of time that Barth 
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442 Ibid., 611. 
443 Ibid., 612. 
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mean identity, but togetherness at a distance.”446  Togetherness includes the concept of 
distance, unlike “identity.”   
Therefore, according to Barth, God cannot be described as non-spatial, if we want the 
Christian concept of God to stand, for non-spatial excludes distance, which then implies 
“identical to.”  If God is identical to everything else, then we have pantheism, not the 
Christian God.  God has is own place, which is space, though not a space that is absolute and 
limits him.447 
 
God possesses His space.  He is in Himself as in a space.  He creates space.  He is and 
does this so that, in virtue of His own spatiality, He can be Himself even in this 
created space without this limiting Him or causing Him to have something outside 
Himself, a place apart from Himself, a space which is not His space too in virtue of 
His spatiality, the space of His divine presence.  Or, to express it more positively, God 
possesses space in Himself and in all other spaces.  He does this as the being who is 
completely present in the spatiality that belongs to Him.  There is no place where He 
is not present in His essence, which includes, of course, His knowledge and power.  
There is no place where He is less present than in all others.  On the contrary, He is 
everywhere completely and undividedly the One He always is, even if in virtue of the 
freedom of His love he is this in continually differing and special ways.448 
 
God’s omnipresence to everything external to itself is grounded in his omnipresence to 
himself.  Omnipresence is not something that is only because the universe exists, but rather 
God is omnipresent, proximate and distant, in his triunity.  In this way omnipresence is a 
perfection of divine freedom—he is present to another because he is free to be present to 
himself.  The fact that he is free to be omnipresent to himself and possess his own space is the 
ground for his presence to all spatial things outside himself.  Therefore, just as it is with time 
God possesses space, which makes possible his positive relation to our space.   
Despite Barth’s consistency here he inexplicably argues against the idea that 
omnipresence and eternity should be treated as parallels as in the “older theology” on two 
counts:  First, he believes that God’s omnipresence is a determination of his love, since he is 
present to himself and to all external to himself.  However, according to Barth, the same 
cannot be said of his eternity.  Though it is not disconnected from his love, but is unified with 
it, it is more properly understood as a determination of his freedom.  “God’s love requires and 
possesses eternity both inwards and outwards for the sake of its divinity, its freedom.  
Correspondingly, it requires, creates and therefore possesses in its outward relations what we 
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call time.  Time is the form of creation in virtue of which it is definitely fitted to be a theatre 
for the acts of divine freedom.”  Time is required, according to Barth, in order for God to act 
as the eternal, free, sovereign one.  If creation was eternal, then he would be bound to 
creation’s eternity.  “Thus God’s eternity is bound up both with His love and also with time 
as a determination of creation in the freedom in which both inwards and outwards He is 
always Himself, one and the same.”449  Yet, space is the requirement that God may be 
omnipresent to the creation, just as he is in himself.  Barth acknowledges a similarity in the 
concepts, but maintains that we have overstepped boundaries when we make them parallels.  
The second reason he rejects this parallelism is because of their older grouping as the 
negatively connoted non-spatiality and timelessness. 
Yet, as Colwell points out Barth’s disjunction between eternity and omnipresence is 
arbitrary and unnecessary.  The desire to adhere to the actuality of God’s self-revelation, 
according to Barth, does not necessarily rule out the parallel nature of omnipresence and 
eternity.  Further, Colwell thinks that to perceive eternity as a result of God’s freedom and 
omnipresence of his love “tends towards a conception of eternity other than in the context of 
His actual relatedness to man in Jesus Christ.”450  Everything in Barth’s method and material 
content points to a parallel, thus he may draw this unnecessary distinction for reasons of 
systematic precision.  Additionally, I find puzzling the statement that time is necessary for 
God to act as eternal so that he is not bound to an eternal creation.  If Barth means that our 
time is the matrix of our existence as God’s time (different as it is) is the matrix of his, and he 
is free, yet freely enters into ours because of his capacity for our time, then there is no 
objection.  However, if he means that time is what constitutes the infinite qualitative 
difference between God and humanity, so that to be eternal = atemporal and to be temporal = 
not eternal, then not only would I object to this construal, but I would also question Barth’s 
own consistency.  Later, as I will outline below, Barth is clear in affirming divine 
temporality, thus time cannot be the dividing point between the two realms.  An additional 
problem for Barth is how this arrangement is manifested in the eschaton.  At the end of the 
age when our time is overcome and we take up that eternal life prefigured in Jesus Christ, if 
our time is the distinction between the eternal God and the temporal world, then what 
happens to our existence?  Are we simply assimilated into the Godhead and lose our identity, 
or do we go on maintaining our existence in the same kind of time as Jesus Christ?  Barth, as 
we will discover, certainly wants to affirm the latter, but this distinction between 
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omnipresence and eternity in regard to God’s love and freedom is an example of Barth’s 
tendency toward divine atemporality and the eternalizing of creation, which Jenson counters. 
Up to this point we have hinted at Barth’s relation to the tradition vis-à-vis divine 
temporality and it is interesting to note that Barth himself briefly reflects on it, as well.  The 
question to be asked is whether this concept of eternity has any historical precedence.  Barth 
quotes a brief section from Aquinas, then concludes that his position “clearly denotes a 
positive relation to time which is the special possession of eternity.”  How, then, does Barth 
believe he is improving on Aquinas?  He goes on: “That it is this must be brought into greater 
prominence than in the older theology, without canceling or blurring the distinction between 
the two, or imposing upon eternity the limitations of time.”451  Thus, in Aquinas there is the 
impetus to articulate God’s positive relation to time whilst retaining sovereignty over the 
temporal “instability” of our time—precisely Barth’s telos, yet from the standpoint of the 
priority of revelation.  That is, God, not our negation of time, dictates what eternity is.  What, 
then, is the difference in saying God possesses his life in a simultaneous, total “now” and 
God is timeless?  Well, I contend that there is little difference if by “timeless” you suggest: 
not subject to “the fleeting nature of the present, the separation between before and after.”452 
Yet if the definition is abruptly cut off at this juncture and “Barth agrees with 
Boethius”453 is allowed to stand on its own, confusion would be the result, not to mention that 
it would surely signify an inconsistency in Barth’s methodology.  God’s eternity is temporal 
in that it possesses beginning, succession, and end in a simultaneous now, but this is merely 
Barth’s first step (though it is in reality the conclusion of his actualism).  He has begun with 
God’s eternity to demonstrate how it is that God has capacity for what we know to be the 
case in revelation.  That is, Barth’s adherence to actualism forces him back to the question of 
the divine eternity and the answer is: Jesus Christ is God and man, temporal and eternal, 
because God is eternal and temporal in the manner described above.  “God has time because 
and as He has eternity;” therefore, God has time for us.  And the time he has for us is the time 
of Jesus Christ.  “He Himself is time for us.  For His revelation as Jesus Christ is really God 
Himself.”  Thus, Barth’s definition of God’s eternity in the Boethian sense serves the purpose 
                                                 
451 CD II.1, 613.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape Aquinas’ insistence upon atemporality, regardless of any 
theological admission that God involves himself in our world.  Thus, on the one hand, he is everything that we 
are not, and, on the other, he enters into the created order.  Beyond this paradox Aquinas does not take us.  
452 Ibid. 
453 Indeed, Barth does not uncritically assimilate Boethius, but rather transforms his basic idea into a theological 
construct.  Leftow notes that Boethius simply took this definition over from pagan Neoplatonist philosophers.  
He did nothing to integrate it with his Christian theology.  It occurs, in fact, only in his Consolation of 
Philosophy, “a work whose Christian ties are so minimal that some have doubted that Boethius wrote it.”  
Leftow, “Response,” 194. 
 113 
of demonstrating how it is that God can take up time in Jesus Christ.454  If Barth does not 
ascribe time in some fashion to God’s eternity, then there is no way to speak of Jesus Christ 
as human, and that would impinge upon Christology in a fatal fashion.  “As the eternal One it 
is he who surrounds our time and rules it with all that it contains.  How can He be and do all 
this if as the eternal One He does not Himself have His own time, superior to ours, 
undisturbed by the fleetingness and separations of our time, simultaneous with all our times, 
but in this way and for this reason absolutely real time?”455  If God is not temporal, then it is 
counterintuitive to say that he is present to our time and space, ruling and controlling it.  And 
again: “…the fact that God has and is Himself time, and the extent to which this is so, is 
necessarily made clear to us in His essence as the triune God.  This is His time, the absolutely 
real time, the form of the divine being in its triunity…”  To be sure, however, Barth is not 
assigning our time to the hypostases, but only real time—God’s time—to each.  There is an 
order, movement, and succession in God, but not one that loses or is constrained as in our 
time.456 
Finally, then, the core assertion: Barth gathers his concept of time from the 
incarnation.  “The fulfillment of (and within) the positive relation of God to the world 
established by the creation is the fact that God as the Creator and Lord of the world Himself 
becomes a creature, man, in His Word and His Son.”457  It is the theological reality of God’s 
self-revelation in the incarnation of Jesus Christ that educes Barth’s view of eternity as 
possessing time.  Hence, God “raises time to a form of His own eternal being.”  This is 
established in the very basic assertion that Jesus’ epiphany had a “not yet” and a “no 
more.”458  
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The foregoing is a direct result of Barth’s priority on actualism.  What is actual in 
God is possible for God.  Jesus Christ is God, thus revelation demands we acknowledge 
divine temporality, whilst at the same time acknowledging his lordship over time.  
Furthermore, Barth declares that if time is excluded from God’s eternity, then assurance of 
faith in God is undermined, for the gospel is inextricably bound to time.  This is the heart of 
the matter.  
 
Barth insists that the Bible places time and eternity in a positive relationship, despite 
“the fact that this concept distinguishes God from the world and therefore also from time.”459  
The positive relationship of time and eternity—the union of them—is found, according to 
Barth, in eternity’s temporality as pre-, supra-, and post-temporality.  This threefold 
understanding of eternity’s temporality illustrates exactly how God absolutely conditions 
time in his freedom.  “He precedes its beginning, He accompanies its duration, and He exists 
after its end.”460  He is before, above and after time, and Barth assigns this formula with great 
importance because “a great deal depends on this truth and on the legitimacy of these 
concepts.”461  Barth goes on to declare that the Christian gospel is nullified and useless if God 
does not possess the divine past, present and future, for the gospel “message depends on the 
fact that God was and is and is to be.”  That is, “the truth of God’s Word depends on their 
truth, and they themselves are based on and preserved by the truth of God’s Word.”462  I will 
take each in turn. 
Pre-temporality (Vorzeitlichkeit) is the simple, yet profound assertion that God’s 
existence precedes ours.  “Always and everywhere and in every way God exists as the eternal 
One in the sense of this pre-temporality.”463  Again, Barth’s emphasis is the grace of God in 
creating and reconciling the world, and this was pre-temporal activity.  Only as God pre-
exists the world can he be understood as the One who freely loves and relates himself to 
humanity.  Further, all three persons are active in this pre-temporality: “And in this pure 
divine time…there occurred the readiness of the Son to do the will of the eternal Father, and 
there ruled the peace of the eternal Spirit…”464 
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Additionally, Barth articulates a predestination whose pre- is not merely a logical one, 
but a chronological one.465  That is, predestination as God’s determination to reconcile the 
world to himself in Jesus is something that occurs in the divine pre-temporality.  Our time is 
“foreseen and determined” in Jesus, by the will and gracious decision in Jesus Christ.466  
Barth reveals his supralapsarianism and his affinity for the Reformers’ emphasis on God’s 
pre-creation decree to act in a particular way.  Yet, he perceives that the Reformers placed 
undue weight upon pre-temporality, particularly in their doctrines of election and 
providence.467  Barth praises this perspective because of its emphasis on the gracious decision 
of God to save apart from any merit of our own.  Still, according to Barth, the unwelcome 
result was that human life in our time was “a kind of appendix, though one that was 
expressed with force.”468  He claims that more emphasis on God’s supra- and post-
temporalities is in order to balance this overemphasis.   
Supra-temporality (Überzeitlichkeit) “consists in the fact that eternity does not will to 
be without time, but causes itself to be accompanied by time.”469  God’s knowledge of history 
and our present is determined and controlled by his supra-temporality.  As noted above in the 
brief discussion of God’s assuming time in Jesus Christ Barth insists that even though God is 
timeless in a sense, he can and does know what occurs in time, and this is due to the fact that 
our time is not absolute.470  He can, according to Barth know what is temporal because he 
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of “his version of the fatal definition of time and eternity by mutual exclusion…”  See his ST II, 177.  Jenson’s 
perception is that Barth’s temporal structure is such that election is a pre-temporal activity, which, though the 
decision itself may not be governed by our temporal discontinuity, it nevertheless temporally precedes our time.  
Divine pre-temporality is still distinct from supra- and post-temporality.  Thus, Jenson’s complaint that Barth 
places too great a weight on pre-temporality by locating election exclusively there finds some reasonable 
ground, and it may be the same sort of problem that Barth accuses the Reformers of having; yet, as I will argue 
in chapter six, this need not be the case.  Moltmann has also charged (in a different way than Jenson) that 
Barth’s election demands a temporal “before” and “after,” only he intends that temporal structure (discontinuity) 
to be applied to the divine eternity.  Colwell (228) notes that in this Moltmann “has failed to grasp Barth’s 
conception of God’s eternity as pure simultaneity…”  It is important to understand that Barth and Jenson do not 
ascribe “our time” to God’s eternity.  
466 CD II.1, 622. 
467 Ibid., 631-32. 
468 Ibid., 632. 
469 Ibid., 623. 
470 Thus, to put it in terms of the contemporary discussion, immediate divine awareness of our temporal now 
does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of God existing above that time.  On this see, Edward R. 
Wierenga, “Timelessness out of Mind: On the Alleged Incoherence of Divine Timelessness,” God and Time: 
Essays on the Divine Nature, 153-64; though they share a similar conclusion Wierenga seems more to have a 
divine atemporal eternity in mind instead of Barth’s version.  On the effect of the Special Theory of Relativity to 
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possesses supra-temporality—not atemporality, but an eternal “accompanying” of our 
present.   
 
God’s eternity is so to speak the companion of time, or rather it is itself accompanied 
by time in such a way that in this occurrence time acquires its hidden centre, and 
therefore both backwards and forwards its significance, its content, its source and its 
goal, but also continually its significant present….This means that in and with this 
present, eternity creates in time real past and real future, distinguishes between them, 
and is itself the bridge and way from the one to the other.  Jesus Christ is this way.471   
 
Barth goes on to explicate how this is the case.  Jesus differentiates between all that is alien to 
God and all that is truly God, including time and eternity.  And the distinction is not one that 
sets one group on one side and one on the other.  They do not exist side by side in parallel 
worlds, but, as Torrance puts it, the existence “is the place where the vertical and horizontal 
dimensionalities intersect.”472  Furthermore, in doing this work Jesus is pressing one of these 
groups (all that is not God) into the past and welcoming all things that are new.  It is “the 
tipping of the scales to the detriment of the first and the advantage of the second.”473   
The import of time for this idea is that Jesus “makes the one really past and the other 
no less really future, constituting time itself the way from this past to this future.”474  Thus, 
time carries with it a soteriological necessity.  In order for God to justify the ungodly, then 
there must be a real, genuine movement to the past and a continual arrival of the future.  If 
God is not temporal, then how could we understand him to participate in this “making of all 
things new”? 
Two important supporting ideas: first, as Jenson notes, it is important to understand 
Barth’s doctrine of God’s decision as it relates to Jesus Christ and the time God takes for us.  
God’s decision in predestination is to be God in Jesus Christ and to take time for all those in 
Christ.  Therefore, our time is grounded in the life of Jesus, that is, time is what it is because 
of Jesus Christ.475  This is a snapshot of a central disagreement between Barth and Jenson to 
be examined in the next chapter: how is it that our time is like/unlike the time of Jesus Christ?  
God’s eternity is what God decides to be in Jesus Christ, but our time is also what God 
decides to be in Jesus Christ.  Despite this alleged fatal overlap by Barth of God’s time and 
                                                                                                                                                        
the concept of absolute time see, William Lane Craig, “The Elimination of Absolute Time by the Special Theory 
of Relativity,” God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, 129-52.   
471 CD II.1, 626.  This is not unlike Garrett DeWeese’s version of omnitemporality discussed in chapter three. 
472 Thomas F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 75. 
473 CD II.1, 626. 
474 Ibid., 627. 
475 GAG, 129-31. 
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our time, Jenson does happily endorse Barth’s liberation of the doctrine of God from the 
“straightjacket” of an immobile timelessness, or atemporality, who cannot overcome the past 
with the future.476  
Second, this soteriological movement of overcoming the past with the future is the 
divine movement of Trinity.  It is God as event.  God is the happening of Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, and his determination to be God in Jesus Christ is equal to his determination to 
elect in time and overcome the “No” in favor of the “Yes.” “The consequence is that the 
contemporaneity of our being in both spheres is always to be understood as non-
contemporaneity, as the overcoming and dissolution of the past by the future, not as an 
equilibrium or see-saw between the right and validity of two realms.”477  Thus, Barth goes on 
to say, if we understand Luther’s simul iustus et peccator as meaning that we equally live in, 
and consequently act in, both realms, then we have missed the point.  “God affirms our 
righteousness as He negates our sin.”  And this past and future are not empty and uncertain.  
Rather, they are filled because “Jesus Christ and His present are the turning from the one to 
the other.”478   
Therefore, supra-temporality is “the foundation of a real consciousness of time on our 
part…Everything depends on whether time has a different centre from the constantly 
disappearing and never coming ‘now’ of the pagan concept of time.  But time really has this 
centre, and being related to eternity in this centre, it is accompanied and surrounded and 
secured by eternity.”479  Hence, for Barth, understanding our time in its past, present and 
future depends on faith in Jesus Christ as the center point of that time.  “True time-
consciousness depends on a consciousness of this middle point.  It stands or falls by the gift 
and decision of faith.  And faith is faith in Jesus Christ or it is not faith at all.”480  Yet Barth is 
not saying, as some would contend, that one cannot even be aware of temporality apart from 
faith in Christ; the theological has not swallowed up natural reality and made it something of 
an apparition.  Rather, understanding the function of past, present, and future is a faith issue.  
This time-consciousness relates to “the content of time.”481  In sum, supra-temporality is 
God’s eternity breaking into our time as the middle point that pushes all that is not-God and 
should pass away into the past, and bringing in all that is-God from the future.  We live in 
this turning, this supra-temporality that accompanies our time and makes it have a real past 
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and a real future.  Barth’s understanding of time here has a distinctly theological nexus.  The 
only explanation for the discontinuity of past and future is a theological one—Jesus Christ as 
the center of time’s turning point.  Supra-temporality is eternity accompanying time and 
making it past, present, and future. 
Torrance’s conceptual framework complements Barth’s exposition of supra-
temporality and may further illuminate it.  If we think of human existence and our time as the 
horizontal plane and the time of Jesus Christ, which is the divine eternity, as the vertical 
plane, the relation of the two finds its place in their intersection— 
 
…the place where human being is opened out to a transcendent ground in God and 
where the infinite Being of God penetrates into our existence and creates room for 
Himself without the horizontal dimensions of finite being in space and time.  It is 
penetration of the horizontal by the vertical that gives man his true place, for it relates 
his place in space and time to its ultimate ontological ground so that it is not 
submerged in the endless relativities of what is merely horizontal.  Without this 
vertical relation to God man has no authentic place on the earth, no meaning and no 
purpose, but with this vertical relation to God his place is given meaning and 
purpose.482 
 
The problem, according to Torrance, is that because there is this intersection of eternity and 
time where the divine and human relate on the same plane we are tempted to force “the same 
language” on both.  The impossibility of this should be immediately apparent in light of the 
Christian claims concerning incarnation and resurrection.483  Thus, for both Torrance and 
Barth, eternity enters time, yet the vertical plane does not rotate and merge into the horizontal 
so that our time is absolute.  The vertical is truly there, and God’s decision to be who he is in 
Jesus is also the decision to save humanity, thus Jesus was truly temporal in the sense that he 
experienced our time.  Yet, the temporal intersection is one where God remains Lord whilst 
taking time for us.  To borrow from Gregory of Nazianzus only that which is assumed can be 
healed, and in this case time is taken up for us in Jesus Christ, but its discontinuities 
(precisely parallel to human sinfulness) are overcome and healed—albeit a healing that 
awaits its consummation in the eschaton.  
 
Taking up again with supra-temporality Barth maintains the perichoretic nature of the 
temporal moments against the historical overemphasis of each.  Reacting against the 
Reformation’s fixation on pre-temporality, according to Barth, was the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries’ overemphasis on supra-temporality.  He contends that Schleiermacher 
and others posed a much greater threat with this stress than the Reformation fault could ever 
do.  “…[I]t became little more than an exclamation mark which had no positive content, so 
that it could be placed not only behind the word ‘God’ but behind any word at all denoting 
supreme value…”484  Therefore, the weight here is laid on man’s problems and 
possibilities.485   
Yet, according to Barth, if we are to believe in the eternal God, he is not only supra-
temporal, but he is also pre- and post-temporal.  Post-temporality is God’s embrace of time 
that also includes our future.  He is ahead of us in his kingdom and we move toward him, 
fulfilling his purposes from the past, present and future.  The future is not an empty one, but 
is filled with God’s kingdom—more specifically, the person of Christ.486  However, some of 
Barth’s own contemporaries, e.g. Blumhardt, Kutter, Ragaz, in his estimation, 
overemphasized post-temporality, primarily manifested in the combination of “the Christian 
expectation of the kingdom of God and the Socialist expectation for the future.”487  Barth 
himself, heavily influenced by the Blumhardts, acknowledges how his earlier theology was 
an overemphasis on post-temporality and how as a result he unwittingly was allied with 
Bultmann and Tillich.   
 
It was necessary and right in the face of the Immanentism of the preceding period to 
think with new seriousness about God’s futurity.  But it was neither right nor 
necessary to do this in such a way that this one matter was put at the head of all 
Christian teaching, just as the previous epoch had wanted to make what they claimed 
to be the knowledge of God’s presence the chief point of Christian doctrine.488 
 
His desired emphasis in CD is one of equal weight being placed on all three temporal 
moments where Trinity is fully and completely active in each.   
 
                                                 
484 Ibid., 633. 
485 Ibid., 632. 
486 Roberts accuses Barth of leaving us with an empty future with no hope since revelation is a non-temporal 
event, becoming “realised eschatology.”  That is, there is no future “time” because revelation is already “now.”  
However, as McDowell notes, Roberts fails to appreciate the fact that Barth’s eschatological Future is Christ’s 
personal presence, not an emptying of time, but rather our reality finds its fulfilment in Christ’s eschatological 
presence.  Again, the decisive issue for Roberts is his objection to Barth’s methodology—that he is unwilling to 
accept any theological framing of temporality.  See John C. McDowell, Hope in Barth’s Eschatology: 
Interrogations and Transformations Beyond Tragedy (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 45, 55. 
487 CD II.1, 634. 
488 Ibid., 636.  Since futurity is Jenson’s proposed solution to Barth’s alleged ambiguities, we will forgo the 
anticipated discussion on post-temporality until the next chapter when Barth and Jenson engage in more explicit 
critical dialogue. 
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Naturally, one might wonder how it is Barth can maintain such a perichoretic unity without 
sliding into atemporality.  In other words, to put equal weight on pre-, supra-, and post-
temporality might easily be equal to saying that they are identical.  To be sure, the tendency 
is there, and as Jenson believes, it is more than mere tendency.  Therefore, to affirm that 
Father, Son, and Spirit all act in unity before, during, and after our time without any stronger 
sort of distinction is, for Jenson, to say “God is atemporal.” 
The problem is perceived to be even more acute by highlighting Barth’s use of the 
temporal moments in relation to our time.  That is, the pre-, supra-, and post- prefixes 
primarily signify God’s temporal relations ad extra, in spite of the fact that Barth has 
attempted to identify them as God’s eternity, i.e. God in himself.  But how is it that God is 
pre-, supra-, and post-temporal in himself (Father, Son, and Spirit in unity) apart from his 
relations ad extra?  Are not the terms even meaningless in Barth without a reference towards 
God’s relation to all that is not himself?  The discussion of each in CD II.1 certainly frames 
the question this way and avoids any talk that God has a “before” and “after” like ours in his 
divine eternity.  The divine readiness for time should be a function of God’s being-for-
himself that demonstrates how his own temporality grounds ours.  However, God’s 
temporality is held in simultaneity, thus Barth’s explanation of how God is temporal must, 
after all, center on his relation to the created order, and his answer is that God’s eternity is 
before our time, with our time, and in front of our time.  Yet certainly this is an unintended 
consequence, for the aim of the section on the divine perfections is to identify who God is in 
himself, apart from any external necessity. 
 
God lives His perfect life in the abundance of many individual and distinct 
perfections.  Each of these is perfect in itself and in combination with all the others.  
For whether it is a form of love in which God is free, or a form of freedom in which 
God loves, it is nothing else but God Himself, His one, simple distinctive being.489 
 
Thus, negatively, Barth does not explain how God’s eternity can be temporal in a sense that 
relates to the temporal, earthly process of the created order.  Positively, Barth’s scheme 
establishes that God’s eternity intersects with our time (thus ascribing temporality to God), 
yet he is not overcome by the limitations of our time, but rather overcomes them by 
enveloping our time (before, with, and in front of our time). 
We are back to the question of divine transcendence.  Barth is grappling with a way to 
say that God is who he is in himself apart from the created order, but he is also fully and 
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completely who he is in his revelation in Jesus Christ.  There is no god behind God.  
Accordingly, here Barth is expressing that God must be temporal because of what we know 
in revelation, but that temporality is of a radical type unique to God in himself.  Nevertheless, 
Barth cannot even describe that radical temporality without specific reference to the created 
order.  How, then, does Barth even identify this phenomenon as “time”?  At the end of the 
day he has not described divine temporality in himself, but rather has attempted a description 
of how God in his eternity relates to our time.490  This is a common theme running 
throughout the debate on time and eternity, and can be observed in the thinkers discussed in 
this thesis.  It appears that an account of what God does within time or that he is temporal is 
more possible than an actual description of the nature of his time.  But this should not trouble 
us too badly, for a full and universally accepted description of our own time is still wanting; 
thus, how could we expect to reach a similar explanation for God?  Additionally, the reality 
of God’s life with us and our own reality is not undermined by saying “God is temporal, 
though we do not know exactly how to describe his time.”  That he is and that he is with us is 
the crucial matter, even though this fact does not hinder us from theologizing and getting as 
close to the truth as is possible.   
 
The Time of Jesus Christ 
 
Thus far we have established Barth’s foundational concept that any definition of time must 
flow from an actualistic understanding of revelation, of which we should only speak 
Christologically.491  But to speak Christologically means to speak about history.  Barth 
explains: 
 
The fact that the Word became flesh undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be 
eternity, in its very power as eternity, eternity became time.  Yes, it became time.  
What happens in Jesus Christ is not simply that God gives us time, our created time, 
as the form of our own existence and world, as is the case in creation and in the whole 
ruling of the world by God as its Lord.  In Jesus Christ it comes about that God takes 
time to Himself, that He Himself, the eternal One, becomes temporal, that He is 
present for us in the form of our own existence and our own world, not simply 
                                                 
490 GAG, 153: “But what can possibly be the content of saying that God in eternity is whatever is the prototype 
of his life in time?  Either this sentence is perfectly empty; or the very form of the statement makes some sort of 
comparison between God’s own characteristics and his temporal characteristics.  Such a comparison can only be 
between timelessness and time.  Either the introduction of analogy adds nothing at all to the fundamental claim 
that God could have been God otherwise than as God in and for our time, or what it indicates as the condition of 
this freedom must be a mode of being other than temporality, radical or otherwise.” 
491 CD II.1., 616. 
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embracing our time and ruling it, but submitting Himself to it, and permitting created 
time to become and be the form of His eternity.492 
 
 
But what is it about Jesus’ life that determines our understanding of time and eternity?   
According to Barth the time of Jesus’ life between incarnation and death was 
temporal and, in this sense, just the same as any other historical human being.  But God 
reveals in Jesus another time, a “third time,”493 or a “further history.”  In a general sense this 
“third,” different time is revelation time, or, “God’s time for us.”  “God’s revelation is the 
event of Jesus Christ.  We do not understand it as God’s revelation, if we do not state 
unreservedly that it took place in ‘our’ time.  But, conversely, if we understand it as God’s 
revelation, we have to say that this event had its own time…”494  For Barth, revelation time is 
real time (wirkliche Zeit)495 because it is God’s own time—the one that overcomes the 
questions and difficulties of our time because it is time without the contamination of the Fall.  
God reveals himself in Jesus without ceasing to be what he is in himself, and without 
succumbing to the effects of fallen time.  To be clear, then, revelation time for Barth is the 
real time of Jesus Christ, yet fully present in our created time.  The eternal Logos meets time 
in the person of Jesus.  Barth notes this connection and draws the inevitable conclusion that 
time and eternity are not antithetical since the true God has taken up that time into his being.  
“So the time God has for us, as distinguished from our time that comes into being and passes 
away, is to be regarded as eternal time.”496  However, to be eternal does not equal 
atemporality.  By virtue of the incarnation it is right to say that the Word become time.  His is 
the life of a man, thus is a life within created time.  
  
It is also a section of what we call ‘historical time’…Revelation…is an eternal, but 
not therefore a timeless reality.  It is also a temporal reality.  So it is not a sort of 
ideal, yet in itself timeless content of all or some times.  It does not remain 
transcendent over time, it does not merely meet it at a point, but it enters time; nay, it 
assumes time; nay, it creates time for itself.497 
 
                                                 
492 Ibid.  Unfortunately, Barth often confuses the reader with his inconsistent usage of terminology.  At times he 
uses “created time” as a synonym for “history” or “our time.”  At other times, “created time” specifically refers 
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“revelation,” and “real time” denote identical realities.   
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As Barth himself acknowledges there is a shift from Romans II in that in CD he insists that 
revelation is a temporal, historical reality—the Christ event is within our time, but he is 
revelation time, which is this third time. Barth’s view of revelation time in Jesus Christ is 
joined to his view of His humanity.  That is, just because Jesus was real human flesh it does 
not follow that he took on Adam’s propensity to sin.  He was fully human and sinless.  
Likewise, the Word became time and God takes up time for us, but it does not follow that it is 
exactly like our time.  It “became a different, a new time.”498 
Revelation time is real, fulfilled time because it is the time of the Lord of time.  
Revelation time is superior to our time and we must say it is the time of Jesus Christ because 
revelation time gives us the genuine present that we cannot explain or identify within our 
time.  Recall Augustine and how the present is virtually non-existent because of its flight into 
the past or anticipation in the future—both of which only exist in memory and expectation, 
i.e. the soul.  The genuine present is real because the Word of God is real and “is never ‘not 
yet’ or ‘no longer.’  It is not exposed to any becoming or, therefore, to any passing away, or 
therefore, to any change.”499  Hence, Jesus’ time is taken “up into His own eternity as now 
His own time, and gives it part in the existence of God which is alone real, self-moved, self-
dependent, self-sufficient.”500  Jesus perfects our time and demonstrates the genuinely real 
time that is taken up into the being of God.  His present is not like ours that is fleeting, but 
establishes the genuine before and after.  As Lord of time, according to Barth, God does not 
become subject to our time in its fleeting boundaries, but he masters and controls time to such 
an extent that he creates revelation time in Jesus Christ; which, incidentally, may not differ 
much from created time, but differs radically from our time.501  And why, we might ask, 
could this not be the case?  As noted before if Jesus can be “truly man,” yet without sin and 
can take up that humanity, heal it and restore ours to its original purpose, then can he not be 
“truly temporal,” yet without its limitations?  Therefore, I would want to defend Barth to the 
extent that if Barth is criticized for disconnecting Jesus from our time, then we must also 
criticize him for disconnecting Jesus’ humanity from ours.  I have yet to see this criticism, for 
I believe Barth’s Christology of fully God, fully human is well within the Nicean tradition.  
Rather, the typical refrain is that Barth endorses what the Christian faith at-large professes: 
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that because of Jesus Christ’s perfect humanity, he lifts our humanity to be what it was meant 
to be.  So it is, according to Barth, with time.  He lifts our time to what it is meant to be.   
 
Thus far I have acknowledged that, according to Barth, since Jesus lived a true, historical life 
as a man, temporality belongs to God.  But we have also heard Barth say that God’s time is 
“revelation time,” a third time that radically differs from our time, and even overcomes it 
because he fulfills what our broken, fallen time is intended to be.  How and where do we see 
this third, revelation time in Jesus?  What is the exact event(s) or location that demonstrates 
this so-called revelation time?   
For Barth, it is the post-resurrection period of Jesus’ presence on earth that is the 
determining factor in defining both our time and revelation time.  To be sure, Jesus’ time is 
time within history.  He lived as a man with a temporal beginning and temporal end, but the 
unique occurrence of Jesus’ time is his Easter time, the “further history” that begins on the 
third day after his death and we observe in the forty days prior to his ascension.  This is the 
“key position for our whole understanding of the man Jesus in His time.”502  Nevertheless, 
this Easter history, or, resurrection time is an event that occurs within our time and space, and 
indeed the resurrection becomes for Barth the central assertion for the name Jesus, Son of 
God.  “If Jesus Christ is not risen—bodily, visibly, audibly, perceptibly, in the same concrete 
sense in which He died, as the texts themselves have it—if He is not also risen, then our 
preaching and our faith are vain and futile; we are still in our sins.”503  And again, “If Christ 
were not risen from the dead, our treatment of the whole subject [i.e. his temporality] would 
have no basis whatever in the Word and revelation of God.”504 
It is because of this fact that Barth rejects the demythologizing of the Easter event by 
Rudolf Bultmann, who claims that it was “the rise of faith in the risen Lord…which led to the 
apostolic preaching.”505  Even though Bultmann acknowledges that the New Testament 
writers view the resurrection as an event within our space and time, he is unwilling to accept 
that “faith in the risen Lord springs from His historical manifestation, and from this as such, 
not from the rise of faith in Him.”506  Cullman, too, falls short in this regard in two ways: 1) 
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the resurrection is an appendix in his discussion on the New Testament’s view of time and 
hardly relates to it at all; and 2) the New Testament authors, according to Barth, were 
educated as to what time is by the fact that God confronted them in Jesus Christ, not as a 
result of their preconceptions of time, then fitting God into it.  Barth then goes on to say that 
this is a good reason to take care in even trying to determine the early church’s conception of 
time—there may not be a discernable one.507   
It was this resurrection time that became the time through which the apostles recalled 
and discussed everything about their Lord.  They did not have in mind an abstract, timeless 
reality that is other than historical, but Easter time, though it is his time, is real time.508  
“What is the implication of the fact that after He had completed the span from birth to death 
He had this subsequent time?  The answer is that the particular content of the particular 
recollection of this particular time of the apostolic community consisted in the fact that in this 
time the man Jesus was manifested among them in the mode of God.”509  His humanity was 
not abandoned, and the gospels labor this point, yet after the resurrection his deity was 
unveiled to them in such a way that it was previously hidden.  For Barth, it is this resurrection 
time that reveals eternal time, and it is this eternal time that Jesus gives as a gift to his 
covenant people, but he can only do so if he truly takes up their condition, which is historical 
time—our time.  Thus, he takes up our time in order to grant us his eternal time, and Colwell 
is correct to identify the connection between Barth’s doctrines of eternity and election.510 
Furthermore, this time is unique even among Jesus’ redemptive acts. The cross has 
both divine and human characteristics—it can be seen as the work of God and it is historical 
in the sense that it has the elements of human obedience and disobedience; however, the 
resurrection differs in that, like creation, it is solely a sovereign act of God.511  Barth does not 
simply arrive at the above conclusion because it is impossible for man to raise the dead, even 
though it is.  Rather, this conclusion is “something which can be taken only from the divine 
revelation which has taken place in this event.”512  Resurrection is the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ.  It is not something that is purely “formal and noetic,” but it was “the true, 
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original, typical form of the revelation of God in Him…”513  This perception of God’s 
revelation in Jesus was not something that was a given prior to the resurrection.  Peter’s 
confession was an anticipation of this fact, says Barth, but Jesus tells Peter that his confession 
is not a result of any immediate knowledge or perception on his part, but comes by the 
Father’s gracious gift.  Further, they walked and talked with Jesus for three years and still 
lacked understanding of who Jesus really was.514  That ignorance was overcome in the light 
of the resurrection precisely because the sovereign eternity of God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ was fully unveiled to them.   
Moreover, because of the resurrection we recognize Jesus, not bound by the limits of 
fallen time, but the Lord of time and, therefore, present in all time.  “The removal of the 
limitations of its yesterday, today and tomorrow, of it once, now and then, is the distinctive 
feature of the time of the man Jesus.”515  To be sure, Jesus’ time was historical in the sense 
that it had beginning, duration, and ending; but it remains true that his life (therefore, time, 
because of Barth’s dictum that existence and time cannot be separated) is eternal and cannot 
be limited in the same sense that ours is by past, present, and future.  Therefore (and here is 
the crucial point to bear in mind), because Jesus is fully God and fully man his time is fully 
historical and fully eternal.  “Thus, as the title of this sub-section suggests, He not only is in 
time and has time like other men, but He is also Lord of time.”516  He is the Lord of time 
because he is the Son of God.  Barth believes that the authors of scripture understand Jesus’ 
being in time as a direct result of the resurrection, or, what he would also name, Easter time 
(Osterzeit). 
Here again, Trinity is determining all forms of time—historical and real—rather than 
time as an absolute determining the divine life.  If God can be man and because God is man, 
then God is temporal like man and Lord of time as God.  The point distinguishes Barth’s 
approach to time from every non-theological, non-trinitarian approach.  However, I would 
also argue that while Barth’s theology of time may be more explicitly trinitarian than others 
this Christological lens through which we affirm both temporality and sovereignty to it is a 
basic Christian assertion.  No Christian theologian would or could deny Jesus’ temporality 
and remain Christian.  The question is not that he is God and man, temporal and sovereign 
over it, but rather, the question is how he is both and what that means for our time.  For this 
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reason, once again, I am suggesting in this thesis that the discussion on divine temporality 
carries a parallel significance that “human and divine” does in Christology. 
Given the superiority of resurrection time, viz., one that is both eternal and human, 
Barth believes it should hold sway when defining what real time is.  “It is in the power of the 
event of the third day that the event of the first day—as something that happened there and 
then—is not something which belong to the past, which can be present only by recollection, 
tradition and proclamation, but is as such a present event, the event which fills and 
determines the whole present.”517  Resurrection history becomes the grounding for Jesus’ pre-
Easter history and for all of history.  His history is not past history that must be conjured up 
by means of resurrection.  He is present to us now and represents us now and bears our sin 
now.  “This temporal togetherness of the Jesus Christ of Good Friday and the Jesus Christ of 
Easter Day as created by the divine verdict is the basis of life for men of all ages.”518  That is, 
Jesus’ history is the ground of all temporal history.    
 
If that is true, we might wonder what becomes of our own time or history.  Barth answers: 
“Since God in His Word had time for us, and at the heart of all other times there was this 
particular time, the eternal time of God, all other times are now controlled by this time, i.e., 
dominated, limited and determined by their proximity to it.”  It is at this point that we might 
hear Roberts’ criticism ringing in our ears that Barth’s view of time ultimately swallows up 
our time.519  Yet, we must continue to the very next sentence: “This means positively that 
they are shown not to be mere illusions.”520  Because God treats it as real, it is not illusory.  
At the same time, however, as a result of Easter time and Christ’s overcoming of time’s 
contingencies Barth can categorically state that our time is not absolute in any sense.  Time 
cannot lord over God, but this does not mean that our time is destroyed or not real.  
“Relativised does not mean discarded.”  Time is real and all times are set beside this Easter 
time, yet they are not obliterated.521  Indeed, how could it not be so?  If Jesus took on our 
time and lived a limited, historical life, then in what sense could eternal time render our time 
illusory?  It would do just as well to say that Jesus’ life was illusory.  We have already 
established that as representative for humankind Jesus had to be temporal as we are, else he 
could not represent us.  Yet, he was God’s representative as well, and if the covenant was to 
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stand, he would have to overcome the limitations of our humanity by doing precisely what we 
cannot do—defeat sin and death.  According to Barth, by doing this Jesus grants to his people 
the gift of eternal time, the time of Jesus Christ, the time of God.  The reality of that time is 
manifested to the disciples and others in the post-resurrection appearances, for all such reality 
pertaining to their Lord had scurried by their eyes prior to that period, the eternal, Easter 
time.  Hence, when we read the New Testament authors, according to Barth, they talk of 
Jesus and his work of salvation explicitly through the lens of the resurrection.522 
Yet, here, just as in the debate on the meaning of “historical” critics charge that in 
Barth our time is eternalized and rendered illusory.523  Morrison, for example, believes that 
Barth’s Christological doctrine of time and history necessarily excludes our time. 
 
The otherness of God, which must be set forth as present to us in Jesus Christ, 
remains outside “our” fallen times.  This appears often to be an intrusion of an almost 
Platonic or neo-Platonic sense of difference regarding the relation of eternity to 
history.  It finally excludes the necessary factuality of the Deus praesens and thereby 
distorts the existence of the existing believer in history…The outcome for Barth’s 
Christology is a redemptive-historical problem lying in his understanding of the 
nature of God and the relation of God to humanity and the historical process…While 
in one sense wanting to express the non-contradictory unity of God’s being and 
existence whereby we are actually confronted and grasped in existence here, Barth 
finally lets human, fallen history go as that which cannot be partaken of by the 
coming and self-giving God.  God’s time for us is, like God’s otherness, that of which 
the human as human cannot partake of.  If God cannot, even as the Creator who 
comes in freedom to redeem, partake in human fallen time for our sake, how can one 
even by grace participate in God’s time?524 
 
The problem cannot be so easily dispensed with, for included in the time and history of Jesus 
Christ, which conditions God’s eternity,525 is his pre-history—all of his earthly life that was 
fully and completely within our time.  Barth has already extensively argued for the spatiality 
and temporality of Christ’s life, death and resurrection.  To be sure, he constantly qualifies 
himself that the resurrection and the forty days were the revelation of real time, God’s time—
the time of his eternity.  Hence, one must recognize, as Jenson does, the tendency towards 
eternalizing history, yet Barth does not do so in quite so obvious a way as Morrison suggests.  
He genuinely attempts to militate against this, and he does so by saying that Jesus Christ truly 
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did live in the bounded time of humanity, but he overcomes it and redeems it by the 
eschatological gift of eternal time.  He has fully participated in our time, but he has redeemed 
both it and us.  Therefore, salvation history (election) encompasses both God’s eternity and 
the time of Christ’s obedience (human response).  Or another way of putting this is that 
God’s being ad extra is identical to his being ad intra.  God’s decision to be for himself who 
he is in Jesus Christ is not separate from his decision of election, so that our time is not 
obliterated, but is taken up into the divine life, not swallowed or eliminated, but healed and 
recreated into what it was meant to be.  In a passage on our history included in Christ’s 
history, importantly, Jenson notes that for Barth “Christ’s reality includes ours without 
swallowing it up, without abolishing us as persons, in that God reveals to us what has already 
happened to us.”526  Morrison’s perception of Barth and his zeal to maintain the autonomy of 
our time indicate a troubling pattern that has crept into trinitarian theology.  To overcome this 
(as I believe we should) Barth’s and Jenson’s voices should be more prominent.    
 
The resurrection and particularly the forty days is the revelation of God’s eternity, and that 
divine, temporal eternity is his pre-, supra-, and post-temporality.   
 
The life of Jesus comes to an end, and therefore there was a moment when His time 
became past.  But its end is such that it is always present and still future.  The man 
Jesus was as He is and will be.  Even the time after His time, the time in which His 
time is already past time, because it is the time of His past, the time which derives 
from Him, is the time of His renewed presence, the time of His new coming, and 
therefore again His time.527 
 
Therefore, according to Barth, Easter time is the key to unlocking the reality not only of 
created time but also of God’s eternity.528 
Easter time demonstrates that the man Jesus is present, which relates to God’s supra-
temporality.  According to Barth, the New Testament writers considered the past history of 
Jesus not to be something relegated to the past, but rather is “transcendentally present.”529   
 
The yesterday of Jesus is also today.  The fact that He lives at the right hand of God 
means that even now He is absolutely present temporally.  And to His own on their 
further journey into time…He has given them His Spirit, the Holy Spirit.  But where 
                                                 
526 Jenson, Alpha and Omega: A Study in the Theology of Karl Barth (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
2002), 135. 
527 CD III.2, 464. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid., 467. 
 130 
the Spirit is, there is more than a mere tradition or recollection of Jesus.  Of course 
there is tradition and recollection as well.  But the message of His past is proclaimed, 
heard and believed in order that is should no longer be past but present.530 
 
Clearly, for Barth, Christ’s presence to us is a real presence, but one that is wholly and 
completely dependent upon the Spirit.  The sacraments, Barth claims, cannot be such 
“without His real presence as very God and very Man, both body and soul.”531  Yet, his 
presence is not “restricted” to them, but rather permeates each aspect of the Church precisely 
because that is where the Spirit is.  It is important to note that, for Barth, Jesus is not merely 
present with us, but is temporally present to us.  He still lives and operates within time.  
Though his earthly life is past his time is not past, for Easter time demonstrates the ongoing 
presence of that life with us.  Two questions can be asked: 1) negatively, what does this 
exclude?  2) Positively, what does it imply?   
Negatively, to say that Jesus Christ, the gendered Jew (to borrow Jenson’s phrase), is 
really present with the world necessarily excludes divine atemporality.  Again, I believe the 
questions have been confused in the time and eternity discussion.  To say that God in Christ 
is temporally present to the world is necessarily to exclude atemporality; however, it does not 
necessarily exclude some sort of transcendence over time.  To be transcendent over time is 
not the same as atemporality, but it could be taken to mean timelessness.  Christ may be 
present and timeless, but he may not be present and atemporal.  It may appear to be a 
terminological game, but taking into consideration the Barthian and Jensonian theological 
perspectives, the argument stands.  God transcends time, but he is not without time or 
completely disconnected from it.  Perhaps new terminology is in order.  Nevertheless, Easter 
time, for Barth, demonstrates how Jesus can reveal his divine temporality within fallen time. 
Positively, Christ’s temporal presence prompts the question of his particular location 
(further demonstrating the close link between space and time even for God), i.e. what of the 
sacraments?  Contrasting Barth and Jenson on this is roughly parallel to the Reformed and 
Lutheran conceptions of Eucharist.  For Jenson, for one to be present and available to another 
there must be embodiment, else that person and that communication are both unidentifiable 
and enslaving.  So, if the Christian community is going to address God and others, especially 
in terms of gospel proclamation, there must be embodiment of all participants.  “The word in 
which God…communicates himself must be an embodied word, a word ‘with’ some visible 
reality, a grant of divine objectivity.  We must be able to see and touch what we are to 
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apprehend from God; religion cannot do without sacrament.”532  And this “seeing” and 
“touching” of God’s body is the church partaking in the elements of bread and wine in the 
Supper.  For this to be the case, yet remain a non-biological reality, it is only necessary, 
according to Jenson, that Christ understand himself in this way, thus determining its 
reality.533  God identifies himself within the temporal reality that is Jesus, but now that Jesus 
is resurrected and not walking this earth, Jenson believes that God turns to himself in the 
bread and wine, for that is precisely the place where Jesus places his identity.  Hence, the 
gravity of the doctrine for Jenson: “If the gospel is indeed gospel, its speaking is Jesus’ 
presence as himself: in the same body that Mary bore.  Therefore, we must assert: the body 
Pilate hanged, and the embodiment of gospel-speaking among us, the ensemble of the 
gospel’s sacramental reality, are one thing.”534  But the question is, how?  The answer is 
unclear.  What is clear, at least to me, is that Jenson’s view of divine ontology pushes toward 
a biological presence of Christ, which elevates sacrament and is in effect detracting from the 
priority of the Word and the actualizing power of the Spirit. 
In my estimation what is lacking in Jenson is a strong pneumatological activity in the 
Eucharist meal.  If the Spirit is indeed future, is it not possible to say that in addition to 
bringing in God’s eschatological kingdom, he also brings to our present the eschatological 
presence of Christ?  He has already given assent in this direction by speaking of the 
inexhaustibility of Jesus’ work since it is taken up by the Spirit who brings it from the future.  
Why not the reality of his presence in the bread and wine, as well?                                   
Indeed, it is the Spirit who is the proof that Jesus does not leave his children as 
orphans, for Jesus’ own understanding of his presence with his disciples continued in an 
unbroken, albeit different form because of the Spirit (Luke 24:49).  He is really present with 
us, though not in a way that we can reach out, grasp him, and embrace him in the same 
manner as the disciples did.  Furthermore, his Spirit even took that role as making his 
presence real for his church to such an extent that this same embodied Jew of the first century 
could himself claim to be with two or three gathered in his name (Matthew 18:19).  In his 
pre-resurrected state, it is difficult to imagine such a scenario on Jenson’s account of 
embodiment and temporal presence.  This consideration brings to the fore the need for a 
stronger emphasis upon the role of the Spirit in bringing Christ’s presence to us.  It is not 
merely Christ who is present to us, and the tendency in Jenson is to read “God with us” as 
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exclusively pertaining to Christ.  Clearly, the Spirit is with us, too, and we detract from his 
person when he is marginalized in the worship of the Church, particular in the Eucharist.  As 
Gunton writes, “Crucial here is an important distinction: that the presence of Christ is not as 
but through the Spirit, who is the mediator of both Christ’s presence and his (eschatological) 
otherness.”535  Therefore, Easter time, according to Barth, demonstrates that Christ’s presence 
with us is ongoing by means of the presence of the Spirit. 
Easter time also illuminates the pre-Easter life of Jesus—it is pre-temporal.  There is a 
unity in the person of the forty days and the pre-Easter days in that they hang on one another.  
There cannot be a distinction, as modernity would have it, between the “Jesus of history” and 
the “Christ of faith,” or, the pre-Easter and post-Easter life.  The Easter time that unveils to 
his followers Jesus in the mode of God would be meaningless if it did not have an organic 
connection with the time of veiling between his birth and death.  How could we know his 
presence today if he had not been and done all that he did previous to this post-Easter time?  
“He would not be if he had not previously been.”536  Jenson, Gunton and others charge Barth 
with a lack of interest in the historical life of Jesus, i.e. between birth and death, but the 
criticism from Jenson goes much deeper than a mere “you fail to write enough about it” sort 
of affair.  For Jenson, it is a symptom of a greater problem, viz. that the eternal being of Jesus 
Christ is prior to his temporal obedience in reconciliation, and by doing so “he [Barth] puts 
himself in danger of removing reconciliation itself, the inner reality of Jesus’ life, from our 
history.”537  The possibility that this is a tendency in Barth and the consequent weaknesses of 
such a tendency must be reserved for the next chapter.  What has to be noted here is that 
Barth is fully aware of the crucial reality of that pre-Easter life both for God’s being in 
himself and God’s being for us. 
But Barth takes the pre-Easter time of Jesus back even further to the Old Testament 
time as also the time of Jesus Christ.  He states: 
 
Hence the references to the Old Testament which we find in the New tell us that the 
history and time of Israel were prophetic, their meaning and perfection consisting in 
the fact that they moved towards the history and time of the man Jesus.  Prefiguring 
and expecting this history and time of the man Jesus, they belonged to His time.  
Indeed, no less really than they history and time of the apostles, although inversely, it 
was His time.538 
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It is important to understand that Barth’s conception of the prophetic history of Jesus is real 
history, not merely a prefiguring or pre-word about his coming history.  It is that, to be sure, 
but it is more than that.  Jesus Christ is the center of all time—time for God and time for 
humanity—thus, Barth asks, “Are we not forced to see it as the time which embraces and 
controls all time before and after Him?”539  That which is absolute is the sovereign 
intersection of divine revelation in Jesus Christ, not time.  In this context Barth specifically 
identifies Cullmann as falling victim to an absolutizing of our time when he claims that the 
Old Testament could only be a prefiguring for Jesus, for the time of Jesus (that of birth to 
death) could not be identical to the prophetic times, else time is illusory and all is timeless.  
“To find the witness to Christ in the Old Testament does not mean, then, to find the 
incarnation of Jesus in the Old Testament.  It means rather to learn, upon the basis of our 
knowledge concerning the incarnate and crucified Christ, how to understand the past events 
of redemptive history as preparation for the incarnation and the cross.”540  Additionally, 
under such a scheme the Old Testament would necessarily render the New irrelevant.541 
 Barth’s answer to Cullmann is instructive in that it parallels his overall perception of 
the divine eternity as in one sense timeless and in another temporal.  He states: 
 
The truth is that the contemporaneity in question here does not exclude a certain non-
contemporaneity as well.  After all, Abraham, Moses and the prophets, and all the 
other figures of the Old Testament, still remain what they are in their own right.  They 
are clearly distinguished from Jesus, and there is no question of their being identical 
with Him…Yet it is none the less true that the non-contemporaneity in question does 
not exclude a certain contemporaneity…Speaking to their own age, the fathers do in 
fact speak of Jesus.  And what about Israel, the people of the covenant, in whose 
history Jesus is certainly promised and expected but has not yet come, and yet is not 
simply absent, since in all its history He is promised and expected?  Was not the time 
of Israel necessarily another time as the time when He was still far off, but also His 
own time as the time when He was promised and expected?  Just as the tradition and 
recollection of Him make Him the Contemporary of the Church, so in the time of 
Israel the promised and expectation of His coming makes Him the Contemporary of 
Israel.  In both cases it is a spiritual contemporaneity, perceptible only through Him, 
and only in faith. 542 
 
But surely Cullmann is not denying that Trinity is present with Israel only from the 
incarnation forward?  That does not appear to be the case.  Therefore, the radical declaration 
                                                 
539 Ibid. 
540 Cullmann, 135. 
541 Ibid., 133. 
542 CD III.2, 481-82. 
 134 
here by Barth is that Jesus Christ, God and man, not some pre-existent, non-corporeal Logos, 
is present to the prophets and even extends to the Urgeschichte that is creation.543  The man 
who walked the earth and performed those miracles and died that death is the same one 
whose time includes Israel, creation, and even prior to creation.  The time of Jesus Christ is 
temporal, but it includes our temporality, everything prior to our time, and everything in front 
of our time.  Jesus Christ, the man, is both temporal and timeless. 
 Hence, Barth rejects out of hand the concept of the lovgo" a[sarko" due to the fact 
that such an idea would be essentially tied to the Deus absconditus.  God in his revelation 
demonstrates himself to be the one that he is in eternity, and the incarnation, rather than 
signaling a change in the divine being, is the actualization of the being of the eternal Son.  
There is no “Logos in itself” that lacks the form that is Jesus Christ, and to posit such is mere 
speculation and an invitation to wonder whether the Deus pro nobis is indeed the real God.544  
Obviously, as McCormack notes, Barth is not saying that Jesus brought his body with him 
from eternity when he was born in Bethlehem, so in this sense and only this sense the Son is 
a[sarko".545  What Barth was rejecting was “an indeterminate state of being in the life of the 
Logos above and prior to the determination to enter time and become human.”546  Therefore, 
the pre-existence of Christ and God’s predestination of humanity, eternity and election, are 
one. 
   Precisely at this point an interesting problem arises between Barth and Jenson that 
must be considered.  Jenson recognizes the unity of pre-existence and predestination for 
Barth and assimilates that into his own theology.  Indeed, his construal of the divine eternity 
as primally God’s futurity and only because of that, his anteriority, and the unity of both in 
Christ’s earthly act (both then and ongoing in the church), necessarily impacts his view of 
predestination.  “Therefore it is not that God has already decided whether I am or am not of 
his community.  He will decide and so has decided; and has decided and so will decide; and 
so decides also within created time.”547  The same applies, according to Jenson, to Christ’s 
existence in that it occurs in time, yet not apart from his futurity and his past.  If Christ and 
election are one and the same, then Christ’s existence in time is essential to the eternal 
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decision of election, and predestination cannot be relegated to God’s pre-temporality.  Thus, 
for Jenson, predestination is something that “happens to and for individuals when they 
encounter Christ in his gospel: that the judgment they then hear is nothing less than God’s 
eternal act of decision.”548  Then Jenson adds in a footnote that Barth “would not tolerate this 
consequence” because of his “fatal definition of time and eternity by mutual exclusion.”549  
But why must this be the case?  Barth’s very definition of election/predestination is the 
history of this man, Jesus Christ,550 whose time is pre-Easter (including pre-creation), Easter, 
and post-Easter.  This formula is identical to Jenson’s quoted above.  Jesus Christ is what has 
happened in his pre-temporal eternity, is what happened in our time and what continues to 
happen, and is what will happen (parallel to and united with the divine eternity that is pre-, 
supra-, and post-temporal).  Why could not the same be said of predestination?  If Barth is 
truly guilty of this charge from Jenson, then he has separated God in himself from God for us 
in a manner inconsistent with his doctrine of time and eternity.  But how could it be so?  
God’s supra-temporality is our life being lived in the intrusion of eternity into time, pushing 
all that is not God into the past and bringing all that is future to the present.  Another way of 
saying this, for Barth, is God justifying the ungodly.  And there it is—an explicit unifying of 
the time of Jesus Christ with election.  Election is what is happening now, for the time of 
Jesus Christ is ongoing and is not exclusively pre-temporal.   
Wherever the alleged problem Jenson has with Barth is located, I find it difficult to 
believe that it is in time and eternity, especially in light of Jenson’s own temporal formula 
(quoted above), which is nearly identical to Barth’s.  Since our history and election is the 
history and election of Jesus Christ Barth strives in his doctrine of time and eternity to give 
an account of how his life is contemporaneous with ours.  Yes, the time of Jesus is past, but it 
is also contemporaneous with us.  If the problem truly exists, then it is not because Barth has 
not given an account for Jesus’ time and history with us now.  It is possible, as I have already 
mentioned, that Barth may overemphasize God’s pre-temporality in election so that he gives 
this impression that Jenson articulates, but if he does, he does so over against his own 
doctrine of time and eternity.  This need not be the case and simple adjustments or a shift of 
emphasis could help. 
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Easter time dictates the reality that Jesus’ time is also future—it is post-temporal—and it does 
so because the resurrection frees us from viewing Jesus as exclusively past.  Due to his Easter 
time we anticipate that the future, our future, is united with his future.  It is his future, but it is 
his future for us.551   
 
The unity of His glory and our glorification already achieved in His resurrection has 
again become the future, His future, for us.  For us, therefore, the resurrection and the 
parousia are two separate events.  But for Him they are a single event.  The 
resurrection is the anticipation of His parousia as His parousia is the completion and 
fulfilment of the resurrection.552   
 
Because of the centrality of the future for Jenson’s divine ontology I will postpone any 
critical interaction with him until the next chapter, so at this point only a brief statement on 
Barth’s view of the time of Jesus Christ as future is in order. 
 For Barth, there is no call for the primacy of the future dimension of the time of Jesus 
any more than on the Easter time (present) and the pre-Easter time (past).  All three are equal 
“in substantiality, importance or urgency, in dignity or value.”553  The trinitarian background 
is again evident here, though no explicit link is made by Barth.  Indeed, it may merely be the 
idea of God’s Triunity that grounds this configuration of time, since the overarching 
emphasis is that this is Christological temporality.  The Father is hardly mentioned in this 
section, if at all, and, though the Spirit gets some attention in the latter pages of “Jesus, Lord 
of Time,” it is only because the community “has the form of the Spirit means that the 
community not only derives temporally from the this commencement and moves towards this 
consummation, but that it is effectively established and gathered by the One who was and 
who comes, being not only ruled but continually nourished and quickened by Him.”554  It 
remains the time of Jesus Christ and not that of the Spirit, even though the Spirit is present.  
This threefold temporal dimension is equal in degree, emphasis, etc. because the one whose 
temporality it belongs to is one person.   
 
There is no justification for trying to systematise the being of Jesus from this 
standpoint.  The New Testament always thinks and speaks eschatologically, but never 
with full logical consistence.  Its only logical consistence is to think and speak on all 
sides and in all dimensions and relationships christologically.  And it is for this reason 
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that with equal emphasis and seriousness it can always think and speak 
eschatologically as well.555 
 
Thus, for Barth, God’s being is not substantially a future being that somehow determines his 
past and present, but rather God is equally and fully God in Jesus Christ in all three 
temporalities. 
 Moreover, as I have already indicated, the future to which the community moves is 
not an empty one, but is the person of Jesus himself.   
 
The last time which dawned with His appearance, and in which the community has its 
mission and task; and the conclusion of time, the judgment and the consummation 
which, corresponding to the time of creation, will form the content of this concluding 
time and of the ensuing time of the being of all things in God—this time too, as the 
New Testament sees it, is wholly and utterly His time, the time of Jesus, the time of 
His being.556 
 
The God of the parousia is the same one that pre-existed our time and exists along with it.   
The question of the exact nature of our future is not new and is a fundamental 
dimension of the time/eternity problem.  Barth has been accused of rendering our future as 
unreal given his insistence that God’s presence and knowledge fills our future, just as it does 
our present and past.  The same charge could be laid at Jenson’s door.  How does that relate 
to his temporality?  In other words how can Barth make such an assertion regarding pre-, 
supra-, and post-temporality and it relate in any way to temporal process.  Barth’s own 
theological answer will be fleshed out in the next chapter.   
 The precise nature of our time and God’s eternity remains sketchy, but I believe that 
theology and philosophy are making strides here.  We are certainly better off with accounts 
given by the chief interlocutors of this study than with atemporal accounts of the divine 
eternity from those who have gone before us (and some who remain with us!).  Exactly what 
it means for God to be temporal yet transcend the limitations of time has not fully been 
explained, but it appears to me that this is a question that eludes a comprehensive answer.  
What is crucial is that theology carefully avoids stretching orthodoxy to accommodate the 
philosophical or scientific inclinations of the day, whilst at the same time giving it an 
attentive ear.  To some extent, I believe, Barth and Jenson (particularly the latter) have done 
that, and offer us a way of speaking of God that is in concert with what we observe in our 
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world—bearing in mind that our observations are finite and ever-changing!  What we 
understand about time and creation may give us insight into the divine life, but it would be 
foolish to allow that to dictate a theology of it.  “God reveals Godself” is Barth’s dictum and 
the one I have attempted to emulate; therefore, asserting that God is temporal is primarily a 
theological conclusion and one that the contemporary church must make if it is going to do 




 The structure of this chapter properly reflects Barth’s approach to time and eternity: 
there is God in his eternity where “in the uncreated self-subsistent time which is one of the 
perfections of His divine nature, present, past and future, yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, 
are not successive, but simultaneous;”557 there is humanity in its time “in which past, present 
and future follow one another in succession;”558 and between them as the fulcrum and 
determination both for the knowledge and condition of time is the man, Jesus Christ.  For 
Barth, to say that Jesus has time is to say that 1) he was human and experienced time in 
succession just as we do, but notwithstanding this 2) his time is “real time,” God’s time, 
primarily perceived in the resurrection appearances.  Wirkliche Zeit is God’s authentic 
temporality and is the ground for, yet is contrasted with, our fallen, successive time.  Real 
time, then, is located in the event of Jesus Christ and not in our fallen time, and this is true 
not only based on the trinitarian and Christological arguments from Barth, but also because of 
the perpetual elusiveness of the nature of our time.  Reminiscent of Augustine this 
elusiveness is most obvious in that “the present can be experienced only in the form of 
recollections and expectations.”559  According to Barth, there is no possibility of giving a 
genuine, certain picture of human temporality, because any “venture is nurtured either by 
illusions or by secret borrowings from theology.”  The only conclusion about human 
temporality that we can come to is that it is a “riddle.”560  Yet, the riddle does not lead us to 
nihilism, but to faith.  The aim of this section is to describe how Barth conceives of our time 
in relation to Jesus Christ. 
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That God’s time is authentic and our time is inauthentic does not merely stem from 
the Creator/creature distinction, the infinite and finite, but rather this temporal discontinuity 
reflects God’s judgment upon humanity.  “What we have been describing is sinful man in 
time.”561  The desire to escape this situation is obvious, and by virtue of the desire itself, 
something tells us it is “abnormal and unnatural.”  Yet there is a positive side to this 
declaration of judgment in that the time of Jesus Christ not only demonstrates the inauthentic 
nature of our time because it is sinful, but it also demonstrates that time is “given” to us by 
God for our existence.  An extended paragraph from Barth expresses the argument: 
 
But the being of Jesus in time has this power to unmask and sober man, to recall him 
to the truth from every height and depth and reinterpretation and forgetfulness, 
because the monstrosity of general human being in time is overcome in Him.  Thus 
the primary significance of His being is not critical.  It is critical only as it actualises 
and reveals positively the real being of man in the time really created by God and 
given to man.  It depicts our general being in time as the plunge into falsehood against 
which God protests.  It allows us no rest in this falsehood, because it is itself the truth 
which confronts it; the truth of human nature as God created it; the truth of our being 
in our time.562 
 
 
Further, according to Barth, Jesus “is temporal among us as we are.  Yet He does this in a 
manner appropriate to himself.”563  This “manner” is time as that which was created and only 
existed before the fall.  Since Barth understands our fallen time as that which exists, then 
passes away—being which is gone—this is necessarily in conflict with the Easter time of 
Jesus, whose time is past, present and future.  Hence, this, for Barth is how he unites his 
eternity as God and his temporality as human.  The human side of Jesus’ temporality is 
human time as it should be—authentic human time, rather than fallen time. 
It is at this point that the question of the relationship of our temporality to the divine 
temporality becomes acute.  Our time is fallen, inauthentic, sinful time.  It is not the way God 
is, nor is it the way we are meant to be.  But how is it, then, that Barth can maintain the 
positive nature of “given time”?  Only in this sense: the temporality of Jesus guarantees that 
our time is given to us by God, and “if the gift is a gift of God, then it is indestructibly a good 
gift.”564  “…The existence of the man Jesus in time is our guarantee that time as the form of 
human existence is in any case willed and created by God, is given by God to man, and is 
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therefore real.”  To be human is to exist in time—“it is the form of our existence.”565  Eternal 
life even, says Barth, “will still be in his time.”  As close as soul is to body, that is humanity 
in its time.  Thus, just as eternal life will be humanity living out its authentic existence with 
soul and body, so it will live it out in authentic time. 
The intimacy of the relation between God and humanity is reflected in the fact that 
there is nothing to know of God or fellow humanity apart from temporal, historical relations.  
How could we possibly assert anything disconnected from notions of time?  Therefore, this is 
argument enough for the temporality of God in that, “God would not be my God if He were 
only eternal in Himself, if He had not time for me…all this is history, and has its time, and 
refers to me in this time of mine, even in God’s eternity before I was and when I shall have 
ceased to be.”566  Thus, humanity and time are inextricably united. 
Yet this time is not intrinsic to humanity, but rather “man is in the time given to 
him…We have no control over time and our being in it…We do not have it in virtue of our 
being.”567  Time is a gift given to humanity it might be more proper to say, according to 
Barth, that time has us instead of we have time.  Our temporal existence is not an autonomous 
one, but the very fact that we are in time and that time is a gift from God to us indicates that 
we are not in time alone, but rather with God.  “To say, ‘man’ or ‘time’ is…to say ‘God.’”568 
Though time is skewed or abused by sinful humanity, time cannot be destroyed 
because the “presence and gift” of God cannot be destroyed.  Yet, the perplexing question is 
that the discontinuities of our time are viewed by Barth as “fallen,” not the way it is supposed 
to be.  In what time does the presence and gift of God exist, real time or our time?  He 
implies that it is the latter in that time is praise to God because “it is the dimension for the 
history of the covenant between God and man, thus making possible a history between man 
and his fellow-men, a history of humanity.  If man were not in time there would be no 
dimension for this history, for the history of the divine covenant and his own salvation, and 
therefore for the history of humanity.”569  Initially Barth’s discussion seemed to point in the 
direction of something like “our time is inextricable to our humanity,” but then he moved 
beyond that to “our time is necessary for covenant history.”  It seems to me that these are two 
very different notions in that the former is a mere observation and makes no value judgment 
on the situation, but the latter does indeed make a value judgment, and in this case a positive 
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one.  If that is true, then how do we reconcile it with Barth’s view that the discontinuities of 
our time are a result of sin that will and must pass away?  The answer, I would suggest, is 
found in Barth’s idea that humans having time depends upon the receiving of that time as 
gift.  Clearly, then, Barth could not intend this to mean time that is common to humanity, for 
not everyone acknowledges the Creator’s gift of time, yet all humanity has temporality.  All 
times are given by God, but the time that gives humanity a real present that is different from 
the fallen, fleeting nature of our time is the gift from God that is also received.  Let us think 
of it in slightly different terms.  How do we overcome Augustine’s dilemma of the existence 
of a “present”?   
Because God’s Now is not an abstract Now but is a Now for us, therefore our present 
is real because it is God’s present.  Were this not the case, according to Barth, we would be 
“sinking into nothingness.”  But as it is, by virtue of our temporality, we are assured of being 
in the present because that temporality is given and under the time of God.  Indeed, it is what 
we need to be in relationship with him for, “only if I had to be a creature without God should 
I have to regard this transition as my destruction.”  “I am where I may live neither threatened 
by illusion nor enmeshed in falsehood, i.e., in real time [wirkliche Zeit], in the present of 
God.”570  The use of this term and the tone of the passage indicate that Barth clearly views 
our history as within God’s history and not one that stands on its own.  He explicitly alludes 
to our time as real time, which is, in other sections of the CD God’s time alone.  But it must 
be quickly noted that Barth does not deny the reality of the discontinuity of our time, nor 
would he suggest that we are collapsing into the divine, but rather by calling the time under 
God as real time, he is merely demonstrating the ultimate meaning and significance of this 
time, and to the reality of real time as gift.  Our time is an existential crisis apart from 
viewing it as resting in God’s real time.  Our Now is non-existent without the Now of God’s 
time.  Thus, they are both real, but as Creator he upholds the creature and the creature’s time.  
If one wants to argue that our time has to be autonomous, then the corollary of autonomous 
being necessarily follows.  Therefore, what we have within covenant relation to God is real 
time, which is God’s time given to us.  What we have outside of covenant relation to God is 
fleeting time and nothingness.  True enough, even in covenant we experience “our time” in all 
its discontinuity, but we receive glimpses of God’s real time during our time, which are 
proleptic of our eternity with him.  When it comes to eschatology Barth may encounter 
certain difficulties, but that is a different question than the one we are pursuing here.  Thus, 
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thinking of humanity’s time in soteriological terms (time is God’s saving gift) enlightens 
Barth’s intention. 
Our transition from past to future in the present is “the invitation to be with God now, 
to be present with Him, to make this transition with Him, recognising that He always 
precedes us, not without us, but for us and on our behalf.”571  The movement that God makes 
is not an atemporal one because it accompanies our temporal movement.  Literally, God is 
intimately moving our time through the present to the future.  Thus, it is always a present to 
him, but it is a movement, just the same.  When does God do this?  He is always doing it in 
our present.  “This then is how the present is filled.  It is real.  And from this we are entitled 
to conclude that all our time is real, that we are really in time, that we really have time.  
God’s presence and gift creates, delivers and sustains this reality…But this means that though 
we are sinners who have forfeited our time, and indeed ourselves, we are not lost, but as we 
were created, so we are sustained and delivered.”572 
When we read Barth on our time in the present tense, as I have just described it, there 
is something in it that makes us doubt the certainty of what he calls “our time.”  Our time is 
sinful and is all that is passing away and all that is not God.  Real time is that which is a gift 
of God, but is given and received by faith so that our present is real and is filled by God’s 
present.  But if God’s present is his authentic time, his eternity, which is not successive but 
simultaneous, then it follows that the same should be said for us.  A comparison with Jesus 
might help.  Though he existed in our time his time was authentic and the post-resurrection 
appearances demonstrate this.  After our resurrection and Christ’s return we will fully realize 
the real time that we possessed all along, but only had glimpses of along the way.  This idea 
is made more explicit in Barth’s description of man’s past time. 
Just as is the case for our time in its present, our past is a reality, not because we 
maintain it in memory, but because God’s eternity sustains it.  But in order for God to 
maintain the reality of our past he must also do so for his past.  But how does this happen so 
that it “is not subject to any ‘no longer’” if he is temporal and not atemporal?  And here is the 
problem: “For there is a Then, a genuine past, in God’s eternity, as surely as it is the eternity 
of the living God.  Of course, no lines are drawn there.  The past is not left behind, nor does it 
fade.”573  But the genuine past that Barth is referring to must be past in relation to our past.  
Thus, it is only past in the sense that he was in our past, but not in the sense that his eternity 
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has a past and present by mutual exclusion.  To say with Barth that God’s eternity has a past 
is not to say there is temporal succession in the divine eternity life Moltmann would, but 
rather it is to say that God’s eternity has a past that was with our past.  But how is that not 
equivalent to saying “God is always present in his eternity”?  God’s past, on this 
understanding is a present that was present with us.  God’s future is a present that will be 
with us when we get there.  Thus, God is always present, no matter where we are on the 
temporal continuum, and this is essentially saying with Boethius, Aquinas, et al., that God is 
timeless.  The difference is that Barth is saying timeless does not equal atemporal.  
Atemporal means that something cannot have anything to do with time.  Timeless should 
mean that God is not subject to time’s contingencies, but enters into time freely as its Creator 
and Lord. 
Though our past is truly gone to us and is no longer our present, it still exists in God’s 
love because he cannot lose any of our being.  Thus, our past still exists in God’s present, 
though it is irretrievable to us in our time.574  This makes perfect sense, though, since God’s 
being is only present and his pre-, supra-, and post-temporality is so only in relation to our 
time.  His eternity does not march, but simply is.  It appears that this section (#47, Man in His 
Time) is the seal on Barth’s stance when it comes to time.  He definitely holds to a timeless 
God—one that exists in “Now” that is in our past, present, and future—but this does not 
mean he is atemporal. 
  
 The same can be said, perhaps surprisingly, of Wolfhart Pannenberg.  He, too, 
embraces a timeless God who is not atemporal, and along with this affirmation he carries 
some of Barth’s tendencies.  I find in Pannenberg someone who, along with Jenson, stresses 
God’s economic presence in history and his power and deity from the future.  Yet, he does 
not go as far as Jenson does in identifying the hypostases with the temporal moments of past, 
present, and future, which, in the end pushes him more toward a position like Barth’s.  I 
include this discussion on Pannenberg not to exonerate nor to condemn either Barth or 
Jenson, but rather to demonstrate that similar refrains are being played in each that demand 
our attention.  Furthermore, I do want to argue in favor of Pannenberg’s disagreements with 
Jenson and his overlap with Barth.  
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Pannenberg on Time and Trinity 
 
Like Jenson and Barth, Pannenberg represents an interesting effort to mediate 
between atemporality and process theism.  As a thoroughly modern thinker575 he rejects the 
Augustinian account of eternity as timelessness,576 opting instead for a perspective that 
unifies time and eternity.  Relying more on Plotinus than Plato Pannenberg believes that time 
and eternity are positively related because eternity is both everlastingness, unaffected by the 
march of time, and wholeness of life.  That is to say, in time we experience a succession of 
moments that constitute past, present, and future, yet we can refer to them in totality in terms 
of eternity.  Eternity is not opposed to time, but is the foundation for understanding it, 
because life is “the enduring self which always has the whole present to it.”  Time, then, 
becomes a continuous sequence by the reference to eternity.577   
Not a little confusion has persisted over the centuries concerning the “classical” 
definition of time and eternity.  Perceiving this state of affairs Pannenberg criticizes Nelson 
Pike578 for assuming the unity of Plato and Plotinus on eternity.  Pannenberg also praises 
Boethius’ dependence on Plotinus when he gave the definition of eternity as “that which 
grasps and possesses simultaneously the entire fullness of life without end; no part of the 
future is lacking to it, and no part of the past has escaped it.”579  Eternity is not always 
opposed to time and to assume so leads Pike to affirm complete divine temporality as the 
only possibility once one disposes of timelessness.580  Pannenberg rejects this idea of 
complete temporality as he carefully explains: 
 
But this idea makes God into a finite being if it implies that like ourselves God at 
every moment of his life looks ahead to a future this is distinct from the present and 
sees the past fading away from him…If God is, then his whole life and all things 
created by him must be present to him at one and the same time.  This is not to set 
aside the distinction of what is temporally different.  On the contrary, differing 
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precisely as regards its temporal position, it is present to the eternal God.  In the same 
way it can be said to be affirmed, willed and created by him.581 
 
 
Pannenberg, contrary to thinkers such as Wolterstorff582 and Swinburne,583 does not think a 
rejection of complete divine temporality eliminates the possibility that God knows what is 
temporally different, since God is not eternal in the sense of atemporal, but is eternal in the 
sense of possessing all distinctions of time at once.584   
 Plotinus provides the paradigm for Pannenberg’s understanding of eternity as the 
totality of life,585 for which he also argues from an anthropological perspective.  Pannenberg 
builds on Augustine’s view that humans experience the present moment of time in the soul, 
inasmuch as it reaches out to remember the past and anticipate the future.  Augustine 
understood this time-bridging present as illustrated in common speech and a piece of music.  
Both are comprehended and acted out only as they exist in their totality, i.e. an entire 
sentence or paragraph, and the entire piece of music.586  It is in the soul’s giving “attention” 
to this time-bridging present that Augustine believes we experience duration—a concept 
fundamental to our existence.  Hence, Pannenberg notes that living within time is only 
possible when considering it (time) in its totality, since that is what constitutes duration.587  
Further, in recognizing our “Now” by remembering the past and anticipating the future, the 
latter should take precedence “for the totality of life is defined only by the future that 
completes it.”588 
 Thus, in this fashion humans’ experience of time compares to divine eternity in that it 
is a present only in view of the whole, but is contrasted to divine eternity due to its limitation 
of our life span and the fact that we only perceive this totality by remembering and expecting.  
God, says Pannenberg, has no need of recollecting or anticipating, rather he possesses his 
totality of life at once.  For Augustine the idea of God’s eternal present implied atemporality, 
but Pannenberg claims that this is an unnecessary move and prefers to “think of it as an 
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identity that overarches time.”589  That is, since God has no future beyond himself, and is 
thereby not finite, then he is not subject to “the march of time,” but that does not imply that 
eternity and time are antithetical.590  Rather, eternity is the grounding of our time and God’s 
presence is the gift of our time.591  Jenson believes that Pannenberg’s notion that God is his 
own future, which is not distinct from his present, slips back into an Augustinian 
timelessness.592  Jenson agrees with Pannenberg that God is not subject to the march of time, 
hence Jenson’s description of him as “temporal infinity,” but he contends that “this is not 
because his eternity does not march.”593  Pannenberg’s response to Jenson on this score 
necessitates an understanding of his doctrine of the Trinity.  
A fully trinitarian doctrine of God is the most crucial aspect of Pannenberg’s 
dogmatic program, grounding and integrating itself into every other aspect of his theology.594  
Of central concern for Pannenberg as he develops his doctrine of God is to explain “the 
impact, if any, of temporal events and of the outcome of the process of history upon his 
eternal identity,” vis-à-vis the theological concepts of the kingdom of God and the 
incarnation.595  This section is an attempt to explicate the nature of the Triune identity and 
demonstrate how it is significant for Pannenberg’s related doctrine of time.   
 Pannenberg’s doctrine of God radically reorients the manner in which theology 
should speak of the Trinity.  Traditionally, all efforts to identify and explicate the Trinity 
moved from the oneness of God to his threeness, exemplified in, among others, Hegel and 
Barth.596  Pannenberg criticizes this approach saying that for all the positive contributions to 
trinitarianism by Hegel and Protestant nineteenth century theology it could not overcome a 
serious defect.  He explains: “To derive the trinitarian distinctions from the self-
differentiation of the divine Spirit in its self-awareness is to subsume the threeenes of the 
persons into the concept of a single personal God.  This derivation, then, comes into conflict 
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with the doctrine of the Trinity itself.”597  For Pannenberg, this is tantamount to Sabellianism 
since it virtually interprets Father, Son, and Spirit as psychological “phases in the economy of 
salvation.”  On such a scheme, God may be self-conscious of differentiation, yet he remains a 
single subject, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of three with their own 
subjectivity.598  Thus, the Trinity, Pannenberg believes, must be understood in the way that 
the three persons relate to one another, and that is the only means to an understanding of the 
oneness of God.599 
 Interestingly, in suggesting his own trinitarian perspective Pannenberg depends on 
Barth, especially as it relates to the idea that the ground and development of the doctrine of 
the identity of the Trinity is God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.600  From this starting point 
Pannenberg offers two crucial elements for his understanding of Trinity.  The first is self-
differentiation.  Against the classical tradition and even much of twentieth century theology 
Pannenberg wants to construct a trinitarian doctrine “from below” instead of from a 
speculative, single-subject God then proceeding to threeness.  In order to do this Pannenberg 
must ground the Trinity in the person of Jesus, specifically in his historical relationship to the 
Father.  This self-distinction of the God-Man and the Father is the only way to refer to the 
threefold divine working, thus the only way to express the nature of the one God.  
Pannenberg graphically states the centrality of this relationship for his doctrine: 
 
Precisely by distinguishing himself from the Father, by subjecting himself to his will 
as his creature, by thus giving place to the Father’s claim to deity as he asked other to 
do in his proclamation of the divine lordship, he showed himself to be the Son of God 
and one with the Father who sent him (John 10:30).601 
 
 
Pannenberg is saying, as Olson puts it, “…that Jesus’ sonship is established by his active self-
differentiation from the Father whose lordship he proclaimed.”602  Further it is not only the 
Son who receives his identification from his self-distinction, but the very deity of the 
Godhead is dependent upon this differentiation.  Pannenberg explains that, “As Jesus glorifies 
the deity of the Father by his sending and in his own relation to the Father, he himself, in 
corresponding to the claim of the Father, is so at one with the Father that God in eternity is 
                                                 
597 ST 1, 294. 
598 Ibid., 294-95. 
599 Ibid., 298-99. 
600 Ibid., 300. 
601 Ibid., 310. 
602 Roger Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the Trinity,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990), 186. 
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Father only in relation to him.”603  That is, the Father cannot be the Father apart from the 
historical work of the Son (especially the resurrection), which, incidentally, gives the Son the 
right to be of the eternal essence of God.604  Pannenberg is not saying that the Son begets the 
Father just as the Father does the Son.  If that were the case, then distinction among the 
persons would collapse, removing trinitarianism entirely.  What he is saying is that “the 
designation ‘Father’ might well involve a dependence of the Father on the Son and thus be 
the basis of true reciprocity in the trinitarian relations.”605  Grenz finds this latter statement 
crucial to Pannenberg’s overall understanding of Trinity because it sharpens the difference 
between him and a traditional belief in self-differentiation.  Classical doctrine might think of 
this idea as “bringing forth of the second and third trinitarian persons through the Father;” 
whereas Pannenberg understands it to signify the essence of personhood as bound up with 
dependence.606  That is, to be a self-differentiated person from another is to be dependent 
upon that other person for one’s identity.  Pannenberg finds an ally in Athanasius for he 
argued against the Arians that God’s fatherhood was dependent upon the Son, and, by 
consequence, the Son’s work as the God Man.  This is vital for Pannenberg because, as Olson 
explains, “so long as the Son and Spirit are represented as dependent on the Father, but the 
Father is represented as possessing his deity independently of the Son and Spirit, 
Subordinationism is inescapable.”607 
 The second decisive element to consider as a foundation for Pannenberg’s trinitarian 
idea is the fact of God’s kingdom rule.  That is, God’s being is intricately bound and 
inseparable from his rule.  Drawing from Luther Pannenberg argues that to be God means to 
have power over all that is finite, else that god could not be considered God.  Hence, God’s 
very being (deity) is his rule.608  The connection for the Trinity and kingdom rule is found in 
the handing of that rule to the Son from the Father and the future returning of that Lordship to 
the Father from the Son in the consummation.  Since rule in the kingdom is this mutual 
interaction between Father and Son Pannenberg sees the dependence of the Father upon the 
Son for his own deity in the strongest ontological terms. 
                                                 
603 ST 1, 310 (emphasis mine). 
604 Ibid., 311. 
605 Ibid., 312. 
606 Grenz, 49. 
607 Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the Trinity,” 181. 
608 Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, 55.  He also makes the connection here that because the 
kingdom is still future and God’s being is intrinsic to kingdom, then “God’s being is still in the process of 
coming to be” (56).  This is to be understood in a Barthian sense, and not in a process sense, as he notes in ST 1, 
331.  For a critique of Pannenberg’s idea in relation to this quote from a process perspective see, Lewis S. Ford, 
“The Nature of the Power of the Future,” The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Twelve American Critiques, 
With an Autobiographical Essay and Response, 85-9. 
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By handing over lordship to the Son the Father makes his kingship dependent on 
whether the Son glorifies him and fulfils his lordship by fulfilling his mission.  The 
self-distinction of the Father from the Son is not just that he begets the Son but that he 
hands over all things to him, so that his kingdom and his own deity are now 
dependent upon the Son.609 
 
 
In sum, Pannenberg is keen to dispel any idea that threeness is derived from a presupposed, 
single-subject and not from the differentiation and interdependence of the persons in the 
Trinity.  Further, the Father does not bestow deity to the Son and Spirit, but is also dependent 
on the Son and Spirit for his very being.  The divine essence does not exclusively flow from 
the Father, but is relationally oriented dependence involving all three persons, without 
removing distinctions.610  The question of how these concepts relate to the world, i.e. time, 
centers around a discussion on the immanent and economic Trinity. 
Olson argues that Pannenberg understands the early church’s emphasis on the 
immanent Trinity as excessive, to the neglect of the economic Trinity in history.611  He goes 
on to say “this resulted from a misunderstanding of the concept of the eternity of God as 
timeless aseity.  Thus the immanent Trinity tended to lose its historical basis and become 
unaffected by the process of history.”612  In order to correct this state of affairs Karl Rahner 
has employed what is now known as “Rahner’s Rule” or “Rahner’s Axiom,” which 
essentially unites the identity of the immanent and economic Trinity.613  Pannenberg credits 
Rahner, Jüngel, Moltmann, and Jenson with refocusing theology on the centrality of the 
economic Trinity, yet he does not do so without objection.  Such a strong identification by 
these theologians pushes us, Pannenberg believes, toward “the absorption of the immanent 
Trinity in the economic Trinity”614 since it lacks any grid or structure through which one 
might even be able to conceive of the eternal, transcendent God with historical temporality.615  
Pannenberg clearly wants to avoid the problems brought on by the tradition’s overemphasis, 
thus sympathizing with the current trends, yet he is hesitant to due to a fear that it leads to a 
                                                 
609 ST 1, 3 13. 
610 Jenson critiques Pannenberg’s trinitarian innovation concerning his application of the term “person” in the 
modern sense to the Father, Son, and Spirit and the problems that might create.  Jenson is hesitant to apply this 
modern sense of the term to all three, preferring to side with the traditional formulation of God as a person.  See 
his, “Jesus in the Trinity: Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Christology and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” The Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg: Twelve American Critiques, with an Autobiographical Essay and Response, 196-202. 
611 Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the Trinity,” 197. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Karl Rahner, The Trinity (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 22. 
614 ST 1, 331. 
615 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of God,” Dialog 26: 4 (1987), 251. 
 150 
God who is the result of the historical process in the process sense of becoming.616  This 
would appear, at first glance, to conflict with Olson’s claim that, based on Pannenberg’s 
previously stated axiom that God’s being is dependent upon his kingdom rule, he is “radically 
dependent on the creation and its history” for his deity.617  A way forward in this apparent 
dilemma is to ask how Pannenberg attempts resolution of the perceived shortcomings in 
Rahner’s Rule.   
 Pannenberg’s trinitarianism finds itself fully rooted in the tradition and much of 
present-day theology (including Jenson) by exemplifying a dogged determination of 
maintaining God’s sovereign, inaccessibility, while affirming his participation within history.  
The question is whether he is able to accomplish this with any sort of coherence.  Note the 
tension Pannenberg endorses: 
 
There has to be a distinction between immanent Trinity and economic Trinity, 
because Barth was correct in claiming that if God’s revelation in Jesus Christ involves 
the trinitarian structure, then there must be a trinitarian structure in the eternal reality 
of God himself, prior to the existence of creation.  On the other hand, the economic 
Trinity is not merely an image (in the Platonic sense) of the eternal trinitarian 
structure in the being of God.  The immanent Trinity is dependent on the process of 
history (hence on the economic Trinity) not only in the ordo cognoscendi, but also in 
its very being as soon as there is a world.618 
 
Not surprisingly the key concept in this resolution is the future.  Yet, if he is going to say, 
“the immanent Trinity is dependent on the process of history,” is he not forced into a 
Whiteheadian view of God’s development?  We have already established that, for 
Pannenberg, “God’s deity is his rule,” and if God’s rule is not explicitly and completely 
established until the eschaton, then his deity in an ontological sense hangs in the balance and 
may collapse if God’s rule does not come to fruition.  Pannenberg explicitly denies this 
possibility and explains how the future is constitutive for God. 
 
But the eschatological consummation is only the locus of the decision that the 
trinitarian God is always the true God from eternity to eternity.  The dependence of 
his existence on the eschatological consummation of the kingdom changes nothing in 
this regard.  It is simply necessary to take into account the constitutive significance of 
this consummation for the eternity of God.619  
 
 
                                                 
616 Alas, the identical fear of every Jenson critic, as well. 
617 Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine of the Trinity,” 199. 
618 Private correspondence from Pannenberg quoted in Bradshaw, 227. 
619 ST 1, 331. 
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The “decision”620 in the future will evidence that it is has been true throughout history.  
Hence, crucial to understanding Pannenberg here is this concept of retroactivity and the 
reciprocal relationship between present and future.  If we apply what has already been said 
concerning the self-differentiation and dependence of the Son to the Father and vice versa, 
then we might easily conceive of the same relationship on a broader scale.  That is, Jesus’ 
resurrection decided (recall the “locus of the decision” in the above quote) retroactively that 
he was the eternal Son of God throughout his earthly life.  Similarly, the completion of the 
work of the economic Trinity at the consummation will demonstrate the essential Trinity in 
all its fullness throughout history.  Therefore, Pannenberg maintains the distinction of the 
immanent and economic Trinity without emphasizing one over the other, by appealing to the 
future consummation where salvation-history is completed and the three persons are shown to 
be one God.621 
 Having discussed Pannenberg’s doctrine of the Trinity we must return to Jenson’s 
accusation from which this all began, viz., that Pannenberg was forced into an Augustinian 
timelessness by saying that God is his own future.  It should be clear at this juncture that 
Pannenberg resists any dualism that posits the immutable God as completely detached from 
the necessary change of finitude.  Yet, he carefully does not fall into an “either/or” 
dichotomy, but employs his concepts dialectically by means of retroactive validation in the 
future.622  In view of the priority of God’s future for this program and the ontological 
dependence of the immanent (we might say, eternal) Trinity on the economic Trinity (and 
vice versa), Pannenberg is keen to demonstrate the unity of time and eternity over against any 
antithesis.  Pannenberg is able to circumvent this antithesis of time and eternity “only if the 
reality of God is not understood as undifferentiated identity but as intrinsically differentiated 
unity.  But this demands the doctrine of the Trinity.”623  Because of God’s self-differentiation 
and the work of the economic Trinity to include creatures in the life of God Pannenberg can 
say that God’s eternity embraces the time of the creatures, i.e., history.  This is a result of his 
                                                 
620 This concept appears as early as 1964 in Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus 
Gerd Mohn, 1964), 333, when noting how the being of Jesus as the God Man was not true from all eternity until 
his resurrection “weil noch nicht endgültig über sie entschieden war” (because the final decision had not yet 
been given).   
621 Olson questions whether Pannenberg really needs to insist on God’s provisional unity.  He believes that in 
Pannenberg’s system, power and glory are lacking for God before the eschaton, but to make his unity 
provisional seems unnecessary, inviting the charge of Tritheism.  See, Olson, “Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Doctrine 
of the Trinity,” 202-03.  
622 Braaten believes that in approaching the God-world relationship in this fashion Pannenberg is explicitly 
combining Hegelian and Kierkegaardian features.  See, Carl E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1968), 30-31. 
623 ST 1, 405. 
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effort to dispense with the presupposed, single-subject God and flows from the idea that it is 
only through his self-differentiation that we come to see his oneness.   
Based on this trinitarian model time is differentiated in history (economy), but is 
unified at the eschaton (immanent).  According to Pannenberg, this does not obliterate time 
any more than the economic Trinity becomes extinct at the consummation—the point where, 
as Pannenberg says, it accomplishes its purpose and retroactively shows the immanent Trinity 
to be the one God.  By virtue of the economic Trinity working within time and its identity 
with the immanent Trinity historical time is appropriated and given its status as “time as it 
should be,” showing that our time is grounded in his eternity.  That is why, as Pannenberg 
points out, that Barth “can say that his present as such is the gift of my time.”624  Further, this 
appropriation of time within eternity at the consummation is vital for Pannenberg because of 
his belief that true essence is derived from the end.  That is, as we have already seen, in a 
very real sense the deity of God is dependent upon the future consummation.625  Likewise, 
real being in humans is only found at the resurrection, the guarantee of which is Jesus’ 
resurrection.626 
For Pannenberg to say that God is his own future is to affirm in relation to time what 
he has already affirmed regarding the Trinity itself, that is, that the Son and Spirit (being self-
differentiated) are the future consummation of the eternal Father who is prior to them.  
Pannenberg resolves any contradiction here by conceiving of God’s eternal identity as “the 
power of his future.”627  What he intends is to maintain the priority of the immanent Trinity 
that brings into time the events of the economic Trinity, yet without collapsing the latter into 
the former.  Because of the incarnation God is truly present within history, and that history is 
not platonic or accidental, but is bound with his identity.  Yet those historical events only 
come about because of the priority of the essential Trinity and its actualizing them by the 
power of his future.628 
Thus, Son is the future of the Father because he establishes his kingdom on earth.  
The Spirit is the future of the Son because of his resurrection, and both are future of the 
Father because of the future acts of consummation in relation to the kingdom.  Nevertheless, 
the Father is the future of both Son and Spirit because it is his kingdom they are establishing.  
“As they share in the communion of the one living God, however, they share in his eternal 
                                                 
624 Ibid., 406. 
625 “Problems of a Trinitarian Doctrine of God,” 252. 
626 See his discussion on this in ST 3, 595-607; and Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans., Matthew J. 
O’Connell (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 240-42. 
627 “Eternity, Time, and the Trinitarian God,” 67. 
628 Ibid., 68. 
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life that has no future outside and beyond itself to occur to it.  The trinitarian God has eternal 
life within himself.”629  Consequently, apart from a trinitarian viewpoint, time would be 
opposed to eternity and we would be left with atemporality.  Within a trinitarian perspective, 
we understand Pannenberg to unite time and eternity, with the former being grounded in the 
latter because of the unity of the immanent and economic Trinity. 
 
As should be obvious from the above discussion Pannenberg’s concept of time rests 
upon the Trinity and upon his method of anticipation, both of which have come under attack.  
Clayton contends that Pannenberg faces philosophical problems by integrating two very 
different concepts of anticipation into one, thus resting his theory of time on shaky ground.630  
On one level Pannenberg is insisting that God is free from the constraints of time, which will 
end at a certain point when eternity breaks in and consummates the historical process.  In this 
model time marches and history develops, yet God does not develop alongside it.  On another 
level Pannenberg insists that God is dependent on the process of history, thus integrated into 
time, so much so that his very deity hangs in the balance—though he believes that all will be 
accomplished so that God’s deity will appear in the eschaton as it was in reality all along.  If 
we combine this view of God and anticipation as Pannenberg wants us to do, according to 
Clayton, then we must also maintain a transcendence-yet-preservation view of time.  “But if 
one rejects the Hegelian dialectic and its Aufhebungen, one must insist that time is either 
transcended or preserved.”631 
Bradshaw raises similar questions in regard to the end of time at the eschaton and the 
new status of the created order within eternity.  “When time ends and God’s triune being is 
wholly consummated, when God is all in all and the whole creation is summed up as 
permeated by the Spirit, then is there a hypostasis of creation to be God’s partner?”632  Since 
Pannenberg sees God as differentiated from and related to the world’s history, the problem 
enters when that history is complete.  Is it possible for God to maintain this distinction from 
finitude, or would the finitude be integrated into the finitude of the Son?633 
 It appears that Pannenberg concludes that at the consummation it is God’s 
overarching of time that will win the day, for our time and the work of the economic Trinity 
has found its fulfillment in him.  Thus, in spite of his efforts to avoid an eternal present, 
                                                 
629 Ibid., 69. 
630 Philip Clayton, “Anticipation and Theological Method,” The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Twelve 
American Critiques, with an Autobiographical Essay and Response, 139-40. 
631 Ibid., 140. 
632 Bradshaw, 341. 
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Pannenberg has the same difficulty that Barth has, namely, the ongoing distinction of our 
time (therefore, our existence) in the eschaton.  Or, our time tends to get eternalized and 
God’s time tends to get defined as an eternal present, bearing little resemblance to our earthly 
time.  However, if we bear in mind that time and eternity are not opposed, but both are based 
on the interrelation of personhood, then problems diminish.  Perhaps it is true that the 
eschaton presents a challenge to Barth and Pannenberg regarding the continuation of our time 
and existence in relation to God’s, but it is not a fatal flaw in their theology.  Recall that for 
both thinkers time is not defined by the discontinuity of past, present, and future, but by 
relation of being.  For God, it is the relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit overcoming our 
discontinuities.  For humanity, it is God holding our being together, even though we lose it to 
the past and anticipate from the future.  Therefore, within a trinitarian theology that highlights 
the relations of persons, time and eternity are not opposed, but can be united.   
Pannenberg does not desire an eternalizing of his theology, thus he orients his 
theology strongly toward God’s economy, just as Jenson does.  Nevertheless, to stretch the 
persons out on the temporal continuum is, for Pannenberg, not the solution to the problem.  I 
believe he is correct to insist upon the unity of the persons in each moment of our temporal 
history and to object to Jenson’s theory.  My reasons for this and my own proposals will 




My efforts in this chapter have been centered on Barth’s doctrine of time in the divine 
eternity, the time of Jesus Christ, and the time of humanity.  I have tried to demonstrate that 
the divine eternity and human time are discovered in and determined by the time of Jesus 
Christ, which is real time (revelation time, authentic time), both on the divine and human 
sides.  What Barth has done is to reject the idea that rationality and temporality are 
autonomous entities into which we must fit our conceptions of the divine being.  Rather, what 
is truly rational is what God reveals, and what he reveals is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as 
God in himself and God for us.  In this revelation we recognize Jesus as Lord, in particular, 
as Lord of time.  Thus, time is what he determines it to be however counterintuitive it at first 
may appear.  In this real time Jesus possesses authentic divine eternity and authentic human 
time, which is a gift to humanity and received by faith.   
Thus, the conclusion of the first part of this thesis is that the question of time and 
eternity is a profoundly theological one.  Similar to the impossibility of positing God’s 
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triunity or his incarnation from a natural perspective, so, too, is it impossible to account for 
God’s eternal relation to time merely by discerning the nature of our time.  Approaching the 
question of time and eternity must be on terms of God’s self-revelation.  Therefore, Barth and 
Jenson speak to the current dialogue for they advocate the development of a trinitarian 
theology that interacts with the broader scientific and philosophical problems, rather than the 
reverse.  The problem with the traditional view of atemporality was the tendency to project 
upon God a natural understanding of what he should look like.  The problem in the current 
time/eternity discussion is not dissimilar in that the tendency is to avoid a trinitarian theology 
and appeal to natural possibilities regarding time.  Barth and Jenson provide a better method 
and need to be heard if we will ever advance toward a resolution—exactly my aim for the 
remaining chapter.  I shall proceed by comparing and contrasting Barth and Jenson in order to 
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses.  This, I argue, sheds light on what a theology of time 
and eternity should look like and how it would be integrated into the wider discussion—
something I have already attempted. 
Toward that end it is helpful to bear in mind that neither author’s doctrine if flawless, 
and in Barth’s case, his concept of fallen time raises significant questions: 
1) Can it be said that Jesus participated in time just as we do, if our time is fallen?  Barth 
never admits to such a concept, indeed, he claims the opposite.  It may be that Barth 
recognizes his problem yet has nowhere to turn, given his insistence on the authentic, 
real time of Jesus Christ—a temporality which turns out to be strikingly reminiscent 
of eternity.  Others have noted that as a consequence he has little interest in the 
humanity of the man Jesus.634  But clearly, Jesus does participate in our time.  He 
matures physically and emotionally (Luke 2), and when he dies and is resurrected by 
the Father he is not the baby from the manger.  Jesus has a history that can be narrated 
in the temporal terms of our past, present, and future.  This does not seem to fit well 
in Barth’s doctrine of time since his time is the simultaneity of pure duration, which 
may be equivalent to an eternal present.   
2) Consequently, Barth’s doctrine of God as the electing God is seen to shape everything 
about the divine being, so that each discussion of time and eternity is controlled by 
soteriology, election.  Barth’s concept of Jesus is skewed if we allege he genuinely 
participated in our time like we do, since that time represents sinful humanity, and 
Jesus was without sin.   
                                                 
634 Gunton, Becoming and Being, 185.  This may be a slight overstatement, but nonetheless it is a perceptive 
comment that fits the dilemmas of fallen and real time. 
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3) If fallen time is that which is passing away and real time is God’s authentic time that 
by grace he gives to us and we receive by faith, then when Barth says that time is 
proper to our being, what is he actually saying?  Are we not in some sense already 
eternal?   
4) What about our identity in the eschaton?  How, on Barth’s scheme, do we maintain 
our temporal identity without morphing into the divine? 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TIME AND ETERNITY: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BARTH AND JENSON 
 
 The previous chapters have served to demonstrate the following claims: 1) 
contemporary theology and philosophy of religion understand the Christian tradition as 
embracing and propagating a doctrine of divine atemporality that tends to minimize essential 
biblical teaching and undercuts theological assertions concerning God and his relation to the 
world; 2) Barth and Jenson reject divine atemporality, yet make every effort to demonstrate 
how their trinitarian modifications (upon which their views of time are based) are within the 
parameters of the tradition; 3) However, Jenson, while affirming much of Barth’s theological 
enterprise, charges that he ultimately fails to overcome this theological impediment and 
offers his own solution to the dilemma. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate that correction both from Barth’s side and 
Jenson’s, whether it is warranted, and whether it advances theology’s conception of divine 
temporality in a helpful direction.  Subsequently, I will offer my own suggestions regarding 
this issue, which (I hope) will build on Barth and Jenson’s foundation, yet improve upon it. 
 
The analogia fidei in Relation to Time and Eternity 
 
Barth’s doctrine of analogy draws most of his critics’ attention partly because of his sustained 
and vehement attack upon natural theology and the analogia entis, and partly because that is 
the location of certain ambiguities.635  In light of these two perspectives two introductory 
qualifications are in order. 
 First, the term “analogy” is burdened with considerable historical weight that cannot 
be wholly dissected here, related in particular to the question of natural theology and the 
analogia entis.  Rather than sift through all the arguments for one side or the other, I must 
focus on the latter of the two perspectives mentioned above, viz., Jenson’s allegation that the 
analogia fidei produces ambiguity in relation to time and eternity.636 
                                                 
635 Gunton, Becoming and Being, 171. 
636 For the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to ascertain Barth’s use of analogia fidei, Jenson’s 
understanding of it, and how it impacts time and eternity.  On perspectives concerning Barth and the analogia 
entis the following are important: H. G. Pöhlmann, Analogia entis oder Analogia fidei?: Die Frage der Analogie 
bei Karl Barth (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965); Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: An 
Essay on Trinitarian Description and Human Participation with Special Reference to Volume One of Karl 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 120-212; G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in 
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 Second, it is important to note that Barth’s assimilation of the analogia fidei was not 
as an a priori consideration from which dogmatic content flowed, but rather exactly the 
opposite is the case.  That is, it is not a method, per se, but is an assertion that Barth 
concludes must be the case, given God’s triune self-revelation in Jesus Christ.637  This fact 
does not elude Jenson and, indeed, it is the feature that distinguishes him from other critics of 
Barth’s analogia fidei.638  If this is true (that the method is accidental to the material content), 
then it appears possible to be critical of the method without giving up on a trinitarianly-
shaped eternity.  The argument here will be that Jenson does precisely that, though his 
proposal does not escape dilemmas of its own. 
 
McCormack gives a helpful definition of Barth’s favored use of analogy: 
 
The ‘analogy of faith’ refers most fundamentally to a relation of correspondence 
between an act of God and an act of a human subject; the act of divine Self-revelation 
and the human act of faith in which that revelation is acknowledged.  More 
specifically, the analogy which is established in the revelation event is an analogy 
between God’s knowledge of Himself and human knowledge of Him in and through 
human concepts and words.639 
 
So, then, the relation between God and humanity is dependent not upon some prior capacity 
within humans to correspond to God, such as being, but solely upon divine grace received by 
faith alone.  As Hunsinger has aptly put it, “Grace elicits faith, and faith corresponds 
analogically to grace, but no ontological commonality of any kind mediates between 
them…Faith is conceived as grounded in grace alone, and the mediating term with respect to 
the analogy is conceived not as ‘being’ but as ‘miracle.’”640  Given the preceding two 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. H. R. Boer (London: Paternoster Press, 1956), 179-93; Jüngel, God’s Being is 
in Becoming, 13-53. 
637 McCormack, CRDT, 19; Gunton, Becoming and Being, 174. 
638 This is one place Hunsinger’s critique of Jenson goes awry.  Jenson is also working within the framework of 
a Christologically/trinitarianly-determined time and eternity, unlike Roberts for sure, and maybe even 
Moltmann.  Hunsinger is wrong to believe that Jenson’s “metaphysical proclivities,” i.e. an over-zealous 
rationalism, hinders him from embracing Barth’s view of eternity.  In other words, according to Hunsinger, 
Jenson is not willing to allow God to be hidden and revealed, conceivable and inconceivable, but rather he 
wants to turn Christology into a “metaphysic of the particular.”  To the contrary Jenson believes that Barth, 
rather than breaking with the traditional understanding of a timeless God, has perpetuated it, albeit in a much 
more profoundly trinitarian fashion, and Jenson wants to follow Barth’s lead whilst correcting what he identifies 
as this one shortcoming.  He is not driven by rationalism any more that Barth himself was in attempting to 
construct an ontology that avoids atemporality.  The proof of this is perceived in his own proposals (see below), 
which, interestingly, Hunsinger admits he does not wish to examine or evaluate.  See Hunsinger, How To Read 
Karl Barth, 19-22. 
639 McCormack, CRDT, 16-17. 
640 Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth, 283. 
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chapters, especially chapter four, this explicit definition of the analogia fidei should be 
expected.  However, what I have not done in obvious terms up to this point is to draw a 
clearer connection between Barth’s use of analogy and his doctrine of time and eternity.  To 
this we now turn. 
 
At the end of chapter five I identified some of the problems with Barth’s use of fallen time in 
relation to Jesus’ own history, our identity, and eschatology.  Through each stage of Barth’s 
doctrine of God (thus, time and eternity) it is the same issue that has continually been raising 
its ugly head, viz. how does Barth maintain the distinction between time and eternity so that 
God does not collapse into the man Jesus, or that our history does not disappear into his 
(Jesus’) history?641  As I have already alluded to, on the one hand Barth wants to distance 
himself from classic Protestant theology that draws too great a distinction between God and 
the world, and on the other hand from liberal theology that very nearly conflates the two, 
elevating existentialism to divine status.  To accomplish this Barth has centered all his 
theological energy on Jesus Christ.  He is God.  We are his and our identity is in him.642  But 
the “is” is intended as both proximity and distance.643  He is the mediation of God and 
creation, uniting them without losing the distinction.  At the heart of this theological 
enterprise is the distinction of time and eternity, and the manner in which Barth discriminates 
between the two is by employing this concept of analogy.  If time and eternity collapse, then 
the Christian claims and our history as part of those claims collapse.  If the duality is too 
sharp, then time is a reality independent of Jesus Christ.  Thus, Jesus is the center point of 
analogy in that our relationship to God in Jesus mirrors Jesus’ relationship to the Father.  The 
following from Barth will illuminate the point: 
 
God repeats in this relationship ad extra a relationship proper to Himself in His inner 
divine essence.  Entering into this relationship, He makes a copy of Himself.  Even in 
His inner divine being there is relationship.  To be sure, God is One in Himself.  But 
                                                 
641 Just as we may ask whether Barth makes room for our time we could also ask whether there is room for 
human freedom.  Webster explores this in Barth’s Moral Theology and claims that indeed not only is this a chief 
concern of Barth’s, but he succeeds in making this room.  Though a full discussion exceeds the bounds of this 
thesis it is instructive to note Barth’s consistent grounding of the attributes in Trinity, rather than speculating 
with regard to the given notion, then projecting that on God and humanity.  Humanity is free, according to 
Barth, because God defines what that is and grounds our freedom in his.  Likewise, God’s self-determination 
delineates what real time is and grounds ours (see pp. 99-122).  Jenson also wants to make that “room” and 
resist the urge both to radical transcendence and pantheism, only in a different way than Barth.  More on this 
below. 
642 GAG, 74. 
643 NB Barth’s discussion on the divine omnipresence in CD II.1, 461-90 where he teases out this idea of 
proximity and distance in God. 
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He is not alone.  There is in Him a co-existence, co-inherence and reciprocity...And it 
is this relationship in the inner divine being which is repeated [wiederholt] and 
reflected [nachgebildet] in God’s eternal covenant with man as revealed and 
operative644 in time in the humanity of Jesus…We have seen that there is a factual, a 
materially necessary, and supremely, as the origin of the factual and materially 
necessary, an inner divine correspondence and similarity between the being of the 
man Jesus for God and His being for His fellows.  This correspondence and similarity 
consists in the fact that the man Jesus in His being for man repeats and reflects the 
inner being or essence of God and this confirms His being for God.645 
 
How does this concept of analogy differ from anything in the tradition?  In one sense, i.e. in 
its use as a tool, it does not differ in the least.  The idea of “resemblance,” “reflection,” 
“mirroring,” are all standard concepts in the traditional use of analogy,646 yet in another way 
Barth deviates from the tradition by replacing the locus of analogy from “being-as-such” with 
Christ.  “Barth’s fundamental objection to the classical doctrine of the analogy of God and 
the world is that as the correspondence between them it puts being-in-general where Jesus 
Christ belongs.”  “God’s reality is, by his choice, the occurrence of the life of this person; our 
lives are incidents in his life—and so we creatures are analogous to God.”647  It is only in 
Jesus Christ that we can speak of analogy between God and the creature.  The creature still 
has no insight to offer in this regard, but the creature is not alone, but in Jesus Christ.  Hence, 
the pattern of analogy remains the same in CD that it was in Romans, but “the moment” in 
the time-eternity dialectic is replaced with Jesus Christ.  The intersection of time and eternity 
is not abstract, but is now a narrated history.  “We have a particular story to tell about 
eternity.”648 
 Since Barth has replaced being in general with Christology as the analogical point, 
then our being is in his, and that is the reality of our identity as humans and of our 
                                                 
644 “Operative” is a strange translation for kräftig, which is normally translated “strong,” or “powerful.”  Even if 
we do translate it that way, however, the relevance of it to the sentence is unclear.  Jenson quotes this sentence 
in GAG, 74 and, interestingly, leaves this word out—the only such omission in that phrase on his part. 
645 CD III.2, 218-19.  This last phrase in German reads: “…und eben damit sein Sein für Gott wahr macht,” KD 
III.2, 261. It seems to me that “confirms” is ambiguous and does not reach the force of Barth’s statement—that 
the meaning of God’s very being is this copy of God’s being for us in Jesus.   Jesus’ being for God is made in 
this analogous relation with us. 
646 Jüngel’s work God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of the Crucified One in 
the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1983), 261-98, 
though not without controversy, is a helpful perspective and interpretation of the traditional theological uses of 
analogy and why Barth’s (and his) Christological analogy is the way forward.  Philip A. Rolnick outlines what 
he perceives as Jüngel’s shortcomings in Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God (Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1993), 243-84. 
647 GAG, 77.  Jüngel arrives at the same conclusion concerning Christ as the center point of analogy in his 
important article “Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie: Eine 
Untersuchung zum Analogieverständnis Karl Barths,” Evangelische Theologie, 22 (1962): 535-57.   
648 Ibid., 78. 
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relationship to God.  Being is grounded and determined in Christ, not in some general 
concept.  Therefore, the same must be true of time.  Time, since it is essential to humanity, is 
grounded in, determined by, and gifted to us by grace in Jesus Christ alone, not in a reality 
independent of Christ.649  Thus, the being of Christ grounds, defines and gives us real 
humanity; nevertheless we lack the full realization of this because of sin.  Likewise, Christ 
grounds and gives us real time, but fallen time persists due to our fallen condition.650 
 The other way Barth at least begins to deviate from the traditional understanding of 
analogy as illustrated in the above quotation is to posit analogy as relations, “rather than 
between substances with partly similar and partly dissimilar attributes.”651  The eternal 
covenant that God establishes with humanity is a relational event that is a repetition of the 
trinitarian relations, primarily, between Father and Son.652  This, of course, echoes the 
Cappadocians, Basil in particular, much more than it does Augustine,653 hence, we are not 
surprised to discover that Jenson finds hope in these advancements.  As has been noted 
before, Barth was not interested in maintaining a metaphysics of substance654 so that eternity 
was perceived to be the static prototype of our dynamic temporality—this, of course, is the 
risk one runs using terms such as “grounds,” “prototype,” and “ectype,” and one that we 
could easily dispense with.655   
                                                 
649 Hopefully the quotations from Barth in chapters four and five adequately demonstrate this. 
650 Hunsinger contends that in Barth “time’s healing is distinct from salvation from sin.  Time’s wounds, as here 
set forth, are inherent in the good creation.  They may be exacerbated and corrupted by sin, but they are not 
identical with it, nor are they hostile to God.  When measured by eternity, they are merely imperfections, not 
corruptions.”  See his, “Mysterium Trinitatis,” 185.  I recognize the concern and understand it by virtue of 
passages such as the one on “Allotted Time” in CD III.2, 553-72.  Yet based on the distinction Barth draws 
between “created time” and “fallen time” and upon discussions such as that under “Given Time” in III.2, it is 
difficult to see how he does not consider the succession of past, present, and future in our time as directly 
parallel to our sinful state.  True, past, present, and future in themselves are not, in Barth’s perspective, sinful or 
antithetical to God, but the fact that we lose the past and cannot anticipate the future is indeed something 
antithetical to God’s time.  We have fallen time because of sin.  Barth states in CD I.2, 47: “but the time we 
think we know and possess, ‘our’ time [unsere Zeit], is by no means the time God created.  Between our time 
and God-created time as between our existence and the existence created by God there lies the Fall.  ‘Our’ 
time…is the time produced by us, i.e., by fallen man…Our time, the time we know and possess, is and remains 
lost time, even when we believe that God is the Creator of time” (my emphasis). 
651 GAG, 155. 
652 CD III.2, 218-22.  “Between these two relationships as such—and it is in this sense that the second is the 
image of the first—there is correspondence and similarity.  There is an analogia relationis” (220). 
653 The best article I have seen on this is Gunton’s essay entitled “Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological 
Crisis of the West,” which is a chapter in his book, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 30-55. 
654 But, of course, this does not mean that Barth (or Jenson, for that matter) reject a Trinity of substance in favor 
of a full-blown social trinitarianism; but rather their polemic is against the trappings that typically (but do not 
necessarily) accompany it—absolute simplicity, atemporality, absolute immutability, etc.  For an interesting 
essay on this see, William P. Alston “Substance and the Trinity,” The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on the Trinity, 179-201. 
655 Dropping such language would also soften one of Roberts’ key objections to Barth, viz., that the “tension 
between eternal work and temporal realization is still problematic…so long as all the interpretative categories 
are grounded in and derived from the divine and eternal being of God” Theology on Its Way?, 34.  Roberts’ 
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 It follows from this particular aspect of analogy—that of relations—that I want to 
suggest what Barth might need in overcoming any weakness in his doctrine of time and 
eternity (I hinted at this in the previous chapter under the section on Pannenberg).  I am 
simply enquiring into how Barth’s doctrine can be optimized, whilst remaining within the 
bounds of Christian theology and avoiding an excursion into unnecessary speculation.  By 
way of introducing this section I will summarize some thoughts that have gone before. 
 It is important to distinguish between Barth’s essential proposals concerning time and 
eternity and the points of weakness to be shored up.  What is wrong with an eternal present?  
If you mean by that that God exists atemporally, then everything is wrong with it, as we have 
repeatedly noted in this thesis.  If you mean by eternal present that God is not hindered or 
overcome by time’s contingencies so that he interacts temporally with the created order in an 
absolute sense in its past, present, and future, then I fail to see its fault.  The crucial point to 
be made is that Barth believes God has a temporal relation with creation;656 it is not an 
atemporal relation.  God can have this temporal relation and still be God, i.e. the God the 
scriptures testify to that is Creator and Lord over his creation.  Jenson offers the same 
theological proposal for the same reasons, only modifying the structure of the trinitarian 
relations and placing an accent on future.  Furthermore, Barth doggedly insists that time, 
freedom, reality, etc. is not defined by human cognition, but rather by revelation alone.  We 
may think true time is the everlasting separation of past, present, and future, but since, 
according to Barth, God’s time exhibits different qualities we must adjust our conceptions 
and language.  So, to say “eternal present” does not necessarily equal “atemporality.”  Eternal 
present for Barth is merely God’s ability to be in the past, present, and future without 
hindrance.  There really is a past, and God has been there.  There really is a present, and God 
is here now.  There really is an as-of-yet-unrealized future and God is there, too, indeed, he is 
that future.  Our time is not an illusion, though it is in need of healing. 
 Indeed, it is only the otherness or difference between God’s time and humanity’s that 
establishes our time, thus, it is my contention that Barth’s essential understanding of eternity 
and time is not unsalvageable, for he maintains this key feature.  Furthermore, the distinction 
                                                                                                                                                        
objection to Barth is that his doctrine of time and revelation is so eternalized that it renders the created order as 
unreal.  That is, the created order should possess autonomy and not derive its reality from God’s being and time.  
Surely this is an objection to Barth’s core conviction that God reveals Godself and would not be completely 
satisfied by dropping the “prototype” terminology.  However, it does alleviate the eternalizing tendency without 
capitulating to Roberts’ rationalism and natural theology. 
656 “…[W]e cannot understand God’s eternity to be pure timelessness.  Since it became time, and God Himself, 
without ceasing to be the eternal God, took time and made it His own, we have to confess that He was able to do 
this.  He was not only able to have and give time as Creator, but in Jesus Christ He was able Himself to be 
temporal” CD II.1, 617. 
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of immanent and economic is a good one, for it establishes the freedom of God and creates 
the necessary space for human freedom and time.  However, Barth’s tendency to eternalize 
our time in Jesus may stem from a conception of the triune relations as primarily causal, 
rather than relational.657  Or, to put it another way, “the immanent Trinity is in effect 
conceived in terms contradictory of the economy.”658  If the persons are turned in on 
themselves as a closed circle, then the relationship of God to the world will not be one of 
freedom in relationality, but one of bondage and causality.  If the immanent is set against the 
economic, then time and eternity are mutually exclusive and trinitarian talk is nothing more 
than paradox.  Or we could say, if God is in his transcendence not precisely how he is 
revealed in the economy, then atemporality reigns, for how could the Transcendent be 
temporal?  We might wonder if Barth’s doctrine of time/eternity is very much like this, given 
the use of analogy and the talk of “prototype” and “ectype.”  Yet, this need not be the case, 
for immanent and economic does not necessarily lead to a mutually exclusive time and 
eternity.  The central concept seems to be the role of the Spirit in the economy.  Does he (the 
Spirit) close the trinitarian circle so that God in himself is entirely self-satisfied and whose 
otherness is the antithesis of the created order?  Or, is the Spirit’s role to free the Father and 
Son to love that which is not God, so that the relation to the created order—though not a 
necessary one—gives proper freedom and space to both sides?  If this is the Spirit’s 
eschatological role and it is given proper weight, then it is God’s being to open himself to 
otherness.  We may cite Gunton at length: 
 
The third person of the Trinity is the one whose function is to make the love of God a 
love that is opened towards that which is not itself, to perfect it in otherness.  Because 
God is not in himself a closed circle but is essentially the relatedness of community, 
there is within his eternal being that which freely and in love creates, reconciles and 
redeems that which is not himself.  The relation of God to the creation, which is 
expressed in creation, reconciliation and redemption, is grounded in the other-related 
love of the Father, Son and Spirit to be the dynamic of that love, both in itself and 
towards the world…The difference [with Augustine] is that the introduction of the 
eschatological note changes radically the way in which the relationship is understood: 
not a closed circle, but a self-sufficient community of love freely opened outwards to 
embrace the other.659 
 
                                                 
657 I do not intend to suggest that Barth’s doctrine of God lacks an understanding of relations between the 
persons.  Hopefully, below the point will clearly become apparent. 




Everything about Barth’s theology endeavors to affirm this very fact.  We know God to be in 
himself what he reveals himself to be in time, and the chief pointer to that being is the event 
of election.  However, (despite the awkwardness of the question) when does election happen?  
Election happens in the eternal being of God in that he elects himself to be the electing God 
for humanity.  It is not an election in eternity past and simply unfolds in time, but rather it 
embraces all time.  God is who he is—Father, Son, and Spirit—in not only his pre-
temporality, but also in his supra- and post-temporality.  God is the electing God in all three 
temporal moments, as well.   
 Yet, Gunton, Jenson and others660 have pointed to Barth’s weak pneumatology, 
though not making the same mistakes as Augustine, as nevertheless perpetuating some of his 
core problems.  One of those is the relative isolation of the election event to the Father and 
Son, thus bringing into question the defining role of the Spirit for God and for the relation to 
the created order.  The orientation of the theology inevitably becomes the past.  There is 
something to their criticism and Barth’s doctrine of time and eternity could be improved if he 
had placed greater weight on the eschatological action of the Spirit both for the Godhead and 
in our time.  But it is also true, as I have continuously argued in this thesis, that the tools 
needed for such an emphasis are there in Barth—unity of act and being, the divine relations 
as the ground of being and time, eternity that embraces time—he only need fully avail 
himself of them.  Again, we may turn to Colin Gunton for help.  In a passage contrasting 
Edward Irving’s emphasis on the work of the eschatological Spirit within the created order 
with Barth, he states: 
 
That is Barth’s teaching, too.  Those who deny it have missed a real part of his 
theology.  Barth’s weakness is a weakness of balance; there is insufficient weight 
given to the distinctions between the three divine persons and, in particular, to the 
reality and distinctive functions of the Spirit, with the result that too much is thrown 
on to Christology, too much on to the immanent and eternal; and so too little on the 
particularities of history.  But it is a weakness of balance, or rather of the way in 
which weight is placed in different areas of dogmatic importance.661 
 
                                                 
660 Rowan Williams, “Barth on the Triune God,” Karl Barth: Studies of His Theological Method, ed. S.W. Sykes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 147-93. 
661 “The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature,” Karl Barth: Centenary Essays, ed., S.W. Sykes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 64.  My emphasis added.  As this chapter reflects this is 
Gunton’s frequent criticism of Barth, and perhaps it sharpened over the years after this article was written in the 
late 1980s.  However, I am yet to find in Gunton where the substance of the critique ever evolved toward 
something more serious, such as, Barth’s complete failure to unite God with the world, or his inability to express 
any version of trinitarianism beyond that of Augustine.  No matter where the appraisal appears, it seems to me 
that Gunton’s thrust is always one of balancing Barth’s rather large ship, and not advocating its permanent 
docking.   
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The key shift, according to Gunton, (and it is not a drastic one) would be not to understand 
immanent/economic (freedom/love) in terms of election alone, “but on the eternal love of 
Father, Son, and Spirit in eternity, based on the whole of the Father’s economic action 
through his two hands, not merely on one of them.”662  The result would be a more all-
encompassing divine action within the created order and the tendency to view God’s elective 
act in Jesus as something eternalized, disconnected from time, and already taken place would 
fade.  God has acted in the past and is acting now by virtue of the Spirit’s personal work of 
bringing the kingdom “on earth as it is in heaven.”  This is what theology needs to speak of a 
temporal God.  The relation is not atemporal, mutually exclusive, lacking any sort of logical 
coherence.  But rather it is a way to maintain divine sovereignty whilst creating the space 
needed for our temporal reality and freedom.  God is perfectly free to be community in 
himself, and this is so by virtue of the Spirit’s role in the Godhead.  Just so, the Spirit frees 
the persons to move outward and embrace the community of creation without that movement 
being a necessary one or one of mutual exclusivity.  Put another way: eternity can embrace 
time without being subject to it. 
 Rowan Williams has expressed similar concerns not only with Barth, but with 
Christian theology as a whole, and has lucidly argued that if the Spirit’s role is simply one of 
a second mediator or merely of a “communicator” that “instructs and guides” concerning the 
Son, then there are serious consequences for the relation of God to the world and for the 
Christian life.  If the Spirit bears an ontological role in the trinitarian life, then it is easier to 
make the God-world connection, for the Spirit is the one bringing life (and all it entails—
freedom, time, etc.) to humanity and is not merely “an exercise designed simply to explain 
how we know what Christ does.”663  “…[I]f the role of Spirit is communication, in a narrowly 
‘linear’ sense, whether by ecstatic vision or noetic purity, an impoverished and abstract 
concept of the actual texture of Christian life and experience is likely to result.”664  The 
correction is away from the tendency toward “binitarianism” and “Christomonism,” which 
has resulted in the problematic, radical distinction of immanent/economic, 
atemporal/temporality in the God-world relation. 
 This modification or improvement is easily transferred into the specifics of the 
time/eternity discussion as illustrated, once again, by Padgett’s work and particularly by his 
objection to Barth’s construal of time and eternity.  Padgett’s own conclusions, as articulated 
                                                 
662 Becoming and Being, 240. 
663 On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 118. 
664 Ibid., 116. 
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in chapter four of this thesis, are so similar to Barth’s that it is surprising to hear such strong 
objections from him.  Why? And, more importantly, could his unease be alleviated? 
 Essentially, according to Padgett, Barth holds to a divine eternal Now that embraces 
all time and calls into question the reality of process.665  The reason for this assessment is 
what I have identified and discussed in detail as “real time,” hence, I will forgo another 
summary of that here.666  Suffice it to say that I have acknowledged this tendency in Barth to 
eternalize the reality of time and history of Jesus and the subsequent questions that it raises 
for our time.667  However, my proposal for improvement upon Barth is exactly the place 
where Padgett is weakest—on a theology of trinitarian relations; the only location, I believe, 
where it is possible to approach the issue of God’s “time.”  God’s time is the relationality and 
otherness of the persons made so by the Spirit who frees the Father and Son to be truly other, 
and then frees the Godhead to be free and yet truly in relation to all that is other than himself.  
The process is that of the dynamic interrelation of the persons who “become” in eternal 
perfection.668  That same process of perichoretic perfection is what God gives to humanity in 
Jesus, to be fully realized in the eschaton.  As long as Barth’s immanent/economic scheme is 
held in similar fashion to Augustine and the tradition, then it is easy to see how that eternal 
present can be perceived as atemporality, for it is a relation that is opposed.  However, if we 
articulate a sufficiently broad doctrine of the Spirit, then the God-world relation is not 
disparate, but is a united, though distinct reality. 
 Padgett’s charges toward Barth result from his preoccupation with the nature of our 
time, whether process or stasis, then the resulting theological conclusions.  However, that 
method, while beneficial toward a better understanding of our world is faulty on two counts: 
                                                 
665 God, Eternity, 143.  Padgett’s criticism of Barth is exactly what Leftow attempts to defend in “Response to 
Mysterium Trinitatis: Barth’s Conception of Eternity,” For the Sake of the World, 191-201.  Given my 
inclination to view Trinity as dynamic and temporal (as Barth also does) and our time as dynamic and temporal, 
I cannot see how Leftow’s defense is helpful.  Hence, I have omitted from consideration those who might find 
Barth as an ally and also defend a B-series view of time and an atemporal view of God.    
666 See chapter five. 
667 I must again note how it is a tendency in Barth and certainly not a unified theme that he defends.  As Jenson 
and Gunton have argued he inadvertently falls there at times but it is unquestionably not Barth’s intention to do 
so.  That he recognizes the tension and seeks to avoid those problems has repeatedly been highlighted.  John 
Webster in his recent book Barth’s Earlier Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 88-89, has pointed out that 
even in Barth’s very early writings, especially The Resurrection of the Dead, his accent “is not God’s primal 
decision but the parousia as the full manifestation of the redeemer and his redeemed creation.”  Barth 
consistently worked to avoid an inadequate construal toward the past and the relativization of history.  
Incidentally, Webster cites Jenson as one who accuses Barth of allowing “creatureliness as moral history…to 
disappear.”  Technically, as I have already noted, this is not accurate, for Jenson’s argument is that Barth’s 
tendency has been to eternalize Christ’s work who has taken the place of the old Protestant version of the divine 
decree.  Those guilty of this particular charge from Webster would be, for example, Roberts and Boulliard.  
Carefully observe the footnote in this regard on page 162 of Alpha and Omega. 
668 Incidentally, I believe this is Padgett’s rationale for positing divine change and temporality, though, oddly, he 
does not develop it. 
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first, as persuasive as Padgett’s arguments for a process theory of time are, they cannot be 
conclusive in any ultimate sense, for they are constituted only by finite observations of our 
natural world.  Furthermore, they are heavily disputed among contemporary philosophers, 
thus, it seems counterintuitive for the theist to place such weight on them.  Following from 
this, the irony of Padgett’s entire work is this reliance on a process theory of time, whilst 
arguing for God’s relative timelessness based on theological beliefs.  Surely this lends 
credence to my thesis that understanding eternity and time is primally a theological affair and 
only secondarily a scientific or philosophical one.  Beginning with the latter cannot possibly 
lead us to the former, whilst beginning with the former may indeed tell us something about 
the latter.  Once again, I must note much appreciation for and agreement with Padgett’s 
thesis, yet in the end it fails to deliver on what it purports to, viz., the temporal nature of 
God’s eternity.  Here, a theological approach such as Barth’s and Jenson’s, though not 
comprehensive, is certainly superior, for it is walking down the only possible path. 
 Another way of clarifying this is that Padgett reads in Barth the elimination of 
anything that would resemble dynamism, history, or life in God.  Clearly, this need not be, 
and the answer, as I have already argued above in chapter four, is not to revert to a natural 
understanding of time, but to reorient ourselves to God as he reveals himself in Jesus Christ.  
With a robust doctrine of the interrelations of the hypostases it is easy to see how that God 
could and does involve himself in a temporal world of process, for he has a history, the 
history of his own life.   
 
The systematic unity of Barth’s theology is striking in that everything follows a strict 
trinitarian/Christological (even Chalcedonian) pattern to the extent that each theological 
question at hand is answered merely by saying “Jesus Christ.”  Thus, if one is happy with this 
pattern, then it is perfectly understandable to interpret Barth’s doctrine of God “in terms of 
[God’s] radical temporality.  But it can also be read as itself an interpretation of what makes 
God’s temporality radical, and in terms reminiscent of timelessness.  It all depends on which 
way you look at it.”669  This is a remarkable admission, but reflects the fact that Barth’s 
doctrine of God is a constant effort to maintain the unity and distinction of God’s being for 
himself (eternity) and God’s being for us (time).  The bottom line in this controversy is that 
commentators such as Jenson, Gunton, Moltmann and others have claimed that at the end of 
the day, eternity trumps time and our time ends up looking like an-already-eternity.  Others 
                                                 
669 GAG, 153. 
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such as Hunsinger and Jüngel claim that Barth is successful and that he clearly improves 
upon the tradition by positing a doctrine of God that is radically temporal and trinitarianly 
grounded.  My contention is that Barth is successful in overcoming much of the tradition’s 
metaphysic of atemporality, even though he does not present us with a model of divine 
temporality that directly explains how God can be temporal in terms of the discontinuities of 
our time,670 though I think he gets very close, perhaps as close as is theologically possible.  
Jenson takes a stab at doing just that.  The argument here will be that he presents an 
alternative that falls essentially within a Barthian doctrine of God and ultimately does not 
accomplish anything beyond Barth’s achievements.  Moreover, the consequence is that his 
proposal raises a number of significant problems of its own—problems that I believe exceed 
any we might identify in Barth.  Indeed it forces us to consider whether Jenson has even 
correctly diagnosed Barth’s (and the tradition’s) ills.  That he reads Barth correctly is 
undisputed.  Whether the totality of Barth’s doctrine of time and eternity is the failure he 
claims it to be is quite another matter.  Even so:   
 
If we drop the notion of analogy, we must try to understand God’s transcendence 
within the terms of time itself.  We will have to understand the radicalness of God’s 
temporality as a certain pattern of that temporality itself.  It is clear how this is to be 
done.  We will understand God’s freedom over against what he is for and with us as 
his futurity to what he already is with and for us.  And since Barth is indeed right in 
seeing God’s freedom as one side of his deity, we will define God’s deity as his 
futurity to himself and so to us.671 
 




                                                 
670 But Barth probably does not feel compelled to come up with such an explanation, given that God is Lord, not 
time.  Surely he perceives the faults of the old doctrine of timelessness, but the flipside of that coin is just as 
unwarranted—earthly time does not dictate the divine nature. 
671 GAG, 155. 
672 Given the density of Jenson’s version of divine futurity it is no wonder than such erudite scholars as 
Hunsinger and Colwell have avoided a critique of it.  Most have been content to criticize Jenson’s theology 
proper as a potentially detrimental deviation from classical theology (describing it as panentheistic, or some 
other such label), without evaluating just how he thinks his model stays within the tradition, yet improves upon 
it.  A recent PhD dissertation entirely on Jenson’s project opens the penultimate chapter—one focused on 
critique—with a disclaimer as to why Jenson’s proposal concerning God’s identity was avoided—the “lack of 
space.”  The thrust of the author’s criticisms of Jenson centered on his divergence from the tradition of classical 
theism.  See Swain, 271.  This is not to cast judgment on the dissertation as a whole, but only to highlight the 
fact that Jenson’s position in relation to the tradition is generally being evaluated apart from his own alternative 
proposals.  One would think that whatever conclusions we might arrive at regarding his project they must be 
made whilst taking into account his version of divine futurity. 
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God’s Temporality in Himself and With Us as His Futurity 
 
In chapter five I outlined Barth’s view of resurrection time (whose synonyms include Easter 
time, the time of Jesus Christ, real time, authentic time) and noted that it includes the pre-, 
supra-, and post-Easter time of Jesus Christ.  That is, he was present in his pre-Easter life 
(which includes all of created time and even eternity prior to creation), he is present with us 
now, and he will be present in our future.  As I argued there this amounts to an eternal present 
that is “pure duration” for God and is the real time that God gives to humanity in eternity. 
Jenson agrees with Barth that the post-resurrection appearances “are the center of 
God’s self-revelation, their time the time taken from our time to be God’s eternity.”673  Jesus 
does unite our time with God’s eternity.  Yet, he disagrees as to the appearances’ 
referentiality.  The risen Jesus, according to Jenson, is not about the fulfillment of the 
kingdom, but about the promise of the kingdom.  That is, his identification as the kingdom of 
God is not in the resurrection appearances a present reality, but the promise of the future 
reality.  The uniting of time and eternity that Jesus accomplished in that resurrection was not 
a present reality that the witnesses could point to and visually identify, but rather it was the 
hope and promise of the certain future reality.  “We may put it so: promise is the ontological 
category for the reality of the risen Lord.  Jesus appeared to the witnesses of the Resurrection 
as what he was not yet, but would be: the Lord of the End.”674  Thus, according to Jenson, 
God’s transcendence is not an eminent temporality that is both timeless and temporal in an 
eternal present, but rather God’s transcendence “is his futurity to what already is.”675  But it is 
a transcendence—an eternity that exceeds the boundaries humanity experiences in time.  
Thus, exactly how does Jenson’s version of eternity differ from Barth’s if both seek to 
overcome time’s discontinuities?  This is how he understands God’s eternity to be truly 
temporal: his present is always opening itself up to a future that overcomes any temporal 
contingency.  That is, the ultimate temporal boundary is death, thus, how is it that Jesus is 
both temporal and not bound by temporality?  Jenson’s answer is that the Spirit opens the 
future to his death and overcomes that contingency by resurrection.  Moreover, the future he 
opens up is not an empty, abstract future, but his own future (as Barth would concur).  “God 
is the futurity of the past event Jesus.”  Because God is the one who raised Jesus and did so 
within time, God’s transcendence occurs in this act.  Or, we might say that God overcomes 
                                                 
673 GAG, 157. 
674 Ibid., 159. 
675 Ibid. 
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time in this act, thus freeing us from and for time.  It is God as future that gives us past and 
present, making our lives temporal.  “God’s transcendence is the beyondness of a particular 
future; only because we live for a particular future do we have time.”676  Jesus’ resurrection is 
the guarantee that he is our future—a temporal, narrated future.  So then, as I discussed in 
chapter two, Jenson claims that God is identified by and with the Exodus, but he overcomes 
the temporal necessity and contingency, not by being simultaneously timeless and temporal, 
but by always being ahead of that event, giving it its being and temporality.  God’s ontology 
is not that he was in the beginning, established what will take place, then works in out in our 
time, but rather, God’s being is that he is already in our future giving being and time to us 
now.  Thus, Jenson’s aim is to demonstrate that temporal events are not absolute and God 
transcends them, yet a temporal process is not absent from him.   It is not that he is timeless 
and temporal, somehow here and not here, but rather he is temporal and here because he is 
always in front of us, moving us toward our future, which is God himself.  His eternity is 
moving, not in exact temporal correspondence with us, but always ahead of ours, giving our 
time its reality. 
Humans, Jenson argues, are incapable of overcoming “the contradiction between what 
I will to be and what I see I already am.”677  Humans only are what they are becoming, and 
what we do and who we are, are only relevant in that they result in something.  Jenson 
contends that worship is all about throwing ourselves upon a God who promises the greatest 
of all futures, because he is always ahead of us, determining to overcome what we know 
ourselves now to be.  Likewise, we are to understand God in terms of this future 
determination, though clearly he overcomes any contingency.678  Moltmann is similarly 
motivated and closely related to Jenson in that he desires to avoid the God of the past where 
everything is merely an unfolding of an already determined plan.  The future must have 
priority over the past because of its wider range of possibilities and because it can transcend 
historical time.  Moltmann distinguishes between what will happen in the future and what is 
coming, the latter being the divine transcendent possibility, the former being the events that 
occur then fade into the past.  It is the transcendent future (God) that gives us historical time 
and not the past, thus, Moltmann believes that each present is genuinely open to the limitless 
possibilities, the unpredictable and genuinely new.679  But in Moltmann, just as in Jenson, the 
                                                 
676 Ibid., 162. 
677 Ibid., 159. 
678 Ibid. 
679 See, Richard Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” God Will Be All In All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, 
ed. Richard Bauckham (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999), 164-65; Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation, 132-35. 
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future that overcomes time’s contingencies must be God himself and not some abstract 
concept—at least that is the intention.  
If God’s transcendence is his futurity and not his atemporality, then theological 
reformulations inevitably follow.  Jenson immediately offers two: 1) God’s nature is better 
understood as his acts within the plot of history, rather than a timeless set of attributes that he 
can always be expected to exhibit;680 2) it calls into the question the value of speaking of an 
immanent and economic Trinity, and we should rather adopt Rahner’s rule that the immanent 
is the economic Trinity.  But the way in which Jenson challenges this concept is instructive 
for understanding his theology as a whole.  It is not a rejection because God is not free in 
himself and is necessarily bound to the world, as would likely be the case with Moltmann.681  
The standard western interpretation of the immanent Trinity is that its freedom is one of 
“unaffectedness,” immunity to the contingencies and deficiencies of time.  That kind of 
freedom is not warranted, according to Jenson (and Barth), though there is a legitimate kind 
of freedom that the doctrine intends, which is that God is free in himself only to the extent 
that his identity is not determined by the creation.  He is the self-determining God who in 
freedom and lordship loves the creation.  How is it that Jenson can justify preserving the 
theology of God’s freedom and abolish the tool of immanent and economic?  He states: “The 
two rules are compatible, I propose, only if the identity of the ‘economic’ and ‘immanent’ 
Trinity is eschatological, if the ‘immanent’ Trinity is simply the eschatological reality of the 
‘economic.’”682  God is free from his actualized life with us (i.e. time’s contingencies) 
“because he is always ahead of them; he always can be otherwise triune than he has so far 
been.”  This is not something to fear, according to Jenson, because “we know that every new 
event of his eternal creativity will be seen, when it has occurred, as an inevitable step in the 
life of the good God we have known.”683   
The previous quotation is of particular import.  To put it as plainly as possible: 
regarding the issue of God’s freedom over the contingencies of time Jenson believes that a 
God who is bound by the past and simply persists subject to that decree is not the God who is 
the responsive, temporally active God of the Bible.  That God, according to Jenson, must be 
“immanent and economic,” “timeless and temporal.”  In order to maintain the proper 
Christian perspective that God is Lord over creation and not subject to any absolute view of 
time, and that when he acts he is doing so in a new way—one that was not previously 
                                                 
680 GAG, 171. 
681 See his God in Creation, 72-103.  On panentheism, see the discussion in chapter two of this thesis. 
682 TI, 140. 
683 GAG, 174. 
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settled—then Jenson believes we must posit God as primally future.  But, as he admits in the 
above sentence there is a certain amount of determination (“an inevitable step”) even in this 
“creativity.”  Thus, whether God gives time and being from the past, or whether he gives it 
from the future, it is God who is giving it and determining that his purposes for Christ and 
creation come to pass.684  The aims and overarching theology are identical with Barth: God is 
the sovereign Creator and Consummator of the world, whilst united with his creation in 
covenant.  He is not necessarily bound to it for his own being, though he has willingly united 
himself to it, and there can be no talk of God in himself apart from God for us. 
However, simply because Jenson adopts much of the contemporary concern for 
eschatology and owes at least something to theologians such as Pannenberg and Moltmann 
for their pioneering work in this field he stops short of embracing their version of futurity, but 
rather adapts it to his own purposes, not unlike what he does with aspects of Barth’s theology.  
Here is the reason: according to Jenson, Barth and Pannenberg have virtually the same 
problem in that both theologies take on a shape of determinism that at times portrays God as 
the sole actor in history and where that history appears to be an eternal one, rather than a 
historical one.  For Barth, it is determinism from the past, and for Pannenberg it is 
determinism from the future.  In both cases they are concerned to answer how it is that God 
can be sovereign and universal, yet be a particular being that acts in our history.  Or, as 
Jenson puts it in another context, historical religion has the option of becoming a-historical or 
a-religious.685  We can opt for sovereignty or immanence, but not both.  Barth and 
Pannenberg, according to Jenson, have opted for the universal at the expense of the historical, 
and Jenson wants to bring both together in a coherent fashion that avoids abstraction.  Thus, 
he simply adopts much of what Pannenberg has to say on futurity, whilst striving to avoid his 
overemphasis on universality, or wholeness.686   
A conclusion on the nature of our time and God’s time is the by-product of this desire, 
and Jenson’s verdict of sovereignty/universality in Barth and Pannenberg is confirmed by 
their endorsement of Boethius and (essentially) an eternal present—though, to be sure, both 
claim they are not endorsing timelessness, what we have called, atemporality.  Moreover, 
Jenson’s efforts here can be highlighted by his consideration of A-series time as that which 
theology must endorse (what Jenson also calls “real” time, as opposed to “imaginary”—not 
imaginary in that it does not truly exist, but in that it is counter-intuitive and can only be 
                                                 
684 To the question of God’s determination for creation and salvation, Jenson is fully supralapsarian and fully 
Barthian.  See his Alpha and Omega, 158-59. 
685 GAG, 51. 
686 Ibid., 178-79. 
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appealed to by abstract reasoning).  Both Barth and Pannenberg (along with Moltmann) have 
been charged with accepting B-series time as the only type of time appropriate to God, thus 
potentially undermining the possibility that God’s being with us in Jesus Christ is truly a 
historical one.687  Hence, Jenson attempts to escape a similar eternal “abstraction” by 
explaining the support structures for his doctrine of God that endeavor to unite eternity and 
history in God’s being.  How can God be both infinite/sovereign and immanent/historical?  
This thesis has been an exposition of his answer to that question—one that determines speech 
about time and freedom in God and humanity.   
Before moving on to assess Jenson’s concept of divine futurity there is just one more 
matter to address and I will state it here with minimal comment.  Jenson supports Barth’s 
trinitarian formulation in that God himself is beginning, middle, and end of time, yet he 
insists that Barth’s orientation in that formula is always toward the past—the Spirit and Son 
are from the Father (rightly so), but “nothing is said about the Beginning and Middle going 
toward the End.”688  According to Jenson, a failure to develop a full doctrine of the Spirit’s 
trinitarian identity is the source of Barth’s inability to shape a fully temporal God.  It is the 
driving cause behind his adoption of the analogia fidei.  What must be done, he contends, is 
that the “formal pattern of the doctrine must be reversed, to give the ‘Spirit’ some of the 
formal role which the ‘Father’ has had…Instead of defining all three hypostases by their 
relation to origin, they must be defined by their relation to goal.  The Spirit is the goal of the 
Trinity, and this doctrine must be given the function which has belonged to the doctrine that 
the Father is the ‘fount of the Trinity.’”689  The diagnosis of a poor pneumatology, though 
groundbreaking for its time, is not extraordinary, as that has become a standard assessment 
among many of Barth’s commentators.690  The solution is extraordinary in that it is nothing 
short of a reversal of trinitarian relations as understood in the vast majority of the tradition.  
                                                 
687 On Barth see, Padgett, 141-45; and on Pannenberg and Moltmann see, Luco J. Van den Brom, “Eschatology 
and Time: Reversal of the Time Direction?” The Future as God’s Gift: Explorations in Christian Eschatology, 
eds., David Fergusson and Marcel Sarot (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 159-67. 
688 Ibid., 173. 
689 Ibid., 173. 
690 Chiefly see, Rowan Williams, “Barth on the Triune God;” Gunton, Becoming and Being, 177-85, 233-40; P. 
D. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord, the Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981); Jenson, “You 
Wonder Where the Spirit Went,” Pro Ecclesia: A Journal of Catholic and Evangelical Theology 2 (1993): 296-
304, in which he states: “[p]recisely in that the inner-trinitarian relations do gloriously become concreted and 
alive in Barth, so that the Father and the Son confront one another, the actuality of a vinculum between the two 
parties Father and Son must be their I-thou relation itself.  Thus the very reality of the Spirit excludes his 
appearance as a party in the triune actuality” (301). 
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The background of the disagreement between Barth and Jenson on this score is the long-
standing division between East and West, the Filioque.691   
In chapter three I gave an extended discussion regarding Jenson’s predisposition 
towards the Cappadocians, primarily Nyssa, which also gives insight into his disagreement 
with Augustine concerning his failure to give full personhood to the Spirit to which he directs 
the following: “The saving works of God, the ‘works ad extra,’ are works of the whole 
Trinity no longer can mean that each work is the joint work of Father, Son, and Spirit, in 
which each identity plays a distinct role, but that the saving works are indifferently the work 
of each person and all.”692  According to Jenson and others, the Filioque followed 
Augustine’s lead, which resulted in a lack of reciprocity among the persons and essentially an 
inward-focused Trinity, not inclined to that which is other.  How such a Trinity relates to time 
is more difficult to express and has traditionally been labeled as “paradox.”  Because of 
Barth’s defense of the Filioque Jenson believes that he perpetuates this problem and his 
trouble with time and eternity will not be healed, lest we correct this trinitarian issue.693  The 
crucial feature to keep in mind is Jenson’s conflation of Spirit and future, with “future” 
carrying the greater burden of the two.  As explicated in chapter three of this thesis, Jenson 
assigns past, present, and future to Father, Son, and Spirit respectively, and the solution for 
Barth’s past-oriented theology is primarily divine futurity, and not pneumatology.  Jenson is 
abandoning analogy in order to posit a temporal God, and I would suggest that below we will 
discover how the unavoidable result is that temporal moments tend to carry more weight than 
the trinitarian persons, though, clearly, he does not wish for that to happen.694  I believe 
Jenson has correctly put his finger on a problem in Barth, but I also believe that his correction 
of the problem is an over-correction and introduces unnecessary complications.  It is possible 
to maintain the idea of the immanent and economic Trinity, strengthen his doctrine of the 
                                                 
691 One’s perspective on Barth’s success or failure of a doctrine of the Spirit may be directly related to one’s 
view of the Filioque.  It would be interesting to chronicle perspectives on time/eternity in relation to positions 
on the Filioque.  My suspicion is that, generally speaking, those who defend the West would embrace Barth’s 
view of time and eternity, while those with an eastern persuasion would view it as deficient.  A contrast of 
Gunton and John Thompson may be evidence for this.  See his, The Holy Spirit in the Theology of Karl Barth 
(Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1991), 29-33, 190.  What one does after such an estimation with his 
theology as a whole is one of the points of this chapter.   
692 TI, 126. 
693 As is now obvious Gunton shares Jenson’s evaluation of Barth’s weakness, but rejects his solution. 
694 McDowell notes something similar in relation to Barth’s personal response to Moltmann’s theology, where 
he (Barth) labels it as “its own futurism,” rather than God’s future.  Elsewhere, Barth refers to Moltmann’s 
futurity in Theology of Hope as a reduction of all theology to an “eschatological principle,” and his proposed 
solution to Moltmann is a rigorous doctrine of the immanent Trinity, with particular attention to the threefold 
time in CD III.2 and the threefold parousia of Jesus Christ in CD IV.3.  See Karl Barth Letters 1961-1968, eds., 
Jürgen Fangmeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans., ed., Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 
175-76. 
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Spirit, and improve the time/eternity model without adopting Jenson’s version of divine 
futurity.  The concept of God’s future is built into Barth’s doctrine of God, though, to be sure, 
it needs to be given more weight. 
 
God’s Futurity: An Assessment of Jenson’s Proposal 
 
I have two aims in this section: to demonstrate that, 1) Jenson’s position is unique in that the 
foundation of it is Barth’s theology, whilst incorporating some insights from Pannenberg and 
others; 2) he overestimates Barth’s problems, leading him toward revisions that are even 
more problematic.  Hopefully, this assessment will reinforce exactly how Barth and Jenson 
converge and diverge, and lay the ground for the concluding section, which concerns my 
thoughts on the best theological path forward.   
 A careful read of Jenson’s work makes it all the more surprising that he is accused of 
falling outside the bounds of Christian theology,695 especially given its proximity to Barth. 
Hopefully, the previous chapters have sufficiently demonstrated this even to the extent that 
Jenson adopts certain phrases from Barth, such as “God takes time for us,” and where the 
phraseology is changed, the concept often has been maintained.  In Jenson God is in himself 
who he is for us in Jesus Christ, so that the life of God is the historical life of the man.696  
That God is the event that meets humanity, is related to but does not become his creation in 
Jesus is the heart of Jenson’s theology, as it is for Barth.  It is trinitarian, and throughout this 
thesis I have highlighted the priority that Jenson gives to Trinity as determining and shaping 
all that is other than God (and there is other than God!).  Even Jenson’s future-orientation is 
not absent in Barth, for Barth talks often of the God who makes all things new, justifies the 
ungodly, and is bringing the future in order to overcome the past.697  Moreover, his doctrine 
                                                 
695 George Hunsinger, “Robert Jenson’s Systematic Theology: a review essay,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55 
(2002), 161. 
696 A more detailed account of some of his convergences with Barth is in his little known work, Alpha and 
Omega, 146-61. 
697 See chapter five, especially the section on “supratemporality.”  There I noted that Jenson endorses “Barth’s 
liberation of the doctrine of God from the ‘straightjacket’ of an immobile timelessness, or atemporality, who 
cannot overcome the past with the future.”  Moreover, that future is not an abstract one, but is God himself.  If 
Barth accomplishes this, then why the vociferous protest?  This gives me the long awaited opportunity of 
sharing my encounter with Jenson at a recent meeting in Philadelphia of the AAR.  After informing the 
distinguished professor of my project and conversing for a moment, he turned to me and said, “I will tell you 
what Barth told me after he read my PhD dissertation.”  Then he proceeded to quote him (as best I recall): “Sie 
verstehen mich, wie konnten Sie mit mir anderer Meinung sein?”  I would pose a similar question to Jenson.  It 
appears to me that Jenson has carried through Barth’s eschatological principles, only stretching the persons on a 
temporal continuum and placing the accent on future.  The essentials are the same.  Katherine Sonderegger 
discusses some of Jenson’s overlap with Barth in her “Et Resurrexit Tertia Die: Jenson and Barth on Christ’s 
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of time differs little in its foundational theological assertions.  That is: God is triune and that 
determines the nature of time and eternity; time is not absolute and God is Lord over time in 
the sense that past, present, and future do not cause any loss in him, i.e. he transcends their 
limitations; our time is a slippery concept and cannot sustain a full-orbed definition of time, 
much less eternity.698  All these very Barthian ideas find their place in Jenson. 
 However, the center of the divergence from Barth must be Christology.  That is, that 
God is who he is in Jesus is not a point of contention,699 but Jenson withdraws at Barth’s 
tendency to view Jesus as primally the eternal decree of God and only secondarily the earthly 
history of Jesus of Nazareth.  He puts it thus: “But we must still ask: Which is the prior 
definition?  Barth defines the history in time as the revelation and analogy of eternal history 
and so gives his answer.  And with this answer he puts himself in danger of removing 
reconciliation itself, the inner reality of Jesus’ life, from our history.”700  It is crucial to 
observe that Jenson’s Christological objection does not take the form of merely a radical 
immanence as the antidote to Barth’s allegedly radical transcendence.  Such a simplistic 
solution does not do justice to Jenson’s rich theology, nor does it understand his indebtedness 
to Barth.  Jenson is not claiming that in Barth our activity is eliminated, but rather, that there 
is the tendency to view Christ’s activity as eternal, rather than eternal and historical.701  Nor 
is his solution that our history must be primal and God’s eternity secondary.702  Jenson is 
simply trying to express the unity, to use Barth’s language, of God in himself and God for us 
without one overcoming the other,703 whilst maintaining the freedom of God from any kind 
                                                                                                                                                        
Resurrection,” Conversing with Barth, eds., John C. McDowell and Mike Higton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 
202-03. 
698 ST I, 217. 
699 Alpha and Omega, 161. 
700 Ibid., 163. 
701 Ibid., 162. 
702 Though he rightly understands Jenson to hold both to God’s transcendence and immanence as temporal, 
nonetheless, Hunsinger determines that Jenson’s allegiance lies primarily with an inflated rationalism 
(immanence), finally causing his concept of the divine eternity to be fatally flawed.  See his, HTRKB, 18-19, and 
“Robert Jenson’s Systematic Theology: a review essay,” 181, 199.  Clearly, as has been stated in the above 
chapters and will become even more evident below, this is not the case for Jenson, for his objections to Barth 
are not on rationalistic grounds, but on gospel grounds.  The Jesus of eternity must be the same Jesus of history, 
and if we are to think Christologically and trinitarianly, then we must include temporality in those concepts.  
The irony here is that Hunsinger’s objections (a committed Barthian) seem to press toward the complete 
incompatibility of time and eternity, thus giving credence to Jenson’s thesis that, for Barth, time and eternity are 
opposed.  I contend that not only has Hunsinger misunderstood Jenson, but he has also undercut Barth’s 
theology of time and eternity—a theology that also intends a specific unity of the two. 
703 Alpha and Omega, 163-64.  “If we thus fix our attention on temporal history we see how to understand the 
unity of God’s decisions and works without collapsing them into one and without dividing them.”  Therefore, 
God’s will is at once eternal and historical; not eternal and simply unrolled within history, but eternally one and 
constituted by his historical decisions, centrally, cross and resurrection.  God’s eternality, like his will, is not 
eternal in himself apart from the historical event of Jesus, but the historical life of Jesus constitutes God’s 
eternity, as well as his will.  Thus, there is the drive to hold together eternity and time, without one succumbing 
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of external necessity.704  It is here where Jenson’s Lutheranism comes to the fore in that his 
solution to the (basically) Reformed Barth is the impetus behind the Lutheran communicatio 
idiomatum.705  In Lutheran Christology there is the insistence upon the unity of the human 
and divine attributes to such an extent that to say Jesus is the Son of God does not mean that 
two distinguishable natures constitute his being, but rather that there is a transferring of 
properties from one nature to the other, so that it is possible to say that even in his humanity 
Jesus is omnipresent and sovereign, albeit in a secret way.706  The natures do not exist side by 
side, but rather only he exists.707  This provides us with a grid for grasping the time/eternity 
relation in that Jenson is wary of Barth’s timeless/temporal, immanent/economic 
juxtaposition for the same reasons that he is of the Reformed Christology.  For Jenson, there 
should be no juxtaposing of the divine or human nature, but simply a priority on the person.  
Likewise, there should be no priority on the eternal or the temporal, but simply on Father, 
Son, and Spirit.  The Christologies are different, hence, the resulting time/eternity relation is 
different.708  Therefore, in order to overcome what he perceives to be the central impediment 
                                                                                                                                                        
to the other.  However, if, as Jenson intends, the will of God is eternally one and the work of God in Jesus Christ 
is united with that will, yet it is only united as it unfolds in history, then when it comes to trinitarian ontology it 
appears Jenson has a choice: something akin to process theology where the eternal will is a mere intention and 
God works it out in time not exactly assured himself how it will transpire; or an alternative form of 
transcendence that nevertheless involves divine determination such as, divine futurity.  But how does futurity 
make better sense of the unity of God’s will and work in Jesus than Barth does; or we could say, how does it 
make better sense of time and eternity?  Both involve exhaustive knowledge of all time—past, present, and 
future.  Both involve a type of divine determination.  Both include a unity and distinction between time and 
eternity.  More on this below.   
704 Again, as explained in chapter two of this thesis, use of the term “panentheism” in reference to Jenson’s 
theology is misleading and does not take into consideration his insistence upon divine freedom.  Of course, as is 
the case with Barth, freedom does not connote absolute independence, but is a freedom to be relational with 
creation as he is relational in himself.   
705 Alpha and Omega, 168.  For a further discussion on Jenson’s Lutheran perspective see, Gabriel Fakre, “The 
Lutheran Capax Lives,” TTC, 94-102. 
706 This is most graphically illustrated in the Eucharist, briefly discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
707 See Colin E. Gunton, “Creation and Mediation,” 83-86; CD I.2, 161-71; H. R. Macintosh, The Person of 
Jesus Christ (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1912), 230-46; Robert W. Jenson, “How Does Jesus Make a Difference?  
The Person and Work of Jesus Christ,” Essentials of Christian Theology, ed. William C. Placher (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 201-05. 
708 Gunton, “Creation and Mediation,” 85.  Three concepts should be stressed here: first, this is the sharpest 
distinction I can find between Barth and Jenson, and it accounts for most all of the subsequent discrepancies 
between them; second, the distinction is not so sharp that we cannot decipher the unity between them.  If the key 
divergence of Barth and Jenson is a difference between Lutheran and Reformed theology, then the fundamental 
overlap between those theologies has been well documented over the years, not least by Barth himself.  See, CD 
I.2, 166-71, and T. F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, 30-37.  One way of looking at this thesis is an 
effort to take on board the Lutheran concern in Christology and God’s presence to the world, whilst avoiding the 
inevitable proximity to pantheism to which that theology leads us.  That has been noted time and again here: 
Jenson is not pantheistic or panentheistic, but he tends in that direction and is really only a step away.  I see that 
as a greater problem than Barth’s so-called “eternalizing,” though certainly the latter needs support.  Third, 
Calvinists recoiled at the Lutheran suggestion that the Logos was forever enclosed in a human body, if that 
meant to deny his eternal transcendence.  The central reason for this was that such a concept made him a 
prisoner of earthly time.  Once we dispense of such a boundary, as both Barth and Jenson do, then it becomes 
even more obvious how close these positions truly are. 
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to the Christian doctrine of God, atemporality, and to construct that doctrine in such a way 
that eternity and history have equal footing, Jenson proposes the concept of futurity. 
But there must be questions to pose to Jenson.  If the failure of the tradition’s 
immanent/economic is perceived to be the perpetuation of an atemporal deity it is unclear to 
me in this regard how futurity succeeds where the tradition has failed.  Both in some facet are 
“without time.”  The distinctive feature of Jenson’s version of futurity is intended to be a 
more explicit placement of God’s being within the historical process, without subjecting it to 
the power of that process.  To accomplish this, God must simply overcome whatever it is that 
controls us, in this case, the discontinuities of time, or, death.  Thus, God is transcendent 
because he overcomes history and immanent because he is within history.  There is nothing 
particularly innovative in this approach, as that recalls much of standard Christian theology 
through the centuries.709  Moreover, Jenson’s reading of Barth has him positing God as both 
disconnected from and connected to time; he is transcendent in that time is not lord over God 
and immanent in that he is temporal in Jesus.  In this strict sense, then, both theologians 
embrace some version of timelessness, viz. that time lacks sovereignty over God.  Neither 
theologian posits atemporality in that time has no part to play in God’s being, which is the 
real enemy that Jenson wants to defeat.  At its foundational core Jenson has not attempted 
anything with futurity that Barth did not attempt with his doctrine of time.  Thus, if Jenson’s 
purpose is to rid theology of a deity that is atemporal (in the sense that I intend), then he 
stands in the company of several others before him, in particular, Karl Barth.  Timelessness, 
as I have defined it, is simply God’s sovereignty over time’s discontinuities, and clearly it has 
never been Jenson’s purpose to overcome this.   
Furthermore—and more importantly—if his purpose is to overcome the tendency to 
eternalize the work of Christ which risks his real involvement in history, then Jenson has not 
accomplished this either, for he maintains a doctrine of God that is essentially above 
historical time.  Jenson may claim that Father, Son, and Spirit are more historically placed in 
his version, but they nevertheless transcend temporal barriers, and so in that sense, must be 
considered timeless.  For this reason, I would ask how it is that futurity reveals a temporality 
in the divine eternity that is something other than an eternal present (Barth) if God is, at the 
same time, not subject to the historical temporal process?  What kind of time is Jenson 
talking about that finds its place in God?  He states that theologians are compelled to embrace 
A-theory of time for our universe, yet if we are to understand Jenson correctly that this time 
                                                 
709 One only need survey the Christological controversies for evidence to this fact.   
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is also the time of God, then how could it be that the Spirit is in the future if, as on the A-
theory, the future does not yet exist?  “God cannot be causing [future states] (even 
tenselessly) to exist; otherwise, they would in fact exist at their respective times.”710  If A-
theory is not to be applied to God, then B-theory is the alternative, one that accommodates 
itself nicely to an atemporal perspective, which, in turn, undermines a key intention in 
Jenson’s doctrine of God. 
Perhaps eschatology would be the location of something novel from Jenson along 
these lines, for it is there that he explicitly claims deviation from the dialectical theologians of 
the early twentieth century, specifically naming Barth and Bultmann.711  Yet even there we 
are disappointed to discover he has reverted to a strange dialectic of his own: our time is A-
theory time and God is united to it, yet our time is created time and “differs from God’s time 
in that the extent of the specious present is uncontrollable, in that pieces of temporal reality 
can get away from us, in that the future can be merely threatening and the past fixed and 
dead.”712  This, according to Jenson, is due to our fallen nature—the very infirmity that Barth 
ascribes to our created time.  Hence, what can we expect in the parousia?  Will we continue 
in some version of A-series time or is there a change that is congruent with the transformation 
of our fallen state?  I must cite the entire paragraph: 
 
On the other side of Judgment no such incurvature is any longer possible, and blessed 
creatures’ union with the Son will make their time congruent with the Trinity’s time.  
Then the alienation of past and present from the future, which in this life constitutes 
sight’s difference from hearing, will not obtain.  Caught up in the infinitely swift 
triune perichoresis, the redeemed will see what they hear.  The word will precisely 
present them with their futures.713 
 
It appears that Jenson wants to posit a divine eternity that is temporal in that there is a 
distinction between past, present, and future, without capitulating to the gods of religion that 
strip God’s universal sovereignty, i.e. time is not absolute, but rather God is.  In the end he 
simply concludes that God has his own time that is analogous to ours, and what is the 
significance of this statement, if indeed it is something distinct from what Barth has said?  
This turns out to be the very simultaneity that Jenson eschews.  Jenson is envisioning some 
                                                 
710 William Lane Craig, “God and Real Time,” 336-37.  I am not commenting on whether theologians should 
embrace an A-series view of time of this world.  The question I am raising is whether Jenson is double-minded 
in that he recognizes the need for a process view of time, wants God to participate in that process, yet withdraws 
at the crucial uniting point.   
711 ST II, 309. 
712 Ibid., 345. 
713 Ibid., 346. 
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sort of temporal process in God that is actual, exclusively between the triune identities.  If that 
is so, then what kind of time is it and how does this temporal configuration make more sense 
of God’s relation to our time?  The latter is the more important of the questions, simply 
because this is the theological platform on which Jenson is attempting to stand.  To 
recapitulate: Jenson is objecting to Barth because of his tendency to perceive God’s 
revelation in Jesus as essentially a timeless and eternalized act that is at crucial points 
disconnected from the Jesus of our history, or, our time.  For Jenson, the correction needed is 
a trinitarian configuration of God and time that does not give priority to the eternal or to time, 
but equally embraces and unites both.714  Therefore, Jenson’s aim is to posit a theory of 
divine eternity that makes sense of what we know of God and what we know of our time.  
However, he never in fact explains how it is that God’s eternity transcends time and that 
same eternity is temporal like we are.  Instead, what he offers is a theory that God transcends 
the discontinuities of our time by overcoming them through the power of the Spirit in the 
future.  If futurity is the only explanation Jenson can offer, then that time is not our time, but 
a time unique to the triune identities.  Only Father, Son, and Spirit (if the theory is plausible) 
can exist asymmetrically in the temporal moments, yet be united as one God.  This is 
certainly not a temporal option open for those existing in A-series time, for even Jenson 
admits that we who are in A-series time lose time and being.  Moreover, apparently those 
divine temporal boundaries are regularly breached by the Spirit, if not all three persons, i.e. 
the Spirit transcends the boundaries of the future to encounter our present, making it also his 
present and the present of the Son.  If the future is present, then how is this configuration 
more closely identified with our time than Barth’s doctrine of time? 
 If we think in terms of A-series time where language is irreducibly tensed and time is 
a process, then there exists a barrier between the temporal moments, though, to be sure, 
existential identification of those barriers is impossible.  Nevertheless, for anything or anyone 
to overcome that barrier, then that necessarily obliterates the distinction between the temporal 
moments.  One cannot be in the present and the past and future at the same time.  If one is, 
then it is no longer past or future, but simply present.  If it is the future that overcomes the 
barrier of the present, then how could we possibly maintain a distinction between those two 
and avoid a collapse into a simple “present”?  What gives “future” power to encroach upon 
these barriers, if we are to seeking to maintain the distinction of the three? 
                                                 
714 For that is the Lutheran spirit of the communicatio idiomatum. 
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There are more questions regarding Jenson’s use of futurity.  First, his dichotomy 
between the present and future of the kingdom in the resurrection appearances is not 
convincing.  According to Jenson, at the resurrection what Jesus does in uniting time and 
eternity (and in that much he agrees with Barth) is to give a promise of a certain future, but 
not to indicate that the kingdom was present.  I agree with Jenson and all the evidence he 
offers for it that the promise of the kingdom is a future reality, as does Barth; but he offers no 
evidence that the reality of the kingdom is not also present.  The result is a disproportionate 
weight placed on future and a marginalizing of present and past.  Perhaps Jenson is correct 
that the tradition has focused on the divine past and present to the exclusion of the future and 
the twentieth century’s recovery of eschatology is a welcomed correction.  However, to place 
the kingdom in such an isolated position is to omit what is divinely ordained about the past 
and present.  God is there, too.  God, even on Jenson’s system, must be past and present, as 
well as future.715  Furthermore, if Spirit is future, then is Spirit determining and acting in a 
superior manner to Father and Son?  This would almost appear an inevitable conclusion and 
Jenson gives good reason to make it.716  Yet, because of his dependence upon Barth’s 
Christocentrism, at times Jenson accentuates the present to the exclusion of past and future, 
as in the Eucharist.717  How he resolves this is unclear, but what is clear to this writer is that 
Barth’s structure of divine pre-temporality, supra-temporality, and post-temporality maintains 
a cohesion whose theological judgment surpasses Jenson’s divine futurity.  In Barth divine 
being and temporality is not determined by any one of the temporal moments above the 
others, but rather “God is identical to this event in His past, His present and His future…”718   
To state the matter in a slightly different way, both Jenson and Barth must conceive of 
the divine eternity in a way that distinguishes God’s time and our time.  To do otherwise is 
either to conflate the two, necessarily implying that God faces the same discontinuities and 
uncertainty of the future that we do, or to retreat into an atemporal abstraction where it is well 
nigh impossible to conceive of a divine relation to the created order.  Based on God’s pure 
simultaneity that is absolute past, absolute present, and absolute future Barth maintains the 
unity of the divine eternity with the divine event—this pure simultaneity or pure duration 
(reine Dauer) being the key dissimilarity between God’s authentic temporality and our fallen 
temporality.  Jenson, on the other hand, places inordinate stress on the future as the 
                                                 
715 See the discussion in chapter five of this thesis on Barth’s historical survey of unbalanced treatment of the 
three temporal moments. 
716 GAG, 174. 
717 See chapter five of this thesis. 
718 Colwell, 245. 
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determination of divine being and temporality calling into question the role of the triune 
identities’ action in past and present.  Given these theological risks we would expect the 
upshot to be persuasive and unavoidable; however, the outcome, whilst appearing to be 
radically different than Barth, in reality hardly diverges from him.  Jenson has, at the same 
time, made a clear distinction between God’s time and our time, whilst positing a unity 
between God’s time and our time.  God is temporal in that Father is past, Son is present, and 
Spirit is future (the accent being on the latter).  However, this temporality is not disconnected 
(as in our time), but rather the disconnections are overcome (transcended) by the persons.  
That being the case, Jenson, just like Barth, has not conflated God’s time and our time, nor 
has he reverted to atemporal abstraction.  Instead, he has climbed and reached the peak of the 
same theological mountain Barth climbed, only he ascended from the other, more dangerous 
side.  He has not led us to a new theological position, but the same one by a much riskier 
route.  Both theologians keep divine temporality and human temporality in tension because at 
the same time God transcends the discontinuities of our time and acts within that time.  
Simply put, the question emerges as one centered on how to hold those two together.  Jenson 
chooses the tension of futurity and Father, Son, and Spirit in asymmetry along a temporal 
continuum.  Barth chooses the tension of divine authentic temporality as the ground of God’s 
historical, temporal revelatory event.  Futurity, then, does not accomplish anything that pure 
duration does not, but only leaves us with more theological questions and potential pitfalls.  
Moreover, as stated above, Barth saw the theological antidote to Jenson’s tendency toward 
“futurism” (theology as an eschatological principle) as the immanent Trinity and the divine 
pre-, supra-, and post-temporality. 
 Second, if God (more specifically, the Spirit) really is the future that overcomes 
time’s lack and not an abstract concept of future, then there is on some level necessarily a 
divine determination.  One of his greatest objections to Barth was that his scheme retains the 
God who in eternity past has mapped the course of events, thus rendering the historical event 
of Jesus as at best, secondary or at worst, irrelevant.  Additionally, there exists a deterministic 
flavor to such an arrangement.  The divine futurity, on the other hand, is intended to open the 
door to a spontaneous (as opposed to random or deterministic719) future where predestination 
is not something isolated to the past, but is something that happens now and will happen, by 
the action of the Spirit.  But the future, in this proposal, is not the abstract, emptiness with 
any and every open possibility, but rather only the possibility that the Spirit brings from the 
                                                 
719 See ST II, 38-45. 
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future to the present.  Therefore, Jenson’s doctrine of futurity is not an open-ended future that 
releases every human possibility at any moment.720  Rather than the past commissioning the 
present in terms of a settled plan, the future brings the divine will to the present.  Neither 
Barth nor Jenson believes that humans possess libertarian freedom that necessarily competes 
with God’s will at a zero-sum level, but rather, divine determination is to love and elect Jesus 
Christ and all that is other than him.721  This is God’s freedom; and our freedom is precisely 
grounded in this divine freedom and given by the Spirit.  For both of them God’s sovereignty 
is necessary if humans are to exercise true freedom.722  But if Barth’s tendency is toward the 
past, then Jenson’s is toward the future, both retaining the same elements of divine 
determination.  What Barth has done is constructed the possibility of future into his theology, 
however weak his stress of it.  I noted in chapter five that Jenson’s criticism of Barth 
regarding his doctrine of predestination as an exclusively past event could not be attributed to 
his “mutual exclusion of time and eternity,” as Jenson suggests.  On the contrary, Barth has 
integrated divine action and divine election with his doctrine of pure simultaneity, i.e. he acts 
in our past, present, and future in an absolute sense.  Divine action is not a past event that is 
only realized as history unfolds, but is absolute in each epoch.  In sum, both Jenson and Barth 
embrace God’s absolute sovereignty as the ground and source of our freedom, only from 
distinct points of view.  Second, Barth integrates the future into his divine ontology and our 
existence, whilst Jenson focuses almost exclusively on the future, and this unnecessarily so.   
 Has Barth failed so egregiously in developing the eschatological Trinity that he is 
guilty of perpetuating the perceived problem of God’s boundness to the past and present?  
The answer is yes and no.  Yes, in the sense that this is Barth’s tendency and he needs a 
stronger pneumatology; no, in the sense that he has built into his trinitarian theology a 
                                                 
720 Jenson’s view of human freedom is almost identical to Barth’s given his acceptance of supralapsarianism and 
the divine freedom to elect Christ and that which is other than himself.  To be sure, he believes his attempt is a 
more wide-ranging version of this freedom, but clearly he has not ventured into the realm of libertarian freedom.  
It is a version of voluntarism, double-agency, though not without its nuances.  For a concise statement on 
Jenson’s view of human freedom see his recent work On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003), 32-45.  For example, compare Jenson’s theology of 
freedom with that of Vincent Brümmer in, What Are We Doing When We Pray?  A Philosophical Inquiry 
(London: SCM Press, 1984) on the one hand, and Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1993) on the other.  He fits nicely into neither.  For more on Jenson’s view of freedom see, 
Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 118-36. 
721 “Perhaps we may summarize: The Father commands, ‘Let there be…’ The Son, who is himself this 
commanding word insofar as the Father hears therein his own intention, is given to be the meaning of the 
creature; within creation he is the creature as intended by and for God.  And the Spirit, as the intrusive liveliness 
of this exchange, intrudes also on the creature who is now an item in the exchange, so that the creature is not 
merely in fact and statically intended for God but lives for God” ST II, 27-28. 
722 For Barth’s part: “Where the Word and Spirit are at work unconditionally and irresistibly, the effect of their 
operation is not bondage but freedom.  We could almost put it this way, that the bondage which results from the 
operation of the Word and Spirit is itself true freedom.” CD III.3, 150. 
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priority of the future as overcoming the past.  Again, Barth’s discussion of supra- and post-
temporality included within it the idea that there is a non-illusory future that is yet to be 
realized, to which we are moving and genuinely await the parousia of Jesus Christ.  God is 
making all things new, turning all that is not-God away and bringing in his kingdom from the 
future.  The doctrine of the Trinity is an event whose trajectory is essentially eschatological in 
nature.  That is, God has not already in eternity accomplished all that is to be done regarding 
election, but the consummation, though Jesus as our future is already there, awaits us.  
Speaking of Barth’s eschatological Trinity Willis states: 
 
If it is true that from the concrete basis of his revelation it can be determined that the 
work, the revelation, of Jesus Christ is not yet concluded, that it is “‘still’ in process 
and ‘not yet’ completed,” and that it will not be until he comes again in a “universally 
perceived,” “evident Lordship” which will usher in a “new age” and a new heaven 
and new earth, then following the logic associated with the doctrine of the Trinity, 
God’s eternity is post-temporal and holds the future of all things and all times.723 
 
Therefore, Jenson has committed two faults here: first, he has overestimated Barth’s 
weakness as so tied to the past that it necessarily collapses into Augustine’s commitment to 
atemporality; second, his correction is not really a correction, but rather a mere retention of 
much in Barth, together with an introduction of further problems.  Futurity in Jenson has the 
consequence of overemphasizing the future to the detriment of the past and present, whilst at 
the same time failing to accomplish anything that Barth did not also accomplish.724  Barth is 
claiming that the future is overcoming the past and present.  God is this future and is 
perichoretically united with past and present, so that future does not overcome past and 
present in the divine being as it does in the created order.  Jenson also claims that the future is 
overcoming the past, though in structuring the divine persons on a horizontal, asymmetrical 
line, he introduces the problem of accounting for perichoretic unity in all divine action, 
despite the fact he does not wish for this consequence.   
 The result is that even though he correctly perceives the need for improvement in 
Barth Jenson fails to advance Barth’s theology, for he has attempted a correction of the 
wrong issue.  He knows there is a pneumatological problem in Barth, but apparently believes 
that alone will not solve the problem.  Rather, a radical reformulating of Trinity and 
                                                 
723 W. Waite Willis, Jr., Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity: The Trinitarian Theologies of Karl 
Barth and Jürgen Moltmann in Response to Protest Atheism (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 158-59. 
724 Willis’ comparison of Barth and Moltmann as answering atheism with a proper divine eschatology is 
instructive for our thesis.  That is, no matter the various nuances that the two theologians give to theology, their 
emphasis on divine futurity accomplishes the same goal.  The same can be said of Barth and Jenson.  See Willis, 
153-79. 
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dispensing of Barth’s understanding of immanent/economic is a better solution.  But this 
ignores the fact that Barth has built into this system an allowance for divine temporality that 
overcomes contingencies in a similar way that Jenson has a divine temporality that 
overcomes contingencies.  Jenson’s effort to improve upon Barth’s tendency to eternalize the 
revelation event has not resulted in a coherent assimilation of earthly time into that event.  In 
fact, his only legitimate argument put forward in this regard is identical to Barth’s—Jesus of 
Nazareth existed in our time and he is the Son.725  Instead of a radical alternative, then, he has 
maintained the essence of Barth’s theology, whilst rearranging a few elements that, at the end 
of the day, unnecessarily complicate it. 
In that connection one final critique is in order.  Jenson regards Barth’s 
immanent/economic/analogical scheme as having the tendency to eternalize and to disconnect 
our time from that of the divine event.  I outlined in detail in chapters two and three of this 
thesis how Jenson’s theology portrays the alternative tendency of pantheism.  Aside from the 
fact that, all things considered, Jenson does not actually unite the divine being and event any 
closer to our time than Barth does, there remains the sustained effort in his theology to do so.  
God is identified by and with the events of Exodus and Resurrection.  That is, God’s very 
being is united with these events.  I have argued that Jenson is not a pantheist and should not 
even be labeled a panentheist, but that the tendency toward it is there.  This is a greater 
problem than any we might encounter in Barth.726  I will attempt to unpack this a bit.   
One of Gunton’s criticisms of Jenson’s theology is that he does not allow for the 
personal space between God and humanity that enables freedom, chiefly due to a failure to 
carry through fully Barth’s weakness: a strong pneumatology (Here again we are struck by 
the overlap between Barth and Jenson—theological elements are shuffled and restated in 
different ways; or, to use Jenson’s metaphor of music, notes are moved around but the 
symphony is the same).  That is, freedom, both divine and human, finds its source in the 
encounter with personal otherness: the Spirit as Jesus’ other and our other who personally, 
rather than causally, brings us freedom and into relation with God.  Without a strong 
pneumatology God’s freedom becomes more difficult to decipher and the consequence, 
according to Gunton, is what we discover in Barth—the tendency to see time and eternity as 
opposed (I would reiterate that this does not have to be the case and with this renewed 
emphasis on pneumatology, then Barth’s essential doctrine of time and eternity is salvaged).  
                                                 
725 ST II, 27.  “The relation of the creature to the Creator, by which the creature is, holds in the present tense of 
created time without thereby being a timeless relation, in that on of the three, the Son, has his own individual 
entity within created time…” 
726 To the following see, Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 118-36. 
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Therefore, one of Gunton’s objections that we highlight here is that the personal role of the 
Spirit is lost with Jenson’s overemphasis on future,727 and the result is the chorus we 
repeatedly hear in Jenson’s work and the one critics often sing: the tip of the hat to 
pantheism. 
Jenson is not interested in pantheism, even though it is the ever-present trap to his 
Lutheran theology.  He indeed wants to provide the space between God and humanity that is 
necessary both for God’s freedom and for ours, hence, he addresses the problem (and even 
specifically Gunton’s challenge) in ST II, 46-48.  There Jenson admits that the language used 
for time inescapably carries with it language of space, i.e. there is a unity between the two 
concepts that nevertheless should not become confused.  Yet, Jenson has already defined 
creation as “time,” God’s “room” (space) in his life for us.  So, for Jenson, the space or 
distance between God and us is the difference between God’s time and our time.  Thus, 
Jenson, like Barth, makes a distinction between the divine eternity (God’s time) and our 
time—and the difference is absolute because the difference between Creator and creature is 
absolute.  “Moreover, we now also see why we had to say that time was the ‘room’ God 
made for us in his life: did not God set us other than himself, did he not make space between 
him and us, all time would just be his time and there would be no ‘accommodation’ in 
him.”728  Of course, depending on one’s theology the reverse could be true: all time would be 
our time.  But in order to maintain the space necessary to preserve both our freedom and 
God’s a clear distinction in time is needed.  Again, Jenson: “God is his own place.”729  We 
could say, “God is his own time,”730 though certainly not absent from ours. 
The criticism Gunton has made is that due to a weak pneumatology Jenson has risked 
swallowing otherness and freedom with immanence, but his response in ST II does not 
mention the Spirit, but rather is limited to a discussion of space.  Moreover, Jenson’s 
attempted clarification seems rather reminiscent of Barth’s distinction of immanent and 
economic—the very thing, interestingly enough, that Gunton suggests as a remedy to 
Jenson’s lack.731  In essence, we have traced Jenson’s theology from its earliest work732 to its 
very latest733 and we have heard him repeatedly insist upon immanence between God and the 
created order.  Here, however, is evidence that I believe calls nearly everything into question: 
                                                 
727 Ibid., 133. 
728 ST II, 48. 
729 Ibid. 
730 And he has in ST I, 218. 
731 Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 134. 
732 Alpha and Omega 
733 On Thinking the Human 
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when faced with the peril of losing divine and human freedom by means of an overemphasis 
on immanence, Jenson’s solution is almost identical to Barth’s.  Time and space are sharply 
differentiated between God and his creation, though he is not absent from it.  This is precisely 
Barth’s conclusion on the matter, and the one that he was trying to attend to with 
immanent/economic and the analogia fidei.  The irony of it all is that both theologians walk 





 From Israel’s earliest recorded history the most significant factor in her existence was 
the identity of her God and his identification with them.  It is not an overstatement to say that 
the entire Christian faith hinges upon God’s identity and his presence to his people, and the 
greater part of the tradition has been, in one fashion or another, a search for articulating that 
relationship in terms that are faithful to God’s self-revelation.  The nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have fostered—following the rise of modernity—a probing question pertaining to 
this relationship, one of God and time.  This thesis has attempted two specific contributions 
to the current debate: 1) that the disciplines of philosophy and science, while necessary and 
profitable, must, for the Christian, be controlled or scrutinized with theology.  A study of God 
and time whose guiding principle is something other than God’s self-revelation in Jesus runs 
the risk of superimposing the natural upon the supernatural and arriving at dogmatic “God 
is…” statements by means other than God himself; 2) this thesis has explored two theological 
proposals concerning the nature of God’s eternity and our time with the intention of moving 
Christian theology toward a more robust doctrine of God’s relation to the created order—
what we often refer to as providence.  I have argued that Barth and Jenson share much more 
in common than Jenson would have us believe; that Barth has laid an advantageous 
foundation for our understanding of time and eternity; and that both Barth and Jenson 
maintain problematic elements that theology must address.   
 Chief among these problems is that Barth retains enough platonic tendencies from his 
Römerbrief period to call into question whether he indeed has dispensed with atemporality.  
Others have identified the culprit as simultaneity, i.e. time has no past, present, and future but 
is simply an eternal present.  I have confirmed that this does appear to be the case in Barth, 
but that notwithstanding, his theology is broad and deep enough for improvements that could 
mitigate this tendency.734  Such improvements surround Barth’s trinitarian formulation, 
specifically the ontology of the Holy Spirit in the God-world relation.  If the Spirit is the one 
who brings life and time to us and in so doing unites us to the divine life (albeit presently in 
an incomplete way), then our time and God’s time are not opposed, but the former is a gift of 
the latter and will be fully healed in the eschaton.  That Jenson’s intended corrections of 
Barth center on the Spirit’s role and activity within and outwith the Trinity corroborate this 
                                                 
734 Again, it is a tendency, not a crippling malady for his theology as a whole. 
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point.  The key feature to bear in mind here is that because of the Spirit the Father and Son 
have a dynamic life that is historical in the sense that God moves, works, did “this” for Israel 
in the past, and will do “that” for us in the future.  God has a history.  Yet, in so doing God 
does not lose being to the past or anticipate something outside himself since he is the giver of 
all life and time.  This is very different than viewing God as a monad who stands over against 
a dynamic world.  God is trinitarian/dynamic in himself; thus, he is able to enter into a 
dynamic relation with the world.  Indeed, because God is in dynamic relation with himself 
and as a dynamic being he is in relation with the world, then it follows for the Christian 
theologian to conclude that we must be living in a dynamic world.  That is, there is real 
movement as opposed to static simultaneity.  Granted, this does not solve all the cognitive 
dissonance that one faces when contemplating the nature of our time, but I must simply refer 
the reader back to those cited in this thesis who have extensively argued for a dynamic view 
of time.  I believe they are correct, not only because of the physical or philosophical reasons 
given, but because theologically this is God’s nature.   
 Barth lays a solid and appropriate foundation for Christian theology, one that rejects 
atemporality yet retains God as sovereign Lord over creation.  He is aiming for the version of 
timelessness I have defined and indeed argued for in this thesis.  Jenson recognizes Barth’s 
weaknesses, but offers a rather strange alternative that conceives of Father, Son, and Spirit 
each occupying one of the three temporal moments—past, present, and future, with the accent 
being on Spirit and future.  As I have sought at length to demonstrate Jenson intends the same 
as Barth intends: God is temporal, but sovereign over our temporality.  Yet by introducing 
this configuration of the hypostases, theology is at risk of overemphasizing the future to the 
detriment of past and present, which in turn prompts reservations regarding God’s relation to 
the world in general.  That is, what are we to say regarding the presence of the Son and the 
Father to the world?  Are they with us, too, or is it only the Spirit with whom we fellowship?  
Clearly Jenson does not believe this, nor does he indicate it is even an option for theology, 
yet these are the sort of problems that may arise from his formulation—a strange antidote to 
Barth’s pneumatology. 
 
 Where exactly does this leave the current debate on time and eternity, and has this 
thesis done anything to move it along in a useful direction?  The discussion on the nature of 
our time should and will continue, but it will inevitably yield only partial results.  Even if the 
future brings some overarching paradigmatic revolution, such as STR, it does not follow that 
all our questions regarding the nature of time and especially God’s relationship to it are 
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thereby answered.  Thus, treating this shifting source as the core of the time-eternity question 
hardly seems appropriate.  More suitable is that we follow Barth and Jenson who teach us 
that time-eternity is an issue of theology proper, which then must listen to and dialogue with 
the natural sciences.  God does reveal himself and if we are to know anything about him and 
about our world, we must hearken to his self-revelation.  The continuing question that 
Christian theology must address is exactly how God is dynamic in himself and how that 
dynamic life participates in our world.   
The correlate to this is the areas of theology that flow from trinitarianism, e.g. 
anthropology (in particular, freedom), salvation, providence, eschatology, and prayer.  By 
further developing a trinitarian theology of time and eternity I believe we make headway 
toward more coherent dogmatics.  There are signs that the current theological climate holds 
promise, for most are not content to allow paradox to dominate Christianity’s core claims.  
This is not to say that mystery is eradicated, for that must remain a central feature of the faith, 
and I am not so naïve as to think that if we can just answer the time/eternity question, then all 
other problems in theology will be solved.  I am merely suggesting that issues such as 
freedom, Christology, sacraments, etc. are illumined and improved with a robust doctrine of 
time and eternity that articulates God’s dynamic nature and his involvement with our 
dynamic world.  I have done little in the way of fleshing out the implications for them; 
nevertheless, this thesis has accomplished its purpose in that it has demonstrated that the 
question of time and eternity is vital for theology’s understanding of God and the created 
order, and that the way forward is by means of an improved trinitarian theology that 
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